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PREFACE 
Equal Pay Day reminds us annually of the sizable gender pay gap, and there still appears to 
be a glass ceiling for women, leaving many company boards completely in the hands of 
men. The Norwegian government responded by imposing a quota of 40 percent women on 
boards as early as 2006. Some governments have adopted similar initiatives, and the politi-
cal agenda in most industrialized countries includes equal opportunities. 
However, other “gender gaps” get much less attention in the media and the public, though 
they may actually help explain the less favorable labor market success among women. In 
particular, women may be disadvantaged in terms of their access to training opportunities. 
Further training, in particular, paves the way for each individual to update skills and 
knowledge. Therefore, a person’s chances to be promoted to higher rungs of the corporate 
ladder as well as income opportunities may hinge on continuing training. That is particular-
ly true in a world with strong skill atrophy and the need for lifelong learning. It is therefore 
surprising that differences between men and women in terms of their access to continuing 
training are not much studied and not much debated in public. 
In her dissertation, Caroline Wozny tackles this issue. She studies the continuing training 
gap for women in Europe and explores institutional reasons for the observed gap. Caro’s 
contribution is threefold.  
First, she is among the first researchers analyzing micro data in the 2005-8 Adult Educa-
tion Survey for 22 European countries, and definitely the first researcher computing multi-
level regressions. She thereby addresses possible gender training gaps for a broad range of 
economies and avoids false generalizations that often result from single-country studies.  
Second, she argues – and finds supporting empirical evidence – that there is a complex 
interaction between educational attainment, gender, and access to further training. As a 
result, women with a degree have better access to continuing training than comparable men 
but women without a degree have worse access to continuing training than comparable 
men. Conclusions in the literature according to which the gender training gap has disap-
peared are therefore premature.  
As a third contribution, Caroline Wozny explores institutional factors that account for the 
cross-country differences. Borrowing from the varieties-of-capitalism approach, she is able 
to show that the system of initial education and training is especially important. In coun-
tries with a strong emphasis on vocational training (rather than tertiary education at univer-
sities), women without a university degree are particularly disadvantaged in terms of ac-
cess to continuing training.  
It is a daunting task to combine in one coherent piece of work not only micro and macro 
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data but also theoretical arguments relating to individual behavior and to country systems. 
But Caro has managed to do just that. We need more of such multilevel, cross-country 
work among scholars in business and economics, work that helps us to understand our 
globalizing world and to build resilient institutions. I was pleased to see Caro go for that 
challenge, and it was fun to see her argument grow and unfold. The result is an intriguing 
book for those interested in comparative institutional analyses, equal opportunities, and the 
economics of training. 
 
 
Prof. Dr. Martin Schneider    Paderborn, December 2014 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Continuous investments in human capital are crucial for workers’ productivity and labour 
market success, and female disadvantages in continuous training are discussed as being 
one reason for the persistent gender inequalities in the labour market. However, the exist-
ence of such gender training gap is not clearly supported by empirical literature. The aim 
of this study is to shed light on the determinants of the gender training gap and explain 
under which conditions a female training disadvantage occurs. Human capital and discrim-
ination theory, traditionally used in economics to predict training differences between men 
and women, are therefore complemented by two additional approaches. The first approach, 
based on Lazear & Rosen (1990), predicts women of high ability (approximated by high 
education) not to be disadvantaged in terms of training, while all other women should have 
a training disadvantage compared to similar men. The second approach, based on work by 
Estévez-Abe (2005; 2006; 2009; 2012), assumes the gender training gap to depend on the 
human capital focus of a country: In countries with a focus on specific human capital, 
which is reflected in the labour market and the educational system, women have a training 
disadvantage compared to men. This is because specific human capital is at odds with 
women’s high flexibility needs. Institutional support is thus necessary to encourage em-
ployees and employers to invest in female human capital. 
To test the hypotheses derived on these theoretical bases, individual training data from the 
first wave of the Adult Education Survey covering 22 European countries are complement-
ed by macro data referring to the labour market, the educational system and the support for 
women. The data is scrutinized in three analytical steps. First, individual data is used to run 
country regressions. Second, the aggregated training differences between men and women 
at different educational levels are regressed on macro-level variables. This is a preparatory 
to a multilevel analysis which is then performed. The analysis reveals that while there is a 
training disadvantage for women without a university degree, women with university edu-
cation are not disadvantaged. This indicates that theoretical arguments by Lazear & Rosen 
(1990) should be taken into account when analysing the gender training gap and that em-
pirical analyses that do not differentiate between women of different education may lead to 
biased conclusions concerning the training gap. This is because human capital and discrim-
ination theory rationales appear to be valid for the prediction of gender differences among 
employees of lower education but not among employees of higher education. Further, the 
analyses find that gender differences in training vary significantly across the analysed 
countries. For highly educated employees, the cross-national differences can be almost 
entirely explained by characteristics of the labour market (mean tenure and union density) 
and support for women (the provision of childcare and child benefits), while the initial 
vocational educational system explains part of the gender differences among lower educat-
ed employees. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Relevance 
The unequal distribution of employment opportunities and socioeconomic rewards be-
tween men and women is widely recognized and one of the main issues in the on-going 
inequality debate (see e.g. Charles, 2005 or Gornick, 1999). Especially phenomena such as 
the gender pay gap or the so called “glass ceiling” effect (meaning that women do not 
reach the top levels in companies’ hierarchies) are frequently discussed in politics and eco-
nomic literature (European Commission, 2011; Arulampalam, Alison L. Booth, & Bryan, 
2007). In the discourse of potential causes of such gender inequalities in labour market 
outcomes, it has been argued that continuous training is one important explanatory factor 
(Evertsson, 2004; Mazur, 2001; Tomaskovic-Devey & Skaggs, 2002). The idea is that 
women have fewer opportunities to participate in continuous training than men because 
they are more likely to be affected by career interruptions. These interruptions reduce the 
return on investments in women’s human capital (Grönlund, 2012). 
Since human capital must be constantly updated to fulfil the requirements of today’s mar-
kets, continuous training has gained in importance vis-à-vis initial education and training 
(O’Mahony, 2012). From an employee’s point of view, continuous training is important to 
maintain employability: There is an increasing risk of skill obsolescence due to technologi-
cal innovations. The acquisition of state of the art knowledge is often crucial for securing 
the current job or for increasing ones market attractiveness for alternative employers (Ok 
& Tergeist, 2003). In addition, certain skills are more efficiently learned at the workplace 
than at school. Not surprisingly, empirical studies find continuous training to be strongly 
connected with career-perspectives as well as wage premiums (Görlitz, 2011; Melero, 
2010). As a result, continuous investments in human capital are crucial for workers’ 
productivity and labour market success. 
From the point of view of standard economic theory, women are assumed to take part in 
less company training due to higher levels of family responsibilities, more frequent em-
ployment interruptions and discriminatory employer practices (Becker, 1985; Estévez-Abe, 
2005). While such a training gap might explain part of the observed gender differences in 
occupational success, empirical studies on the relationship between gender and training 
lead to heterogeneous results: Many authors find men to train more than women; others do 
not find any effect or even find women to train more than men (for an overview of studies 
on gender and training see Table 18 in the Appendix). In order to obtain a comprehensive 
picture of the training gap between men and women, it is necessary to understand the rea-
sons for this phenomenon. The heterogeneous results might hint at hitherto unrecognized 
interactions of gender with other factors in its effect on training.  
On the one hand, such interactions could occur between gender and other characteristics of 
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the individual. Insights by Lazear & Rosen (1990), Light & Ureta (1990) and Royalty 
(1998) indicate that the assumptions made by human capital theory, like comparatively 
lower female labour market attachment, may not be equally valid for women of different 
ability levels or educational backgrounds. Lazear’s & Rosen’s (1990) work implies that the 
gender training gap may differ for employees of different ability and that highly able wom-
en may not be disadvantaged compared to equally qualified men while other women 
should be disadvantaged. The rationale is the following: As human capital theory suggests, 
average women usually have a lower labour market attachment than men due to higher 
female abilities in non-market activities such as child rearing. However, in contrast to hu-
man capital theory, the authors argue that for women of high ability, non-market returns 
are less likely to exceed market returns and that their labour market attachment should not 
differ from men’s attachment. The risk of losing investments in female human capital thus 
decreases with rising female ability. Employers may therefore invest less in human capital 
of average women while they should treat high ability women equally to men.  
While an employee’s ability is usually difficult to observe, education can serve as a proxy 
for ability (Becker, 1962). Light & Ureta (1990) find labour market attachment to rise with 
education. Empirical results by Royalty (1998) suggest that while lower educated women 
show higher turnover rates than lower educated men, turnover of highly educated women 
is not higher than turnover of equally qualified men. Consequently, Lazear’s  & Rosen’s 
(1990) assumption of differing labour market attachments of women depending on their 
ability seem to be more realistic than the assumptions made by classical human capital 
theory, which treats women as a homogeneous group in terms of labour market attachment. 
Including Lazear’s & Rosen’s (1990) rationales in the analysis of continuous training may 
therefore provide interesting insights in the gender training gap as it suggests higher train-
ing inequality among the lower educated than among the higher educated. 
On the other hand, work by Estévez-Abe, Iversen, & Soskice (2001) and Estévez-Abe 
(2005; 2006; 2009; 2012) indicates that gender inequality may be influenced by national 
institutions. Most importantly, institutions supporting specific human capital could be det-
rimental to women’s human capital development. The reason is that due to higher family 
responsibilities, female employees have higher flexibility needs than male employees and 
these flexibility needs are at odds with the rather inflexible specific skills. Estévez-Abe et 
al. (2001) point out that women need more institutional support to invest in specific human 
capital. The provision of childcare is especially crucial at that point. It serves to minimize 
the investment risk for employees and employers as it enables mothers to return to their job 
early after childbirth. Based on Estévez-Abe et al.’s (2001) rationales it is arguable that the 
gender effect on training interacts with national institutions.  
As continuous training is highly important for an employee’s labour market success but 
seems to be unequally distributed between men and women, this study focuses on training 
differences between men and women. Traditional economic theory may not be adequate 
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for explaining gender differences in training participation as it leaves out potentially im-
portant gender interactions at the individual and at the institutional level. Considering 
complementary approaches that point to interactions between gender and ability (approxi-
mated by previous education) as well as national institutions may offer some explanation 
for the heterogeneous empirical results on the gender training gap. Therefore, this study 
examines how training probability differs between men and women and in which way gen-
der effects on training differ depending on previous education and institutional characteris-
tics of a country.  
1.2 Research gap 
This study addresses three research gaps in the field of training: First, there is no quantita-
tive study that explains differences in the gender training gap found in the empirical litera-
ture. Second, there is no comprehensive model of continuous training that identifies na-
tional institutions and describes their predicted effects on training. Third, there is no empir-
ical study that considers individual and institutional determinants of training participation 
in a multilevel analysis of cross-national data. This subsection discusses the three research 
gaps in greater detail. 
Heterogeneous results on the gender training gap are not explained. 
Traditional economic rationales consistently indicate a female training disadvantage. Alt-
hough empirical studies on the relationship between gender and training lead to heteroge-
neous results, to my best knowledge, there has been no meta-analysis that explains these 
differences in empirical results. Thus, the reasons for these discrepancies remain unclear. 
While Lazear’s & Rosen’s (1990) assumptions on the differences in labour market attach-
ment among women found some empirical support (Light & Ureta, 1990; Royalty, 1998), 
the implications of their rationales for training participation have not been empirically test-
ed yet and there is no study that scrutinizes the gender training gap differentiating between 
women of higher and lower education.  
Furthermore, international comparisons on training find that the gender training gap differs 
between countries (e.g. Brunello, 2004; Arulampalam, Booth, & Bryan, 2004; Dieckhoff & 
Steiber, 2011). This supports theoretical arguments by Estévez-Abe et al. (2001) who 
claim that national institutions have differing impacts on the human capital development of 
men and women. However, to my best knowledge, until now, there has been no quantita-
tive study that analyses the institutional determinants of the gender gap in continuous train-
ing.  
Hence, although it is conceivable that gender interacts with other training determinants at 
the individual and the institutional level which may finally explain part of the inconsistent 
empirical results regarding the gender training gap, until now, there has been no empirical 
test of these assumptions.  
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There is no common framework for institutional determinants of training.   
To identify the national institutions that interact with gender determining training partici-
pation, it would be useful to refer to an established framework on institutional determinants 
of training, narrow it down to the ones that theoretically may have differing impacts on 
men and women and then test their effects on men and women in an empirical model. Un-
fortunately there is no consensus on a common comprehensive framework to assess the 
impact of institutions on continuous training, although theoretical work suggests that not 
only individual determinants but also national institutions can have an impact on training 
participation by providing incentives for employers and employees to invest in training. 
One reason seems to be that continuous training is studied by different disciplines. Skill 
formation is obviously an important aspect of labour market studies but also of educational 
studies. Traditionally, these fields focus on different institutions when developing explana-
tory models (Sung, Turbin, & Ashton, 2000). Labour market theories mainly focus on in-
stitutions like minimum wages or unions that can lead to wage compression or labour mar-
ket mobility which may influence the payback horizon for human capital investments (e.g. 
Acemoglu & Pischke, 1999b; Acemoglu & Pischke, 1999a; Stevens, 1996). Educational 
studies, in turn, usually point out the importance of the initial educational system for con-
tinuous training (e.g. Brockmann, Clarke, & Winch, 2008; Nelson, 2010).  
Recently, there have been some interdisciplinary approaches combining different perspec-
tives of human capital development. Sung et al. (2000), for example, develop a framework 
on skill formation including the state with its education and training systems, companies as 
well as workers and labour organizations. Along these spheres they describe four alterna-
tive models of skill development and apply them to different countries. However, these 
models are defined by a number of rather specific cultural and institutional characteristics 
and are difficult to apply to all countries that may be of interest
1
. Moreover, the framework 
is concerned with skill formation in general which leads to a focus on initial training sys-
tems and a rather marginal consideration of continuous training. Based on a literature re-
view, Boeren, Nicaise, & Baert (2010) propose an integrated model of potentially relevant 
micro, meso and macro determinants of continuous training
2
. On the macro-level, they 
identify the economic context, the welfare system, the labour market as well as the initial 
education and skill formation system as crucial for individuals’ training behaviour. How-
ever, this rather broad model neither defines the specific institutional characteristics that 
determine the impact, nor the direction of the expected effects of the institutions. Ultimate-
ly, there is no commonly agreed framework for analysing the institutional determinants of 
continuous training, although many authors agree on the importance of the educational 
system as well as the labour market. Thus, it is not surprising that empirical studies on in-
                                                 
1
 Chapter 2.2.2.4 will discuss the issue of country classifications in more detail.   
2
 The authors use the term “adult education” but basically refer to the same contexts termed “continuous 
training” in this study. 
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ternational comparisons in training rather follow an explorative approach. 
Cross-country studies on training do not take a multilevel perspective.  
For the lack of comparable cross-country data, international comparisons on training are 
often qualitative or based on case studies (e.g. Brockmann et al., 2008; Finegold, Wagner, 
& Mason, 2000; Hashimoto, 1994; Ichniowski & Shaw, 1999). Only recently, as compara-
ble data is becoming available, has there been an increasing number of quantitative studies 
comparing training participation in different countries. However, studies usually only focus 
either on individual or institutional determinants of training. 
One of the first international comparisons on training including more than three countries 
is provided by Arulampalam et al. (2004) and analyses data of the European Household 
Panel for ten countries. The authors find significant differences in national training practic-
es. More specifically, their results suggest gender and previous education to have differing 
effects across countries. However, the aim of their study is to detect differences rather than 
to explain them and the authors do not systematically trace their observations back to cer-
tain country characteristics. Macro-level variables are thus not considered in this study. 
Dieckhoff & Steiber (2011) analyse gender effects on training in 23 European countries. 
The authors find a smaller gender training gap in Nordic countries than in the rest of Eu-
rope. They explain this result with unique Scandinavian characteristics like the combina-
tion of high female labour market participation and a modern gender culture. However, 
they do not explicitly measure these institutions but include a dummy for Nordic countries 
in their models. Consequently, the documented effects cannot be clearly ascribed to partic-
ular national characteristics.  
Other studies focus on country variables to explain training differences between groups. 
Beck, Kabst, & Walgenbach (2009), using organisational data from 14 countries, analyse 
training inequalities between employees of different hierarchical levels and trace cross-
country differences back to differences in the national context. They find that training is 
distributed differently across hierarchical levels depending on institutional features of the 
vocational education and training system. However, they use company data and do not 
account for individual determinants of training. Two studies by Roosmaa & Saar (2010; 
2012) are dedicated to training differences as well. Based on aggregated data from 23 
countries, they explain differences in training participation between low-skilled blue collar 
workers and high-skilled white collar workers by country characteristics. In their 2010 
study, they find that inequalities between high- and low-skilled workers can be explained 
by the educational system, the skill-level in a country as well as trade unions and other 
labour market characteristics. In Roosmaa & Saar (2012), the authors link their analysis 
more closely to the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) literature, but essentially confirm the 
results of their earlier study. Nonetheless, due to their data structure, neither Beck et al. 
(2009) nor Roosmaa & Saar (2010; 2012) include micro-level variables in their analyses 
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and thus do not control for individual determinants on training and their possible interac-
tions. 
Very few studies consider both macro and micro variables to explain training differences. 
Brunello (2004) is one of the authors including country and individual determinants simul-
taneously. Using data on training participation from the European Household Panel for 13 
European countries, he analyses the effects of the educational system and the labour mar-
ket characteristics on training participation while controlling for individual characteristics. 
Here, he does not only consider direct institutional effects but also indirect ones. His re-
sults indicate that features of the educational system as well as the labour market have a 
significant direct impact on individuals’ training participation. Additionally, he finds the 
structure of the educational system to have differing effects on individuals of different ed-
ucational backgrounds. Another example including micro and macro data is the work by 
Bassanini, Booth, Brunello, De Paola, & Leuven (2007). Based on different data sources, 
the authors analyse individual and institutional determinants of training in 13 European 
countries. On the individual level, they find women to train more than men and training to 
increase with education. On the macro-level, they find training to vary depending on char-
acteristics of the schooling system as well as labour market institutions. Neither Brunello 
(2004) nor Bassanini et al. (2007) are primarily interested in the multilevel structure of 
data. Hence, instead of applying a multilevel modelling approach, both use adjusted stand-
ard errors to take the different levels of data into account. Insights on the interplay of de-
terminants on different levels are therefore limited.
3
 
To my best knowledge, the only cross-country study on training which choses a multilevel 
approach is the one by Edlund & Grönlund (2008). The authors study the effect of labour 
market coordination on human capital by analysing the individuals’ stock of firm-specific 
skills in different countries. Their results indicate that employees’ firm-specific skills differ 
depending on the labour market regime of a country and that men have higher levels of 
firm-specific skills than women. However, as their focus is on the individuals’ stock of 
specific human capital, they do not analyse actual training participation but the amount of 
training on-the-job necessary for a hypothetically newly hired employee. As this measure 
refers to a rather particular part of training – which is not only essentially firm-specific but 
also largely introductory – results cannot be easily transferred to training participation in 
general. 
In summary, the existing empirical studies mostly either focus on the individual or on the 
institutional determinants of training. The few studies including both either do not model 
the underlying data structure as a multilevel one or do not measure training participation 
directly. 
                                                 
3
 A more detailed discussion of the advantages of the multilevel approach follows in Chapter 3.2. 
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This study addresses these three research gaps.  
The principal aim of this study is to make a contribution to closing the research gap on the 
determinants of the gender training gap. To achieve this goal, a multilevel model on con-
tinuous training participation will be developed and empirically tested, this way contrib-
uting to narrow the other two research gaps. Hence, this study also adds to the slowly 
growing field of international comparisons on training and complements it.  
Overall, this study gives new insights in the gender training gap, disintegrating the gender 
effects on employees by previous education. It shows that women without university edu-
cation are disadvantaged in terms of training whereas women with university education are 
not. Thereby, it also contributes to the theoretical framework for analysing the gender 
training gap as it shows that model assumptions by Lazear & Rosen (1990), predicting 
different human capital investments in different groups of women, should be taken into 
account when looking at gender differences in training. However, these gender training 
gaps vary across countries. Using a multilevel approach, this study is able to shed light on 
the determinants of these variations. It can be shown that for highly educated employees, 
country differences in the gender training gap can be almost entirely explained by country 
differences in mean tenure, levels of childcare and generosity of child benefits. Cross-
country differences among employees without university education, in turn, can be partly 
explained by differences in the importance of the initial vocational system.   
1.3 Structure 
Following the introduction, the underlying theoretical concepts of this study will be out-
lined in Chapter 2. Here, in a first step, standard economic approaches explaining the rela-
tionship between gender and training will be discussed. Principally, these are human capi-
tal theory and discrimination theories. These theories consistently predict a female training 
disadvantage. However, empirical studies reviewed in section 2.1.3 show heterogeneous 
results: While many studies confirm a male training advantage, others do not find any gen-
der differences or even a female training advantage. These results indicate that classical 
economic approaches are not able to predict the gender training gap in an adequate way. 
Therefore, section 2.2 presents two additional approaches that may help to explain gender 
differences in continuous training. The first is based on theoretical reasoning by Lazear & 
Rosen (1990) and suggests that average women take less training than men while highly 
educated women are not disadvantaged compared to equally qualified men. Empirical evi-
dence for the underlying assumptions is provided. The second approach is mainly based on 
work by Estévez-Abe (2005; 2006; 2009; 2012) who argues that gender differences are 
exacerbated in countries whose institutions focus on specific human capital. Here, three 
sets of institutions are identified that may have an impact on the gender training gap: the 
labour market, the educational system and support for women. For these three sets, the 
expected impact on training participation of men and women is discussed on a theoretical 
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basis before empirical evidence on these relationships is stated. The chapter closes with a 
synthesis of the theoretical approaches and the deduction of six main hypotheses.  
In Chapter 3, the data and the applied method are presented. As this study assumes indi-
vidual as well as institutional variables to have an impact on the gender training gap, the 
empirical analysis is based on micro as well as on macro data. The micro data comes from 
the first wave of the Adult Education Survey (AES) while the macro data originates from 
different public sources. Under section 3.1, the AES is presented and the main individual 
and institutional variables are introduced. The applied method is described in detail in sec-
tion 3.2. The analysis follows three basic steps: First, individual data is analysed by coun-
try. Second, macro-level regressions are conducted to explain the gender training gap by 
national institutions. Third, micro and macro variables are combined in multilevel models. 
The function of the single steps and the advantages of the multilevel approach are high-
lighted in that section.  
The results of the empirical analysis are presented and discussed in Chapter 4. First, the 
descriptive statistics provide an overview of the data basis and its structure. After that, logit 
regressions with the individual data are run for each of the 22 countries included in the data 
set. Initially, models do not distinguish between highly educated and other women. Here, 
the gender training gap does not show a clear pattern of male or female advantage. When a 
distinction by education is finally made, results confirm differences in the gender training 
gap depending on the educational background: In most countries, women without a univer-
sity degree have a training disadvantage compared to men while women with university 
degree do not. Building on these results, the training differences between men and women 
are taken as outcome for macro-level analyses in section 4.3. The countries’ gender train-
ing gaps among all employees and among those with and without university education are 
regressed on national institutions characterizing the labour market, the educational system 
and the support for women. This preliminary analysis reveals that different institutions are 
relevant for explaining the gender training gap among employees of different educational 
backgrounds. Section 4.4 describes the development of the multilevel models for all em-
ployees before repeating this process for employees with university education and employ-
ees without university education separately. Three different models, integrating individual 
as well as institutional variables simultaneously, confirm that different institutional settings 
help to explain the cross-country differences in the gender training gap at different educa-
tional levels.  
Section 4.5 closes the chapter by discussing the implications of the results for the proposed 
hypotheses. The study concludes with a summary of the main results in Chapter 5. Its limi-
tations as well as some suggestions for further research are outlined before reflecting the 
implications of this study for research and policy-making. 
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2 THE GENDER TRAINING GAP 
Since the importance of continuous training for labour market success is widely recognised 
(see e.g. Melero, 2010), numerous studies have been dedicated to answer the question: 
Why are there considerable differences in training participation of different people? In this 
context, one of the most frequently analysed determinants of training participation is gen-
der (see Mure, 2007:15-23). The aim of this section is to discuss socio-economic theories 
as well as empirical findings referring to the determinants of the gender gap in continuous 
training. Thereby, this study takes an educational economic perspective on continuous 
training. In line with previous research, continuous training is defined as adult training that 
is not part of an initial formal education system and is therefore characterised as non-
formal (see e.g. Arulampalam et al., 2004; Dieckhoff & Steiber, 2011). The participation in 
these training settings is assumed to lead to the formation of human capital in terms of 
skills.  
This chapter is structured as follows: First, traditional economic theories are reviewed. 
However, as empirical evidence is not quite in line with these classical explanations, addi-
tional approaches, suggesting different gender training gaps among employees of differing 
ability levels as well as across different institutional settings, are taken into account. Based 
on that, a multilevel framework is developed which leads to the deduction of the hypothe-
ses to be tested in the empirical section. 
2.1 The gender training gap in standard economics 
This section reviews standard economic arguments in explaining the gender training gap. 
Most prominently, this is human capital theory which is complemented by theories of taste 
and statistical discrimination. After that, empirical findings on the gender training gap are 
summarized. While theoretical arguments point to a clear training advantage of men over 
women, empirical findings are far from homogeneous in this aspect. 
2.1.1 Men and women have different preferences 
Human capital theory points out the importance of education and training in determining 
employees’ productivity and ultimately their labour market outcomes. Differences in wag-
es or employment can therefore be justified by differences in human capital investments 
(Becker, 1962; Mincer, 1958; Landes, 1977). The theory also provides explanations for 
differences in human capital investments in men and women. Here, they focus on differing 
investment rationales of male and female workers due to higher family responsibilities of 
women.  
The different payback horizons for men and women have long been discussed by human 
capital theorists. As married mothers usually spend considerable time outside the labour 
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market, they are confronted with shorter time horizons for recovering training investments. 
Compared to men, this provides them with lower incentives to invest in training. And even 
if they are planning to return to the labour market after childbirth, the skills they acquired 
previous to childbirth may have depreciated at the time returning to the labour market 
(Mincer & Polachek, 1974). Becker (1985) extends this argument to full-time working 
spouses. When comparing full-time working, married men and women, he finds women to 
dedicate considerably more time to household activities than men. He explains this behav-
iour by specialization benefits that can be realised due to labour division between the 
spouses.
4
 As wives usually undertake the major part of the household responsibilities, they 
are not able to dedicate the same amount of energy to labour market activities as men of 
similar constitutions, even if they work the same hours. If husbands have more energy left 
for labour market activities than wives, their labour market returns are higher as they are 
more productive and can consequently realise higher hourly wages. Investments in human 
capital that are of value in the labour market should therefore be more attractive for men 
because they can receive higher returns. Accordingly, husbands should invest more heavily 
in human capital that is of value in the labour market while wives should specialise to a 
higher extent in household tasks.
5
 These investment rationales can be easily extended to 
unmarried women in case they are planning to have children. If they anticipate lower la-
bour market participation or higher specialization in non-market work, they have a shorter 
time horizon or less energy left to recover human capital investments than men. Therefore, 
they would be less likely to invest in human capital than men.  
The assumption that women take fertility plans into account when it comes to human capi-
tal investments leads Polachek (1981) to conclude that labour market segregation is driven 
by these investment rationales as well. He argues that women voluntarily sort themselves 
into occupations with lower rates of skill atrophy. Obviously, these occupations not only 
promise a lower depreciation of skill investments after a career interruption but should also 
require lower levels of training.  
2.1.2 Employers prefer men over women 
Differences in training behaviour of male and female employees can also be caused by 
employers offering unequal training opportunities to men and women. An employer could 
simply dislike working with a certain group of employees, even though he or she does not 
                                                 
4
 Becker (1985) makes clear that the benefits from specialization could be realised by a division of labour 
independent of the gender if household member were intrinsically identical. Gronau (1977: 1113) points out 
that the scope of these benefits depends on previous differences between the spouses. If before marriage both 
participate on the labour market to the same extend, “marriage [and the resulting possibility of specialization] 
does not yield any gains of trade”. However, as women usually gain less than men (do to discrimination or 
lower labour market involvement), wives often specialize in home-production while husbands more often 
than not specialize in market-production. 
5
 In a full equilibrium this leads to a complete specialization of husbands in the labour market and wives in 
household activities. 
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doubt that the members of that group are as productive as other employees. In this case, 
working with this group causes a disutility for the employer, which can be interpreted as 
non-monetary production costs. To balance production costs, the employer would therefore 
refrain from employing this group at the same wages as other employees. Becker (1971: 
14) calls this phenomenon “taste for discrimination”. Applied to gender differences in 
training, employers can have preferences for working with men or women. If not only 
wages but also training investments are seen as costs of labour, employers can reduce 
training investments in the employee group they dislike to balance the costs they bear by 
working with it. Based on taste discrimination either men or women could be disadvan-
taged in terms of training, depending on their employer’s preferences.  
As economic discrimination theory does not allow predicting the direction of discrimina-
tion, social closure theory must be taken into account at this point. The idea of social clo-
sure was first introduced by Max Weber and suggests that a social group of advantaged 
status will defend its privileges and position by restricting non-members’ access to certain 
resources (Weber & Schluchter, 2009). Gender can be an important characteristic for de-
fining such a social group in the labour market (Mehra, Kilduff, & Brass, 1998). Here, 
male employees still represent the majority. More importantly, they occupy the majority of 
executive positions. Based on social closure theory, they could have an interest in defend-
ing male dominance against women by excluding them from influential positions (To-
maskovic-Devey, 1993). As training is an important determinant of labour market success, 
one way to keep women away from influential positions and to defend male status could be 
by restricting women’s access to training (Tomaskovic-Devey & Skaggs, 2002). Social 
closure theory therefore indicates that taste discrimination can lead to female disad-
vantages in training. 
However, the assumption that employers would discriminate certain groups only based on 
their personal preferences is not unanimously shared in economic literature. Arrow (1973) 
argues that other employers that do not have a taste for discrimination could gain a com-
petitive advantage over the discriminating employers, as the former can choose their em-
ployees from a bigger pool of applicants, hire women at comparatively low market wages 
and gain advantages from investments in human capital of male and female employees 
equally. In this case, the discriminating employers accept foregone income opportunities to 
satisfy their preferences, i.e. they act as if they were willing to pay something for the privi-
lege not to work with women (Becker, 1971). In the long run, this would drive the discrim-
inating employers out of the market as other employers are more competitive. Under the 
assumption of perfect markets, taste discrimination should expire in the long run as dis-
criminating employers should not be able to compete with non-discriminating employers. 
As inequality still exists in the labour market, Arrow (1973) argues that there should be 
other driving forces apart from simple preferences. Here, the theory of statistical discrimi-
nation comes into play, focussing on the problem of imperfect information: If employers 
are not able to evaluate their employees’ true productivity (or only at high costs), they 
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might rely on more easily and less costly observable characteristics and use them as a 
proxy for productivity.  
One possible proxy can be the employees’ gender. Such employer behaviour is reasonable 
if the employers have any preconception of the productivity distribution among men and 
women. This preconception may be based on previous experience with men and women 
working in these jobs but can also be based on sociological beliefs or other subjective ra-
tionales. Based on the employees’ gender, the employers then make a prediction concern-
ing their productivity. If the employers are convinced that women are on average less pro-
ductive, they will only be willing to employ them at lower costs than men (Arrow, 1973; 
Phelps, 1972). Likewise, if employers are convinced of a lower average labour market at-
tachment of women, they will also be less willing to invest in the labour relation as the 
payback horizon for these investments will on average be shorter than investments in men. 
Based on this rationale, employers should prefer training investments in male employees 
over training investments in female employees.   
2.1.3 Empirical findings 
Empirical evidence concerning the impact of gender on training is far from homogeneous 
and is not able to support classical human capital and discrimination theory predictions of a 
clear training disadvantage for women. Although many studies find men to train more than 
women, there are many others that do not find any gender effect at all. Recently, there have 
been also studies that find women to have an advantage in training (for an overview of 
empirical studies on gender and training see Table 18 in the Appendix).  
Most studies find a training advantage of men over women. Pischke (2001), using training 
data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), finds women to have lower train-
ing incidents and shorter training spells. 31% of the male employees received work-related 
training between 1986 and 1989 while only 22% of the female employees did. The female 
disadvantage holds true even after controlling for education, industry, occupation and part-
time employment. Similarly, Georgellis & Lange (2007) using more recent training data 
from the GSOEP waves 1989, 1993 and 2000 find women’s training incidents to be signif-
icantly less likely than men’s, especially when it comes to employer sponsored training. 
Using the Swedish Survey of Living Conditions, Evertsson (2004) analyses pooled cross 
sectional training data of 10,721 employees aged 18 to 65 covering the years from 1994 to 
1998. Training questions in the survey refer to training that took place in the past three 
years, was paid or organised by the employer, and lasted at least one week. Similar to the 
results for Germany, Evertsson (2004) finds that about 30% of the male employees partici-
pated in on-the-job training while only about 24% of the female employees did. Again, the 
results show that even after controlling for education, tenure, labour market experience, 
work hours, industry, socio-economic status, civil status and the presence of small chil-
dren, women’s odds to train are significantly lower than men’s.  
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For the US, Lynch (1992) uses data from the 1980 and 1983 waves of the National Longi-
tudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79). Analysing a subsample of non-college gradu-
ates, she finds men to be more likely than women to receive employer provided on-the-job 
training but less likely to receive off-the-job training. Royalty (1996) analyses the relation-
ship between predicted turnover and training of US-American men and women based on 
the 1980 to 1986 waves of the NLYS79. She finds men to participate in significantly more 
on-the-job training than women. However, about 25% of the gender differences can be 
explained by differences in the predicted turnover of men and women. These findings offer 
some support for the human capital theory assumption that employees invest less in female 
training because they expect them to be more likely to leave the firm. Barron, Black, & 
Loewenstein (1993) use data from the American Employment Opportunity Pilot Project. 
This company survey asks questions concerning the position an employer most recently 
filled referring to the amount of on-the-job training, the average starting wage and the 
wage after two years as well as whether the newly hired was male or female. With this 
information at hand, the authors analyse gender differences in on-the-job training and wag-
es. They find a similar training intensity for men and women in the first three months of 
employment. However, in general, for positions filled with men, training requirements are 
more than twice as high as for positions filled with women. Their results suggest that em-
ployers hire men in positions that require more training as well as capital investments. The 
authors assume employers to consider female employees to have a higher likelihood of 
leaving the firm. 
However, there are a number of studies showing mixed or insignificant results. O’Halloran 
(2008), for example, uses on-the-job training data from all NLSY79 waves until 2004. He 
finds that, on average, 10.72% of women received on-the-job-training in the past year 
while only 9.96% men did. However, men reported longer training spells and among those 
who participated in training, men reported more training incidences than women. Overall, 
men spent about 2.2% of their working time in on-the-job-training while women trained 
only 1.8% of their working time. The gender gap in training duration persists even after 
controlling for labour force attachment and expected tenure. In contrast, analysing on-the-
job training data from the 1986 to 1991 waves of the NLSY79, Veum (1996) does not find 
any gender differences in the probability to participate in training, the number of training 
incidents or the hours of training. Still, he does find that white females receive higher train-
ing intensity (on-the-job training hours per hours worked) due to higher levels of part-time 
employment and a higher likelihood being employed in an entry-level position. Maximiano 
(2012), using the Dutch 2005 survey “Monitor Postiniteel Onderwijs” to assess work-
related training, initially finds a non-significant gender effect on training. However, a more 
detailed model reveals that the non-significant effect masks two opposing effects: Firms 
tend to offer less training for women than for men. Only because women are more willing 
to participate in training than men, this does not translate into lower training levels for 
women.  
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Finally, there are studies which ascertain a female training advantage. Jones, Latreille, & 
Sloane (2008) explore the development of the gender training gap comparing the British 
Labour Force Survey data from the winter quarters 1994/1995 and 2000/2001. They dis-
tinguish between on-the-job and off-the-job training (employer supported and not support-
ed). The authors find little gender difference when comparing training duration, type of 
training and training outcome in terms of qualification. They find women to be more likely 
to train but conclude that most gender differences occur due to different personal as well as 
job characteristics of men and women, especially in terms of occupation, industry and sec-
tor. Simpson & Stroh (2002) use the Adult Education Data File of the US-American Na-
tional Household Education Survey of 1995 which includes training data of 19,722 adults, 
aged 16 years and older. The survey includes data of work-related adult education in terms 
of on-the-job training as well as off-the-job training. They show that women are more like-
ly to participate in training than men. One important reason for this finding is occupational 
segregation which accounts for roughly one-third of the female advantage in the likelihood 
of overall training participation and for about 40% of the female advantage in employer-
supported training (Simpson & Stroh, 2002: 44). The authors argue that this occurs due to 
technological changes and more computerised workplaces which affect typical female 
workplaces to a higher extent than male workplaces. 
Apart from analyses based on national data, there are a few studies that examine the gender 
training gap in an international context. The results usually show cross-country differences 
when it comes to the effect of gender on training. Using data from the European Communi-
ty Household Panel for ten countries, Arulampalam et al. (2004) analyse gender differ-
ences in continuous training participation between 1994 and 1999. Their training data, 
which samples employees aged 25 to 54 who work at least 15 hours per week, focuses on 
more formal courses of instruction and not on informal on-the-job training. Estimating 
separate equations for each of the ten countries in their sample, the authors find women to 
be typically not less likely to train than men. In Denmark, Finland, Italy and Spain women 
are even more likely to participate in training. For the latter two countries, these results can 
be explained by women’s characteristics that favour training. In Denmark and Finland dif-
ferent returns of training seem important, too.  
Leuven & Oosterbeek (1999) compare the demand and supply of work-related training in 
Canada, the Netherlands, the United States and Switzerland based on data of the Interna-
tional Adult Literacy Survey. They find women in Canada and in the Netherlands to be 
more likely to suffer from training constraints than men. Moreover, for all countries but 
Switzerland, they find women to receive less training than men. In Canada, the Nether-
lands and the United States, the main reason for the female disadvantage seems to be em-
ployer preferences. These results are in line with Bassanini et al. (2007) who analyse train-
ing data from eleven countries from the 1995-2001 waves of the European Community 
Household Panel. The authors find women to have higher training demands than men 
while the training supply for women is lower than for men. Although the authors find 
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women to train more than men, the analysis shows that this is because women are more 
likely to pay for their training themselves. Especially at younger ages, women get less em-
ployer-sponsored training than men. The authors explain this by more frequent career in-
terruptions. 
The most extensive international comparison on gender differences in training so far has 
been conducted by Dieckhoff & Steiber (2011). The authors use the European Social Sur-
vey 2004/05 to compare continuous training participation of men and women in 23 coun-
tries. Their sample includes data of 4,957 employees, aged 25 to 45 who live with a part-
ner. They analyse the effect of fertility plans, childcare responsibilities and the sex compo-
sition of occupations on the likelihood of training in the past 12 months while controlling 
for career orientation, gender attitudes, age, education, household income, part-time status, 
unemployment experience, firm size and sex of the supervisor. They find women to train 
less than men and test different theoretical explanations for this gender training gap: hu-
man capital theory, gender role specialization (meaning that mothers specialize in home-
production such as childcare and have less time or energy left than men or childless wom-
en), occupational sex segregation and statistical discrimination. However, none of these 
theories turns out to have explanatory power for training behaviour of female employees. 
The authors find no evidence that women planning to have children train less than other 
women, nor do they find any negative effect of the presence of young children on women’s 
training participation. Hence, neither human capital theory rationales, that suggest women 
who are planning to (at least temporarily) leave the labour market should invest less in 
training, nor gender role specialization, suggesting that women with children have less 
energy left for the labour market, can be supported. Statistical discrimination of female 
employees by employers cannot be detected either, since younger women who might have 
children in the future train even more than childless women aged 33 and above (controlling 
for age). Most strikingly, the authors find occupational segregation theory reversed. They 
find employees (independent of their gender) to train less in male-dominated occupations 
and conclude that in these (mainly low-skilled manual) occupations, continuous updating 
of human capital is less needed than in other occupations. On the other hand, the proposed 
theories turn out to explain male training participation to a certain extent: Planned as well 
as actual fatherhood increases the probability of training. Taken as a sign of higher labour 
market attachment, this supports human capital theory, discrimination theories (positive 
discrimination of fathers) as well as gender role specialization. Assuming that the authors 
controlled for all relevant variables, they conclude that the remaining gender gap must oc-
cur due to employers’ taste discrimination of female employees. 
In summary, results on the gender training gap are mixed. Many studies find a male ad-
vantage in training but others do not find any gender differences in training or even a fe-
male advantage. In addition the results of international comparative studies indicate the 
gender training gap to differ between countries (e.g. Arulampalam et al., 2004; Dieckhoff 
& Steiber, 2011). Therefore it is not surprising that studies based on data from different 
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countries lead to heterogeneous conclusions: Jones et al. (2008) find a female advantage in 
Britain while Pischke (2001) and Georgellis & Lange (2007) find a female disadvantage in 
Germany and Evertsson (2004) in Sweden. Recent results for the US are mixed. 
2.2 The gender training gap and additional approaches 
The differing empirical results on the gender training gap cannot be explained by human 
capital or discrimination theory. The cross-national variances rather suggest that country 
characteristics may have an impact on the gender training gap. Further, women may not be 
the homogeneous group economic theory takes them for. Different groups of women may 
show different training preferences and employers may not discriminate all women to the 
same extent. Therefore, this section discusses two theoretical approaches that refer to hu-
man capital and discrimination theory but extend them in ways that offer explanations for 
differences in the gender training gap between different employee groups as well as across 
countries.  
2.2.1 Not all women are the same  
 Theoretical background 
Lazear & Rosen (1990) apply the rationale of statistical discrimination to differences in 
promotion between men and women and point out that since the promotion of an employee 
leads to costly training investments, employers see a promotion as an investment in a spe-
cific employee. In line with human capital theory, the authors refer to expected gender dif-
ferences in the probability of leaving the training firm in order to explain the differences in 
employers’ investment in male and female employees. As women are generally assumed to 
have a lower labour market attachment, employers require higher ability thresholds for 
women than for men to compensate for their investment risk.  
Lazear & Rosen (1990: 108-113) argue that these differences in labour market attachment 
occur because women, though having the same abilities in the labour market, have an ad-
vantage in non-market activities, especially in child rearing. This advantage can translate 
into higher non-market returns for women compared to their market returns. Nonetheless, 
at very high levels of labour market abilities (which promise very high returns), labour 
market returns should exceed non-labour market returns for women, so women are no 
longer more likely than men to leave the firm. In this case, investing in human capital of 
women is no longer more risky than the investment in men. Moreover, human capital in-
vestment incentives for a highly able woman herself should not be different from those for 
a highly able man, as investment horizons are similar. Differences in skill investments of 
men and women should therefore not exist at very high ability levels as neither employers 
nor employees have to fear the loss of their investment. On the contrary, women of average 
ability and below should be disadvantaged compared to equally able men as they are ex-
pected to have a lower labour market attachment, and consequently shorter investment 
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horizons than men.  
Empirical findings 
Using personnel records of 4,379 full-time employees of a major financial institution in 
Great Britain, Jones & Makepeace (1996) empirically test the model developed by Lazear 
& Rosen (1990). As regressors they include marital status, education, tenure, age-on-entry 
and whether the employer had allocated the employee to a “fast track”. Their results indi-
cate “that women have to meet more stringent criteria than men for promotion, but that 
much of the difference between men and women’s attainment is due to their attributes” 
(Jones & Makepeace, 1996: 401), which basically supports the main model assumptions. 
Further, they find that promotion barriers for women are highest at lower hierarchical lev-
els and vanish at higher levels. This is in line with Lazear’s & Rosen’s (1990) hypothesis 
that gender differences disappear at high ability levels. Similarly, Winter-Ebmer & Zwei-
müller (1997), using data from the Austrian Microcensus 1983 and taking educational 
achievement as a proxy for ability, find that women “have to fulfill higher ability standards 
to be promoted” (Winter-Ebmer & Zweimüller, 1997: 43). The authors further find “that 
the assignment of career positions reacts significantly to higher separation risk of female 
workers” (Winter-Ebmer & Zweimüller, 1997: 67). However, higher female turnover is not 
able to explain gender differences entirely. Other explanations like discrimination by the 
employer seem to be relevant as well.  
Using panel data on Finnish metal workers for the years 1990-2000, Pekkarinen & Var-
tiainen (2006) are able to test Lazear’s & Rosen’s (1990) model with a more direct ability 
measure than earlier studies as the panel data provides information on individual perfor-
mance bonuses. The authors find women to be less likely to be promoted than men, alt-
hough women appear to be more productive among promoted as well as non-promoted 
workers. In fact, “promoted women were approximately 12.5% more productive at the 
initial job than promoted men“ (Pekkarinen & Vartiainen, 2006: 299). The authors there-
fore conclude that female workers must face higher promotion thresholds than male work-
ers. Since they also find quit rates among young women to be considerably higher than 
those of young men, their results support Lazear’s & Rosen’s (1990) interpretation that 
employers demand higher ability thresholds of women to compensate the higher risk of 
losing human capital investments. However, as gender differences in promotion do not 
completely vanish at older ages, when female separation rates are comparable to men, al-
ternative explanations like taste discrimination by the employer may still be relevant. 
Pema & Mehay (2010) test the model with personnel data from white-collar workers of the 
U.S. Defense Department, which covers information on individual performance, firm-
specific human capital, and promotion history. Their sample includes 27,965 employees 
aged 20 to 55, who work full-time and have at least a Bachelor’s degree. The authors find 
that women who did not get promoted in the past, are less likely to be promoted than com-
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parable men while women who did get promoted in the past are more likely to be promoted 
than men who got promoted. This may be interpreted as support for Lazear’s & Rosen’s 
(1990) hypothesis that women differ from men in unobserved characteristics like their abil-
ities in child rearing and that for some women non-labour market returns exceed labour-
market returns but for others not. Pema & Mehay (2010) further find that at lower hierar-
chy levels, women have to pass a higher performance threshold to be promoted whereas 
this is not true at higher hierarchical levels. This finding supports Lazear’s & Rosen’s 
(1990) assumption that at very high levels of ability, differences between men and women 
vanish because the employer is able to identify the more career-oriented women. 
There is also some empirical evidence for Lazear’s & Rosen’s (1990) underlying supposi-
tion that women’s labour market attachment depends on their labour market abilities. 
Whereas ability is often difficult to observe, empirical studies comparing women of differ-
ent levels of education support the idea that labour market attachment strongly varies be-
tween different groups of women. Light & Ureta (1990), analysing work continuity of US-
American women between 24 and 30, find female labour force participation to rise consid-
erably with education. Comparing turnover of men and women of different educational 
backgrounds, Royalty (1998) finds that women with lower levels of education show higher 
levels of turnover than comparable men. This is largely due to higher levels of job-to-non-
employment turnover. However, for men and women with education above the higher sec-
ondary level, Royalty (1998) does not find any evidence of a higher turnover probability of 
females. In fact, when looking at job-to-job turnover, men actually show higher turnover 
rates than women in this group. The overall probabilities for staying in the same job are 
highest for women with a higher education.   
Propositions 
As women of average ability are assumed to have a lower labour market attachment than 
men, their training disadvantage compared to men may be explained by two parallel pro-
cesses: On the one hand, average women themselves invest less in their own human capital 
as their payback horizons are shorter than men’s. This may be due to long maternity leaves 
or even a complete drop out of the labour market. On the other hand, employers invest less 
in human capital of average women as the risk of losing this investment is higher than the 
risk of losing investments in average men. These arguments should not be important for 
highly able women. As their labour market attachment is similar to men’s, these women 
have expected returns to training similar to men. Consequently, their training investments 
should also be similar to men’s. Employers should not fear the loss of their investments, 
either, and therefore invest similar amounts of training in highly able women as in compa-
rable men. As ability is hard to measure empirically, economic studies usually proxy it by 
educational achievement (e.g. Becker, 1962, Mincer, 1958). This may also be valid for 
Lazear’s & Rosen’s (1990) model (see e.g. Winter-Ebmer & Zweimüller, 1997). There-
fore, this study assumes that women of average education and below (without a university 
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degree) have a training disadvantage compared to similar men, while highly educated 
women who hold a university degree should not be disadvantaged compared to similar 
men.  
In the previous line of argument differences in labour market attachment lead to training 
disadvantages of average women, which may be induced by both employee and employer 
preferences. Both the employer and the employee preferences are in line with Lazear’s & 
Rosen’s (1990) approach as both processes predict the same outcome: A female disad-
vantage among average employees next to training equality among the highly educated 
employees. Since both processes point in the same direction, this study does not distin-
guish between employee preferences or employer discrimination as possible sources of 
training inequalities between men and women. But most importantly, if we assume 
Lazear’s & Rosen’s (1990) model assumptions to be true and if we expect that the underly-
ing reason for training differences is the lower labour market attachment of a certain group 
of women, with reference to policy-implications, it does not matter if gender differences 
are ultimately caused by differences in training supply or demand: Measures increasing 
women’s labour market attachment could then help increasing employees’ and employers’ 
training investments simultaneously.   
2.2.2 Not all countries are the same 
The VoC approach puts human capital in the centre of attention and considers labour mar-
ket aspects and the educational system as important determinants of human capital devel-
opment (Hall & Soskice, 2001b). It distinguishes between different types of market econ-
omies and highlights competitive advantages that originate from particular human capital 
features of these economies. Most relevant for this study, the contributions by Estévez-Abe 
indicate that gender inequality is related to these skill differences originating from national 
institutions (Estévez-Abe, 2005; 2006; 2009; 2012; Estévez-Abe et al., 2001). Although 
the approach strongly focuses on initial education at universities or in vocational pro-
grammes and does not discuss continuous training, its insights are highly relevant for the 
analyses of gender differences in continuous training as well. 
Specific skills and gender inequality 
Estévez-Abe’s assumption that gender differences in training are influenced by national 
institutions is grounded on Becker’s (1993) distinction between general and specific train-
ing. Becker (1993) defines general training as training that is useful in many firms. This 
type of training not only increases the marginal product of an employee in the training firm 
but in many others as well. Contrary to general training, Becker (1993) defines specific 
training as training that increases the employee’s productivity in the training firm to a 
higher level than in other firms. Completely specific training is even useless outside the 
training firm. Most training is neither completely general nor completely specific but lies 
somewhere in between. Therefore, if it increases productivity in the training firm to a 
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greater amount than in other firms, it is defined as specific whereas it is defined as general 
when it increases productivity in other firms at least as much as in the training firm. In line 
with that, Clark & Fahr (2002: 244) note that general training could be defined by means 
of its transferability.  
The distinction between general and specific training offers a starting point for predicting 
training behaviour of male and female employees.
6
 Estévez-Abe (2006: 151-152) points 
out that women are confronted with three gender-specific uncertainties: “(1) the risk of 
dismissal due to pregnancy and other family-related contingencies; (2) the risk of forsaking 
any return on their skill investments during ‘voluntary’ work interruptions such as child 
rearing; and (3) the risk of skill depreciation and missed opportunities for continuing skill 
formation during these work interruptions.” These risks entail higher flexibility needs of 
women and discourage them to invest in specific human capital while causing a strong 
preference for general skills. Though only few empirical studies explicitly distinguish be-
tween general and specific training, the existing evidence mainly supports theoretical rea-
soning of a female preference for general training over specific training. Estévez-Abe 
(2006) shows that in 12 out of 14 countries, men are more likely than women to obtain a 
vocational degree, which is assumed to be strongly related to specific skills. Lynch (1992) 
finds that women participate in less on-the-job but more off-the-job training, and that off-
the-job training is more general while on-the-job training is more specific. Supporting this 
idea, Chisholm, Larson, & Mossoux (2004: 43) find men to be significantly more likely 
than women to prefer learning in working environments and at the workplace, which is 
assumed to be more specific. Women, on the contrary, have a somewhat stronger prefer-
ence for learning in non-working environments, which is associated with more general 
training. Edlund & Grönlund (2008), using data from the 2004 wave of the European So-
cial Survey for 21 countries, find men to have more firm-specific skills than women.  
To invest in specific training in spite of the disadvantages that specific skills provide, Esté-
vez-Abe (2006) claims that women need institutional support to mitigate their risks. Coun-
                                                 
6
 Some of Becker’s (1993) model assumptions are controversial. Especially the importance of completely 
firm-specific training is doubted as there are only very few examples of purely specific human capital 
(Lazear, 2003). For the following analyses, the important insight of the theory is the assumption that there is 
training that generates human capital which is of similar value inside and outside the training firm, i.e. ena-
bles the employee to demand similar wages in many firms, while there is other training that generates human 
capital that has a higher value in the training firm than in other firms, enabling the employee to generate 
higher wages in the training firm than elsewhere. For the purpose of this study it is irrelevant if these differ-
ences in the marketability of human capital arise from actual differences in productivity in different firms or 
if they arise due to market imperfections which might affect some types of training to a greater extent than 
others (e.g. certified training should be more marketable than non-certified training on-the-job, see Acemoglu 
& Pischke, 1999a); the focus lies on the differences in flexibility for the employees. Therefore, the distinction 
between purely general or purely specific training is not an essential assumption for this study. Preferences 
for general or specific training could exist even if there was neither completely specific nor completely gen-
eral training if the types of training differ in their flexibility. The crucial feature here is the difference in flex-
ibility as there should be differences in preferences between men and women.  
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tries differ in such institutional support. Moreover, as the VoC approach assumes, general 
and specific human capital is valued differently across countries. Consequently, the author 
concludes that women’s preferences for general human capital have different implications, 
depending on the country where they live and work.  
Based on the VoC approach and the work by Estévez-Abe (2005; 2006; 2009; 2012), three 
sets of institutions seem to be relevant for the gender gap in training participation: The 
labour market and the educational system, which both reflect the focus on general or spe-
cific training, as well as the institutional support for women, which possibly helps to miti-
gate gender differences by incentivizing and securing investments in female human capital. 
In the following subsections, the assumed impact of these institutions on the gender train-
ing gap is presented in detail. The theoretical and empirical work on the relationship be-
tween the institutions and gender equality will be discussed covering theoretical and empir-
ical results of previous studies.  
2.2.2.1 The labour market, training and gender equality 
A country’s labour market is supposed to reflect the skill needs of the companies acting in 
this market. As Hall & Soskice (2001a) argue, the demand and support for specific human 
capital are caused by companies’ production strategies that concentrate on high-quality 
production. They require employees with a sound knowledge of the firm or industry, who 
are able to work autonomously, perform a wide range of tasks and detect and solve prob-
lems in the production process. In those settings, coordination between the labour market 
actors and a focus on long-term employment are necessary to encourage employers and 
employees to invest in human capital, especially in specific human capital. Employees can 
otherwise be expected to underinvest in such skills because without labour market coordi-
nation and long-term employment, they do not have the security that their specific invest-
ment will pay back. On the other hand, there are countries with labour markets that focus 
on general human capital. These countries are characterized by more market-driven rela-
tionships between the actors that result in rather short-term employments. The countries’ 
labour markets usually have a strong focus on general human capital as this fosters em-
ployee mobility and supports the radical innovation strategies pursued by many companies 
in these countries (Hall & Soskice, 2001a). 
Thus, the VoC literature links the skill focus to the long-term orientation and the degree of 
coordination in a country’s labour market respectively. The labour market coordination is 
mirrored in the industrial relations of a country. As the possible effects of long-term orien-
tation and industrial relations on training in general and more specifically on the gender 
training gap are rather complex, this section discusses the theoretical arguments in detail 
before referring to empirical evidence. At the end of this subsection, a short summary of 
the most important insights is given and propositions for the following analysis are de-
rived. 
 22 
 
2.2.2.1.1 Long-term orientation, training and gender equality 
Since long-term employment lowers the risk for employers and employees to lose their 
skill investments, it is assumed to favour training and especially specific training (Scoones, 
2000; Stevens, 1994; Stevens, 1996). The reason is that investments in specific skills in-
crease the mutual employer and employee dependency since the investments can be seen 
as sunk costs for both parties. Both employee and employer are less likely to end the em-
ployment relationship because neither party would be able to recover these costs outside 
the specific relation. This again raises tenure and makes further investments in specific 
human capital less risky. Hence, there is a mutually reinforcing relationship between long-
term employment relations and the accumulation of specific human capital (Becker, 1993; 
Hall & Soskice, 2001a). Conversely, the accumulation of purely general human capital 
does not depend on long-term employment. Estévez-Abe et al. (2001: 169) suggest that 
short tenure rates, a sign for short-term orientation, can be interpreted as a sign of a focus 
on general human capital because general human capital can be accumulated by job expe-
rience from many different firms. Consequently, labour markets with more long-term em-
ployment relations should foster specific skills to a higher extent than labour markets with 
shorter employment relations while labour markets with more short-term employment 
should provide incentives for employees to invest in more general training.  
Though from an employee’s perspective, long-term employment may appear to be some-
thing plainly positive at first sight, Estévez-Abe (2005: 193-194) points out that it also has 
the potential to cause disadvantages for women. First, maternity leaves in labour markets 
with typically long-term employment can be more detrimental for women’s careers as they 
miss time in the company and have fewer possibilities to build up specific human capital 
than their male colleagues. Second, in labour markets with long-term orientation, employ-
ers may prefer employing men as they are expected to have lower turnover rates, which not 
only enhances the accumulation of specific human capital but also involves lower risks of 
losing training investments. Furthermore, in countries with a long-term orientation, it is 
typically more difficult for employers to hire maternity-replacement on a short-term basis. 
This is not only because hiring and firing costs are generally higher than in countries with 
short-term employment relations but also because the specific skills usually necessary to 
work in these companies are not readily available on the labour market. This leaves the 
employer with two options: To divide the tasks among the remaining workers or to hire 
replacement and invest in the specific skills of this new employee. With an increasing pro-
portion of young women among the employees, the first option becomes less viable and 
expensive replacement investments are more likely to be necessary. As maternity-
replacement is thus more expensive in labour markets with long-term orientation, in these 
countries it is rational for employers to prefer hiring men instead of women. Consequently, 
statistical discrimination against women should be exacerbated in countries focussing on 
specific human capital and women should have fewer possibilities to acquire specific 
skills. Empirically, Estévez-Abe (2005) finds that in countries with high tenure rates, 
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women are less likely to occupy managerial posts. This can be interpreted as a sign of 
stronger vertical segregation due to a stronger focus on specific human capital in labour 
markets with a prevalent long-term orientation. 
2.2.2.1.2 Industrial relations and training 
Theoretical Background  
Exit-voice-theory suggests that trade unions give employees the possibility to express criti-
cism if they are discontent: When employees are unhappy with their working conditions, 
instead of just leaving their employer, they can communicate problems via union repre-
sentatives without fearing any personal sanctions by their employer (Freeman & Medoff, 
1984; Hirschman, 1970). This, in turn, gives employers the opportunity to solve these 
problems if they want to. Thus, unions have the potential to lead to improvements at the 
workplace and to raise workers’ morale. Freeman & Medoff (1984) argue that through this 
mechanism, unions are able to reduce turnover and increase tenure rates. Hence, if union-
ised firms are less likely to lose their trained staff, they have higher incentives to invest in 
training. 
Moreover, trade unions have the potential to lead to wage compressions, especially at the 
lower end of the wage distribution (Freeman & Medoff, 1984). On the one hand, these 
wage compressions can be reflected in the economic returns to skills and compress the 
returns to training for employees (Blau & Kahn, 1996). This way, employees are not able 
to gain wages at their full marginal productivity and cannot recover their investment even 
though they took general training. This may disincentivize employees to invest in their 
own training (Acemoglu & Pischke, 1999a). On the other hand, wage compressions can be 
an incentive for employers to invest in training as they are able to pay wages lower than 
their employees’ marginal product after training (Acemoglu & Pischke, 1999b). This is 
especially true when it comes to lower educated employees since in markets with wage 
compression employers have to pay relatively high wages to low-skilled employees com-
pared to high-skilled employees. After training, the employers can recapture their invest-
ments in the low-skilled by wages below their marginal product (Pischke, 2005). Streeck 
(1992: 259) puts it more drastically. He argues that when unions lead to “rigid and high 
wages, an egalitarian wage structure”, they make it impossible for companies “to be profit-
able in mass market for standardised, price-competitive products.” However, firms being 
prevented from having to compete in a low-wage, mass production segment may realize 
that these constraints can actually be beneficial for them and provide a competitive ad-
vantage because the “excess skills” offer the possibility to produce for differentiated, quali-
ty-competitive, customized markets (Streeck, 1997: 203). 
However, unions may not only indirectly affect training through higher tenure rates or 
wage compression. To raise employability and to reduce the risk of unemployment, unions 
should have an interest in directly fostering continuous training by including it in their col-
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lective bargaining (Heyes, 2007). Therefore, there might be a direct effect of unions on 
training as well. 
Concerning the type of training, the indirect union effects caused by increased tenure and 
wage compression providing employer incentives to invest in training, should especially 
foster the provision of specific training. Nevertheless, Heyes (2007: 243) points out that 
employers and employees do not have the same preferences when it comes to training in-
vestments. Employers should be interested in training that is mainly useful in their own 
company, hence specific. While workers might share these preferences to a certain extent, 
as this kind of training can augment job security with their current employer, they should 
also be interested in general training which is useful outside the training company to raise 
their overall employment security. Edlund & Grönlund (2008: 250) claim that since unions 
want to minimise their members’ dependence on one employer, they should push for train-
ing contents that are more general and applicable in other than the training firm as well. 
Similarly, Dieckhoff, Jungblut, & O’Connell (2007: 84-85) argue that when unions are 
weak and do not oppose this practice, employers are more likely to invest in specific train-
ing to increase employee dependence and to bind them to the company. Thus, while trade 
unions may indirectly support the provision of specific training through higher levels of 
tenure, they may directly engage in bargaining over training that is of more general nature 
to lower their members’ dependence on one employer. 
Empirical findings 
The assumption that unions strive to foster their members’ employability is supported by 
empirical evidence: In a number of countries, unions are involved in bargaining over the 
access to employer provided training (Ok & Tergeist, 2003). Mahnkopf (1992) identifies 
several bargaining agreements negotiated by German unions to improve continuous train-
ing. In Spain, the first Tripartite Agreement on training was signed in 1992 and has been 
followed by renegotiated agreements since (Rigby, 2002). Studies by Dundon & Eva 
(1998), McIlroy (2008) and Bacon & Hoque (2011) stress the importance of union in-
volvement in training initiatives in Britain. In several European countries, unions even es-
tablished specialised union posts that focus on training issues (Dekker, Grip, & Heijke, 
1994: 388). However, as Heyes (2007) points out, the fact that training is included in col-
lective bargaining may not be enough. Although unions may be aware of the importance of 
continuous training, they may not have the power to enforce such agreements at firm level 
and may be unable to influence training supply. One reason for this may be that for union 
representatives at the workplace level, there are a number of other issues that have a higher 
priority than training. Another reason may be that they have little influence in the training 
plans at the company level (Rigby, 2002: 507-508). 
While early U.S. studies found a negative relationship between unions and training (e.g. 
Duncan & Stafford, 1980; Mincer, 1981; Barron, Fuess, & Loewenstein, 1987), more re-
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cent studies usually find a positive link. Lynch (1992) finds evidence of a positive effect of 
union membership on training of young American workers. Green & Lemieux (2007) find 
unionised workers in Canada to participate in more training than non-unionised workers. 
Controlling for sector, firm-size and tenure, however, results in a negative relationship 
between unionization and training participation. Nevertheless, the authors find some evi-
dence that for male unionised workers, employers’ participation in the financing of training 
is higher than for non-unionised workers. The authors suggest that one reason for the weak 
union effects may be that the effect of unions is rather indirect and raises tenure and job 
stability, which in turn increase employers’ involvement in the supply of training. 
Yet, the results of the relationship between individual union membership and training 
might suffer from a selection problem as individuals that decide to become union members 
might differ from other employees in unobserved characteristics which make them more or 
less likely to train. Other studies therefore include union coverage at the workplace to scru-
tinise the effect of unions on training. For Germany, Dustmann & Schönberg (2009) find 
that training in apprenticeship programmes is higher in firms that recognise union wage 
agreements. Similarly, Kennedy, Drago, Sloan, & Wooden (1994) using data from the 
Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey find a net positive training effect of un-
ions that are active in the workplace (and not only have representatives in the work-force). 
Booth, Francesconi, & Zoega (2003) look at the impact of bargaining coverage on training 
of British males. They provide an overview of the different potential effects of unions on 
training and verify them empirically. They find union-covered workers more likely to re-
ceive training and to receive more days of training compared to non-covered workers. The 
effects are quite large: Training incidence among union-covered workers is five percentage 
points higher and union-covered workers receive four additional days of training. After 
training, these workers also get higher wage premiums. The authors suggest higher reten-
tion rates of experienced union-covered workers to be a reason for this, as these larger 
gains were obtained by union-covered workers with long tenure. These results are in line 
with those by Kennedy et al. (1994: 321) who found that unions lead to an emphasis of 
long-term employment relationships. Almeida-Santos & Mumford (2005) measure union-
ism not only in terms of an individual’s current union membership but also take into ac-
count whether the workplace recognises unions in the wage negotiation process. They find 
union membership to be positively related to training participation, both duration and inci-
dence, while union representation at the workplace does not seem to be positively associat-
ed with training. Nevertheless, they find higher levels of relative wage compression to be 
associated with more training. Consequently, there might be indirect union effects on train-
ing through wage compression.  
The previously stated studies look at union variables at the individual-level and may not be 
directly transferable to the macro-level, especially since the relationship between unions 
and training is found to be quite complex. One of the few studies that analyses this rela-
tionship at the country-level is conducted by Brunello (2004) and looks at unions and train-
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ing participation in ten European countries. Although the author does not find any signifi-
cant impact of union density on training, he finds the likelihood of training to be higher in 
countries that have a more compressed wage structure. The author therefore argues that 
unions may have an indirect effect on training if they achieve wage compression. Bassani-
ni, Booth, Brunello, De Paola, & Leuven (2005) analyse the relationship between unions 
and training in countries with low extension of union contracts. Here, they find a positive, 
but imprecisely estimated relationship which does not reach the 10% level of significance. 
Dieckhoff et al. (2007) study training participation in seven European countries. In a multi-
level analysis, they include measures of union density and wage compression at the sector 
level. Not only do they find significant positive relations between wage compression and 
training but also between union density and training. This direct link to union density indi-
cates that unions are involved in bargaining to increase work-related training.  
There are only a few empirical studies explicitly referring to the type of training supported 
by unions. Rigby (2002: 505-506) finds union representatives at the federal and confederal 
level in Spain to be highly concerned about the importance of the transferability of train-
ing. In interviews, the representatives characterised the supply of training that is transfera-
ble to other companies as important. Nevertheless, the transferability of skills does not 
have the same importance for union representatives at workplace level. General training 
was mostly promoted in larger and better organised companies, while it did not reach high 
importance in smaller firms. However, training directly supplied by unions indeed was 
general. The heterogeneous priorities of union representative found by Rigby (2002) may 
be mirrored in the results of a multilevel study by Edlund & Grönlund (2008). Based on 
data of the European Social Survey, the authors examine the level of firm-specific skills 
across 21 European countries. Analysing the determinants of the level of on-the-job train-
ing required for performing the employees’ jobs (an indicator for skill specificity), the au-
thors do not find a significant relationship between skill specificity and union density. Still, 
they find high union density to be significantly positively related to employee-power (de-
fined as the ability of the employee to find an equally attractive job) and significantly 
negatively related to mutual employer-employee dependence (employee-power relative to 
the ability of the employer to find an equally qualified employee). While the assumption 
that employees’ independence and flexibility is fostered by unions can be supported by the 
empirical results, it remains unclear if this is due to differences in training or other aspects 
of union policy. 
Thus, empirical findings seem to reflect the complex relationship between training and 
unions suggested by theory. Direct union effects on training are usually not found, alt-
hough union representatives (at least at higher hierarchal levels) appear to campaign for 
training, especially for general training. Still, several studies find relationships between 
unions, tenure, wage compression and training and therefore suggest an indirect relation-
ship between unions and training. 
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2.2.2.1.3 Industrial relations and gender equality 
Theoretical background   
The previously described union effects on general and specific training could have differ-
ing effects on training of men and women. Because women are assumed to have a stronger 
preference for general human capital than men, union policies fostering either general or 
specific training should have an indirect impact on the gender training gap. These process-
es might not follow a conscious union strategy of supporting training for either men or 
women but simply be part of general union strategy to raise employment security. In addi-
tion to that, unions may however directly engage in gender equality issues. In other words, 
unions may explicitly defend interests of men and women to a different extent if male and 
female employees have differing needs.  
Median-voter theory suggests that organizations like unions should be most interested in 
maximizing the utility of their median members (Downs, 1957). Since union leaders 
strongly depend on the votes of this group to be re-elected as union representatives, they 
should be most concerned about the needs of their median members (Farber, 1978). In 
most unions, these are male, senior, full-time employed manufacturing workers (Oswald, 
1985; Waddington, 2000). Traditionally, women occupied marginal jobs, worked reduced 
hours and were not covered by unions. Even today, they are often atypical or non-standard 
workers and are concentrated in industries and occupations that are typically not covered 
by collective agreements (Dickens, 2000). This could have an impact on union policy 
when it comes to defending the interests of female workers as male interests may dominate 
the trade unions’ agendas.  
However, changes in the composition of employment away from manufacturing towards 
the private service sector have led to a decline in union membership and unions’ influence 
in many European countries (Ebbinghaus & Visser, 1999). Faced with this trend, many 
unions have been forced to change policies and to engage in reform processes to survive. 
With their previous focus group declining in number and relative importance, the attraction 
of workers from formerly underrepresented groups becomes essential (Waddington, 2000). 
By taking into account specific female needs, trade unions would not only attract new 
groups of potential union members previously marginalised but also defend their innate 
goals and values of social justice and equality. Widening their focus away from the typical 
male manufacturing worker, unions could gain in legitimacy as they would represent the 
interests of a larger proportion of the employees in the labour market. Hence, trade unions 
should have an interest in defending women’s equality in the labour market. One way to 
attract female union members could be campaigning for continuous training. As McIlroy 
(2008: 242, 299) states, by following a training strategy, unions might not only become 
more attractive for existing members but also appeal to more women. However, as training 
preferences of men and women differ, the same training may not be equally attractive for 
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men and women. 
Empirical findings   
Mahnkopf (1992: 76) finds German trade unions making explicit efforts to recruit more 
women. But apart from recruiting activities, union policies have to engage in defending 
women’s interests if unions want to become attractive for female workers. Dickens (2000) 
states that for that reason, there are efforts to strengthen women’s influence in union policy 
– even though the majority of decision-makers and office-holders in unions is still male. 
Several unions installed women’s sections as well as reserved seats systems, which have 
not only raised the number of women involved in union policy but also strengthened the 
profile of female trade unionists. Although these mechanisms have not lead to gender 
equality so far, they have increased female influence in unions (Waddington, 2000). This 
shows that the topic of gender inequality has reached the agendas of union policy. In line 
with that, empirical findings by Heery (2006: 539) indicate that unions have the potential 
to fight gender inequality. He finds that unions can promote gender equality and that the 
issue of equal pay is part of unions’ bargaining agenda. He concludes that strong unions 
should lead to more gender equality at the workplace. Likewise, Günseli’s & Bilginsoy’s 
(2000) analysis of apprenticeship programmes in the US reveals that apprenticeships which 
are jointly sponsored by unions and employers, support the graduation of female appren-
tices to a higher extent than programmes that are sponsored by the employer only. Results 
by Rigby (2002) summarize the issue of gender equality and unions in a vivid way: On the 
one hand, he finds unions to be highly concerned about equality issues. One goal explicitly 
expressed by union representatives is to reach equality in training access, widening training 
access for women, low-skilled and older employees. In union sponsored training plans, 
equality issues are also of high importance. However, in practice, the focus of these equali-
ty efforts is mainly on training access for low skilled employees rather than on women.  
While there is no empirical evidence of unions’ gender equality effects on the macro-level, 
Roosmaa & Saar (2010) analyse training inequality between high and low skilled individu-
als in 23 European countries. Based on the EU Labour Force Survey of 2003, the authors 
find that a higher degree of trade union coverage in a country decreases inequality in con-
tinuous training. These results are relevant for this study since ability and gender are as-
sumed to interact in their effects on training. 
2.2.2.1.4 Summary and propositions concerning the labour market 
A long-term orientation in the labour market should raise training incentives – especially 
when it comes to specific training – because the risk of losing these investments is reduced. 
Nonetheless, it can cause disadvantages for women compared to men since in these labour 
markets employers should have a higher preference for employing men instead of women. 
Moreover, in long-term oriented labour markets, maternity leaves are more detrimental for 
human capital development as specific human capital can only be acquired at the work-
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place. Thus, a focus on long-term employment should lead to gender differences in training 
participation and a female disadvantage because it fosters investments in specific training. 
The effects of unions on training are more complex. Based on theoretical reasoning, unions 
can be assumed to raise employer incentives to invest in continuous training, while lower-
ing employee incentives to invest in training. Net effects obviously depend on the relative 
importance of the contradicting effects. However, since most work-related training is 
largely employer paid (see Bassanini et al., 2007: 214), it may be reasonable to argue that 
the presence of strong unions is likely to lead to an overall raise in work-related training. 
Nevertheless, there may be differing effects of unions on training of different groups of 
employees. Wage compressions at the bottom of the wage distribution scale should make 
the employment of unskilled labour less efficient than skilled labour and raise incentives 
for employers to invest especially in training for the lower skilled. The direction of the 
union effects on women seems to depend on the focus of union policy. If unions focus on 
attracting new members, they may engage in combating gender inequality in the labour 
market. One way to do this is to foster training for women. This training should then pref-
erably be of a general nature, which is in line with union goals in terms of employability. 
By contrast, if unions are most concerned about the needs of their median voter, male in-
terests should be the most important basis of union policy. Male unionists may have a 
stronger interest in long-term employment and specific human capital opposed to a more 
flexible employability concept and general human capital that should be attractive for 
women.  
The empirical results on unions and training are consistent with the complex relationship 
proposed by theory and it is unclear whether union effects on training arise from direct 
bargaining or indirectly through longer tenure rates and wage compression. The direction 
of the effect seems to be clear, though: Most empirical studies find union membership or 
union presence to be positively related to training participation. Still, empirical findings 
also point to discrepancies in unions’ policy agendas and their actual practice at the work-
place. Although union representatives at higher levels point out the importance of general 
training, support for general training does not seem to be strongly implemented at work-
place level. Concerning gender equality and union policy there is a similar picture: While 
unions seem aware of the importance of gender equality, women are still underrepresented 
in unions, and efforts to increase training equality are still rather focussed on the support of 
lower educated than on the support of female employees. As women have a strong prefer-
ence for general training whereas men do not, it can be assumed that the stronger the in-
dustrial relations are the higher is the training advantage of men. 
For lower educated women, union effects on training should be stronger than for highly 
educated women since collective bargaining agreements and wage compression are less 
likely to have an impact on training of highly educated employees. Employees of higher 
education usually have a better bargaining position vis-à-vis their employers as their skills 
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are less frequent at the labour market. Lower educated workers should therefore depend to 
a higher degree on union policy and strong industrial relations should especially support 
training for employees without university education. Cross-country differences in union 
strategies should then be especially relevant for the gender training gap between men and 
women without university education while it should matter less for employees with univer-
sity education. Thus, the (in)equality effects of unions on training should be more pro-
nounced for employees without university education than for employees with university 
education. It can therefore be assumed that the stronger the industrial relations system is, 
the less training do women receive compared to men while this relationship is more pro-
nounced among lower educated employees. 
2.2.2.2 The educational system, training and gender equality 
Theoretical background 
The educational system is often discussed as a determinant of social class equality (Ambler 
& Neathery, 1999; Hanushek & Wößmann, 2006). However, the educational system may 
not only have an impact on class equality but on gender equality as well (Estévez-Abe, 
2012).  
The skill needs of a countries’ labour market have to be met by its educational system. 
Differences in skill needs should therefore translate into differences in the national educa-
tion systems. At universities, students usually get a quite general education that prepares 
them for working in different companies, jobs or even industries. For that reason, universi-
ty education is usually seen as generating general human capital. On the contrary, voca-
tional education is usually more specific. Especially when firms are involved in defining 
curricular, like in company-based training schemes (partly in the Netherlands or Luxem-
bourg) or in apprenticeship systems (e.g. in Germany or Switzerland), the specificity of the 
training content is considerably higher compared to university education since it usually 
prepares for a specific job in a specific industry and oftentimes contains skills or 
knowledge necessary in a specific firm. However, Estévez-Abe (2012) argues that voca-
tional programmes whether they have a strong employer involvement or not, are less gen-
der neutral than general programmes as the former lead to qualifications in a specific field 
and induce gender segregation. Not only are gender stereotypes likely to be reinforced by 
early sorting into occupational fields but, most importantly, women planning to have chil-
dren may be more likely to select occupations that offer higher flexibility and are more 
compatible with family responsibilities while avoiding other occupations. Countries rely-
ing heavily on university systems can therefore be seen as having a stronger focus on gen-
eral human capital and being more gender-neutral whereas countries relying on a vocation-
al training system can be seen as having a stronger focus on specific human capital and 
being less gender-neutral (Estévez-Abe et al., 2001).  
Estévez-Abe et al. (2001) assume that in countries where product market strategies mainly 
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rely on specific human capital, societies are more likely to be egalitarian than in countries 
where general human capital is prevalent. They argue that vocational schools and appren-
ticeships in specific skill regimes offer an alternative to reach a certified qualification for 
those who are academically weak. On the contrary, in general skill regimes, there are no 
good alternative means of achieving labour market success for those students who are aca-
demically weak. Hence, they are usually trapped in low-paid, unskilled jobs. Roosmaa & 
Saar (2010: 184) apply this rational to the provision of continuous training and assume that 
training opportunities are more equally distributed in countries that focus on specific skills 
than in countries that focus on general skills. They suppose the training gap between high- 
and low-skilled employees to be lower, the higher the proportion of workers with voca-
tional skills.  
Even so, Estévez-Abe (2005: 193-194) claims that systems relying on specific human capi-
tal provide disadvantages for women: As women have a higher probability of career inter-
ruptions, the accumulation of specific human capital which has limited market value out-
side the training firm is less attractive for them than for men. She further suggests that em-
ployers that value specific skills prefer employing men because of their expected lower 
turnover, which not only enhances the accumulation of specific human capital but also 
involves lower risks of losing training investments. Additionally, in specific-skills-
countries parental leaves are more expensive since replacement workers having all neces-
sary skills are not easily found on the labour market. Consequently, statistical discrimina-
tion against women and labour market segregation should be exacerbated in countries fo-
cussing on specific human capital and women should have fewer possibilities to acquire 
specific skills. 
Though not explicitly stated, it can be deduced from the VoC literature that the focus on 
specific training in countries with a strong vocational training system continues throughout 
an employee’s career and results in a focus on specific continuous training. By the same 
token, countries with an emphasis on initial training at universities, that generates general 
human capital, would focus on general continuous training afterwards (Hall & Soskice, 
2001a).
7
 If the focus of continuous training is in line with the focus of the initial training 
system, more general continuous training will be conducted in countries with strong uni-
                                                 
7
 On the other hand, there is some empirical evidence that suggests initial and continuous training to be com-
pensating which could result in a change of focus from initial to continuous training (Beck, Kabst, & 
Walgenbach, 2009; Goergen, Brewster, & Wood, 2009; Backes-Gellner, 1999). In this case employers and 
employees in countries with a strong vocational system would focus on general continuous training to com-
plement their specific human capital generated by the initial training system. In contrast, in countries with 
university systems the focus would be on specific continuous training to complement the general human 
capital generated at universities. However, against the background of the VoC approach, the complementarity 
argument does not make sense when it comes to the type of human capital. The VoC approach argues that 
economies gain competitive advantage precisely because of their rather one-sided focus on general or specif-
ic training. A change in focus from general to specific human capital or vice versa would macerate this com-
parative advantage. 
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versity systems, and more specific training in countries with strong vocational systems.  
In summary, specific training should be more prevalent in countries with strong vocational 
training systems. On the contrary, university systems can be taken as a sign for a stronger 
focus on general training. This may have differing effects on training participation of men 
and women and employees of different educational backgrounds: While inequalities be-
tween employees of different education might be moderated in specific training systems, 
gender inequalities could be aggravated. The opposite may be true in countries focussing 
on general training.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
Empirical findings   
In the few quantitative studies that analyse institutional determinants of employee training, 
the educational system and skill structure are usually found to have an important impact on 
continuous training (e.g. Bassanini et al., 2007). Brunello (2004) finds a positive training 
externality in the relationship between education and training. He shows that training does 
not only increase with individual education but also with the proportion of educated em-
ployees in the labour market. This portion is obviously reflects a country’s educational 
system.  
Estévez-Abe (2006) offers some empirical evidence for the assumption that the educational 
system has an impact on gender equality in a country. She shows that in countries where 
vocational education is important (a high share of the population has a vocational degree) 
women are less present in the private sector workforce. Moreover, analysing occupational 
segregation in 14 countries, Charles (2005) finds women to be more strongly represented 
in skilled manufacturing or managerial occupation in countries with higher rates of univer-
sity graduates.  
Empirical evidence on the impact of the educational system on training equality is scarce. 
The only study addressing this topic is conducted by Roosmaa & Saar (2010) and refers to 
training inequality between employees of different educational backgrounds. Though not 
targeting the gender training gap, it gives insights into the relation between previous educa-
tion and training and may therefore be relevant for understanding the gender training gap at 
different educational levels. The authors find that the vocational specificity of the educa-
tion system (percentage of upper secondary school students enrolled in vocational educa-
tion) has no significant impact on training inequality. Concerning the importance of the 
university system, the analysis shows mixed results. For the EU-15 countries the authors 
find inequalities to be lower in countries with high levels of university graduates. Howev-
er, for the new member states, the relationship is reversed. Thus, the study does not pro-
vide support for the claim that countries strongly focussing on university education (and 
general human capital) provide disadvantages for the lower educated when it comes to 
training while countries focussing on vocational education (and specific human capital) 
lead to more training equality. 
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Propositions 
The educational system determines the human capital stock in the labour market and lays 
the ground for further continuous training. Following the VoC approach, there are educa-
tional systems focussing on the provision of specific human capital while others focus on 
general human capital. In countries focussing on specific human capital, chances for wom-
en’s career development should be lower than in countries focussing on general human 
capital. On the one hand, this is because specific human capital is at odds with women’s 
training preferences. On the other hand, this is because employers fear the loss of their 
human capital investment. Further, maternity replacement is costly in specific human capi-
tal regimes. Yet, as highly able women have higher incentives to return to the labour mar-
ket early after childbirth, these problems should be less pronounced for them (though still 
existent since even short maternity leaves impose additional costs on the employers). The 
problem of the specific skill system should, however, be very relevant for average women 
whose non-market returns are likely to exceed their market returns while they have small 
children at home. As these women are assumed to take longer maternity leaves, specific 
human capital appears especially unattractive for them while employers should refrain 
from investing in these women’s specific human capital, too.  
In summary: The stronger the focus on specific human capital in the educational system is, 
the less training should women receive compared to men. This relationship should be espe-
cially detrimental for women of average ability. Women of very high ability should be less 
affected as their labour market attachment is similar to men’s. 
2.2.2.3 The support for women, training and gender equality 
Theoretical background 
Estévez-Abe et al. (2001) claim that women need more institutional support than men to 
invest in specific training. Apart from a stable employment situation, they need protection 
against dismissal in case of pregnancy as well as guarantees of reinstatement at the same 
level when returning to work. To prevent women from falling behind their male colleagues 
when it comes to investments in specific human capital, the authors emphasise that afford-
able childcare is most important. Employers could be more reluctant to invest in training of 
female employees, too, since the probability of losing this investment might be higher 
compared to investments in male human capital. This is especially true in countries were 
institutional support in terms of childcare etc. is not extensively available as in those coun-
tries, mothers have more difficulties returning to their job after childbirth.  
However, as Estévez-Abe (2005: 192-193) argues, “women-friendly” policies do not al-
ways lead to more gender equality in the labour market. Many countries offer paid parental 
leaves and child benefits to protect families against high losses of income after childbirth. 
These policies can have negative effects on female human capital development as generous 
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maternity leaves augment mothers’ time out of the labour market. This is especially detri-
mental as child rearing years collide with the early years of career that are usually decisive 
for labour market success. Consequently, maternity leave policies may widen the differ-
ences in labour market participation between men and women as prolonged maternity 
leaves delay women’s acquisition of human capital. Further, long parental leaves are costly 
for employers, as they have to replace the missing worker by redistributing tasks to other 
workers or hiring a new one. Extensive childcare, allowing mothers to return to their 
workplace early, reduces such costs for employers and makes hiring women less risky and 
hence more attractive.  
Further, Estévez-Abe (2006) points out that cultural aspects are likely to translate into gen-
der differences in the labour market. As she postulates, “traditional gender norms…reduce 
overall female labor-force participation rates” (Estévez-Abe, 2006: 164) and lead to a 
higher female specialization in non-market work. The negative attitudes towards female 
labour market participation, which may cause inequality between men and women in gen-
eral aspects like labour market participation, pay or qualification, are likely to lower wom-
en’s training participation, too. It is thus likely that labour markets which show inequality 
between men and women in general aspects also show differences in training participation 
of men and women. 
Empirical findings   
Using employee data from the European Social Survey, Dieckhoff & Steiber (2011) ana-
lyse gender effects on training in 23 European countries. Controlling for individual and 
occupational characteristics, they find women to train less than men. While the gender gap 
in training appears rather similar in most European countries, the authors identify a smaller 
gap in Nordic countries than in the rest of Europe. They explain this result with unique 
Scandinavian characteristics like the combination of high female labour market participa-
tion and a modern gender culture. However, they do not measure these characteristics as 
such but include a dummy for Nordic countries in their models. Consequently, the lower 
gender training gap in Scandinavia cannot clearly be attributed to these factors. 
Propositions 
Women appear to need more institutional support than men to invest in specific training. 
Policies providing the possibilities and incentives for women to return to the labour market 
early after childbirth can mitigate gender differences in the labour market in general and in 
training participation. However, effects on women of different ability levels are likely to 
differ. Average women should depend on these policies to a stronger extent. As their la-
bour market returns are usually lower, their labour market attachment is assumed to be 
lower as well. Thus, their time out of the labour market should be more strongly affected 
by “women-friendly” policies. On the contrary, women of high ability are usually in a bet-
ter bargaining position per se and depend to a lower extent on favourable institutions. 
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Therefore, it can be assumed that the higher the incentives for women to return to the la-
bour market early after childbirth, the more training women receive compared to men. The 
relationship between these incentives and training should be more pronounced among low-
er educated employees. Moreover, a modern gender culture at the labour market could 
translate into more gender equality in training. Thus, in countries where men and women 
are more equal in terms of other labour market characteristics, training should be more 
equally distributed as well.  
2.2.2.4 On the complementarity of institutions 
Analysing the institutional determinants of the gender training gap, this study follows a 
variable oriented approach, meaning that all previously described relationships between an 
institutional characteristic and the gender training gap will be looked at separately. An al-
ternative would be to choose a case-oriented or configurational approach, where countries 
are clustered by bundles of institutions. Such an approach is frequently used in the VoC 
literature as it is argued that national institutions complement each other leading to specific 
combinations of institutions that compose two stable equilibriums: A liberal or a coordi-
nated market economy. For example, it is argued, that in coordinated market economies, 
strong vocational education systems, which foster specific human capital, complement 
labour markets with long-term employment relationships, which favour specific human 
capital as well. On the other hand, in liberal market economies, university systems focus-
sing on general human capital complement short-term oriented labour markets, which need 
employees with general skills to fulfil their flexibility needs. In both configurations, the 
different institutions are assumed to mutually reinforce each other (Hall & Soskice, 2001a).  
Although the previously discussed institutions might somehow complement each other 
(Estévez-Abe, 2005), this study chooses not to cluster countries or bundle characteristics 
into classifications. This is because existing country classifications based on national insti-
tutions are highly controversial (see Becker, 2007: 263). The VoC approach, despite offer-
ing a convenient framework for theoretical reasoning, does often not hold true when it 
comes to an empirical analysis of its country classifications or its assumption of institu-
tional complementarities that are supposed to lead to either coordinated or liberal market 
economies. Many studies criticise Hall & Soskice (2001b) for a somewhat arbitrary align-
ment of some countries to these categories (e.g. Becker, 2007). Especially the group de-
fined as coordinated market economies is often found to be highly heterogeneous (e.g. 
Dieckhoff et al., 2007; Busemeyer, 2009). Nevertheless, the group of liberal market econ-
omies is not homogeneous in many aspects either. Estévez-Abe (2005) points out, that 
countries classified as liberal market economies differ in their vocational training systems. 
Most prominently, Britain, which is classified as a typical liberal market economy, has an 
apprenticeship system, something usually termed as a typical sign of coordinated market 
economies. As Hall & Soskice (2001a) depart from a conclusion by Finegold & Soskice 
(1988) that the British initial vocational training system, though existing, is not working 
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effectively in terms of supporting international competitiveness, they treat it as an unim-
portant nuance and do not include it in further reasoning. Estévez-Abe (2005) criticises that 
view as she finds vocational training systems (independent from their effect on internation-
al competitiveness) to be related to occupational segregation and equality of men and 
women in the labour market and therefore worth including in a comparative analysis. Fur-
ther, as the VoC approach argues that liberal and coordinated market economies represent 
a stable equilibrium of institutional characteristics, the classifications do not allow for dy-
namic change. However, Schneider & Paunescu (2012) find institutions to vary over time. 
Out of the 26 OECD countries analysed, they find that between 1990 and 2005, four had 
moved from a coordinated labour market economy closer to a more liberal one.  
Therefore, it is not surprising that empirical studies that analyse the link between training 
and the VoC classifications do not provide a clear picture. Dieckhoff et al. (2007) do not 
find any clear relationship between continuous training and the VoC categories. However, 
when looking at single features of the labour market (union density and wage compression) 
the authors do find positive effects on training.  
Consequently, the configurations of capitalism proposed by Hall & Soskice (2001b) do 
neither meet the requirements of a study on gender differences nor on educational and 
training matters as they ignore important national differences. Other configurational ap-
proaches usually resemble the disadvantages of the broad categories and inflexibility in 
terms of dynamic developments discussed for the VoC configurations (e.g. Esping-
Andersen, 1990; Amable, 2003). Yet, they must be seen as less relevant for this analysis 
than the framework by Hall & Soskice (2001b) and Estévez-Abe et al. (2001), since they 
do not put human capital in the centre of attention. For these reasons, this study chooses to 
use a non-configurational approach and to analyse the possible effects of institutional char-
acteristics independently from of each other.     
2.2.3 Synthesis of the theory and deduction of hypotheses – a multilevel model 
As shown in this section, classical human capital theory, which predicts a clear training 
advantage of men over women, is not able to explain recent empirical results on the gender 
training gap. Hence, additional approaches should be taken into account when analysing 
the gender training gap. On the individual level, arguments by Lazear & Rosen (1990) 
suggest that classical human capital rationales are only valid for average women, while 
highly able women should not be disadvantaged. On the institutional level, Estévez-Abe 
(2005; 2006; 2009; 2012) indicates that gender differences are driven by a country’s focus 
on general or specific human capital, which is reflected in its labour market and education-
al system. These differences may be mitigated by institutions supporting investments in 
women’s specific human capital. Consequently, the labour market, the educational system 
and the support for women could help to explain cross-country difference in the gender 
training gap.  
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Figure 1: Summary of the assumed relationships – a multilevel model 
 
Graphically, the relationships relevant for the following analyses are summarised in Figure 
1. Most importantly, the effect of gender on training is assumed to interact with ability as 
suggested by Lazear & Rosen (1990): Being a woman may have no impact on training 
participation among highly able employees, while having a negative impact among average 
employees. Further, institutions describing characteristics of a country’s labour market, the 
educational system and support for women are suggested to have differing effects on train-
ing participation of men and women. Here, an interaction with ability is supposed to be 
relevant as well, i.e. the institutional setting may have differing effects on women (and 
men) of differing ability levels. In the following, the assumed effects of the proposed de-
terminants on training and their operationalization are described in greater detail before 
deriving the hypotheses to be tested in Chapter 4. 
Ability, education and the gender training gap 
Although classical human capital theory points to a consistent training disadvantage for 
women, insights by Lazear & Rosen (1990) suggest that this is only true for a proportion of 
female employees. Women with high ability should not suffer from statistical discrimina-
tion. Moreover, if their labour market attachment is comparable with the attachment of 
men, investment rationales from an employee’s perspective should also not differ between 
men and women.  
While the ability of an individual is usually difficult to observe, education is a common 
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proxy for ability in economic studies. This is because human capital theory assumes in-
vestments in human capital to be directly related to the expected returns of these invest-
ments. Individuals of higher ability should be willing to invest more heavily in their educa-
tion and training than others as they can expect higher returns from that training than indi-
viduals of lower ability (Becker, 1962: 46; Mincer, 1958: 285-287). This rationale is equal-
ly valid for previous education as for continuous training: Highly able individuals seek 
higher educational levels at younger ages and train more often during their employment 
career than less able individuals. This leads to a strong correlation between initial educa-
tion and continuous training. Besides, Cunha & Heckman (2007: 31) argue that skill in-
vestments at different stages are complements and individuals that already possess certain 
skills can acquire others more easily. The authors point out the importance of dynamic skill 
complementarity. This means that skills acquired in one period augment the productivity of 
skill investments at later periods, i.e. skills are synergistic. Hence, educational investment 
at early ages makes later investment more fruitful. In a similar vein, the authors assume a 
self-productivity of skills, i.e. they assume skills to be “self-reinforcing and cross fertiliz-
ing” (Cunha & Heckman, 2007: 35). Following Cunha & Heckman (2007), if skill com-
plementarity and self-productivity are important for skill development, all current skill 
development can be seen as determined by previously acquired skills. Therefore, if previ-
ous skill investment was rather meagre, an individual may lack certain skills necessary to 
be trained efficiently. For example, for someone who already has good general computer 
skills, learning to use a new software program is usually much easier than for somebody 
who has only very basic computer skills. Further, an employee having broad computer 
skills can combine the skills learned for the new program with the existing skills and create 
synergies. Consequently, for an individual that is already highly skilled, picking up new 
skills is not only easier than for lower skilled individuals; investments in new skills also 
promise higher returns since they can be combined with existing skills.
8
  
As a result, there should be a high correlation between initial education and training, due to 
different individual returns caused by differences in ability and the opportunities to realize 
synergy effects between existing and newly acquired skills. Employers’ decisions to invest 
in their employees’ training should be determined by similar rationales. As they also seek 
for the highest returns on their investments they should attempt to invest in the most able 
employees (Acemoglu & Pischke, 1998). Although ability is difficult to observe for em-
                                                 
8
 Fahr (2005: 92) explains training differences between higher and lower educated employees by an alterna-
tive approach. He finds higher educated employees to have a taste for training as they invest considerable 
more time in (non-formal and informal) educational activities than lower educated employees do. They ap-
pear to “love to learn” since they train more than others, even if their wages are not influenced by their edu-
cational activity. In a similar vein, Fouarge, Schils, & de Grip (2013) find lower educated to have a lower 
willingness to train than higher educated even though training promises high returns for them. The authors 
explain this with differences in preferences, which is in line with Fahr’s (2005: 76) notion of a “taste for 
educational activities”. As long as these tendencies do not differ between men and women, they should not 
have an impact on the model assumptions on the gender training gap in this study. 
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ployers, they can proxy it by previous education. This may also provide information on 
possible synergies between new and existing knowledge. Consequently, more highly edu-
cated employees would not only be willing to invest more in training themselves, they 
would also receive more employer provided training. 
Thus, in line with previous economic studies, in this study, education will serve as a proxy 
for ability. Here, a distinction will be made between individuals with and without a degree 
in tertiary education (hereafter synonymously called “university education” or “degree”) 
while more detailed distinctions in terms of education will be ignored. This makes sense as 
the assumptions by Lazear & Rosen (1990) referring to the differences in investment in-
centives for women’s human capital distinguish between highly able employees and others. 
When education is used as a proxy, the highest level of ability should be equal to the high-
est level of education, which is a degree in tertiary education. Henceforth, individuals hold-
ing a university degree will be defined as “highly educated employees” (or “highly able 
employees”) while individuals without university education will be denoted “lower educat-
ed employees” (or “employees of average ability”).  
Based on theoretical arguments, lower educated women could be disadvantaged in two 
ways: First, because they are women and second because they did not receive higher edu-
cation. These two effects do not necessarily add up but may interact, as proposed by 
Lazear & Rosen (1990). Highly educated women should suffer less statistical discrimina-
tion by their employer and have higher self-interest in investing in their human capital as 
they are similar to men in their labour market attachment and turnover. On the contrary, 
women without university education should be confronted with labour market returns that 
are more easily outweighed by non-market returns. This not only offers them lower incen-
tives to invest in human capital but also induces statistical discrimination by the employer. 
Consequently, lower educated women should be disadvantaged compared to men as pro-
posed by classical human capital theory, while highly educated women should not be af-
fected to the same extend. Therefore, Hypothesis 1a and b assume: 
There is a gender training gap among employees without a university degree (Hy-
pothesis 1a). 
The gender training gap among employees with a university degree is smaller than 
among employees without a university degree (Hypothesis 1b). 
The labour market and the gender training gap 
A focus on long-term employment should foster investments in specific training which is 
at odds with female training preferences. Further, employers should have a preference for 
investing in long-term employment relations with men instead of women, as long-term 
investments in men are less risky. To describe the long-term orientation in a labour market 
the mean tenure of all employees in the labour market is frequently used in empirical stud-
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ies (e.g. Estévez-Abe et al., 2001). In line with that, differences in mean tenure will be con-
sidered in order to analyse differing effects of the labour markets’ long-term orientation on 
men and women. This leads to Hypothesis 2:  
The longer the mean tenure in a country, the less do women train compared to men.  
To raise employability, unions should have an interest in fostering training for their mem-
bers. Additionally, wage compressions caused by collective bargaining as well as long ten-
ure rates should lead to a raise in training as it provides employers with incentives to train. 
Strong industrial relations should consequently lead to more training. However, union pol-
icies could have differing effects on training participation of men and women. Empirical 
results support median voter theory, which indicates that unions focus more strongly on the 
interests of their male members. As women’s training preferences differ from men’s, 
strong industrial relations could lead to a training advantage for men. This relationship 
should be stronger for lower educated employees than for highly educated ones, as unions 
are more likely to have an impact on training of lower educated employees. Therefore, the 
presence of strong unions should be especially relevant for the gender training gap between 
men and women without university education.  
Union density is frequently used as a proxy for union influence (e.g. Brunello, 2004, Bas-
sanini et al., 2007; Dieckhoff et al., 2007; Edlund & Grönlund, 2008). However, as Bassa-
nini et al. (2007: 239) state, this often happens due to data availability, while “the variable 
of interest in the empirical analysis is union coverage”. The reason is that training partici-
pation of all employees covered by collective bargaining should be influenced by unions’ 
policies independently of the question if the individual is a union member or not. On the 
contrary, union members that work in jobs, which are not covered by collective bargaining 
might not be influenced by union policies. To ensure comparability with other studies but 
also to depict the possible effects of unions’ policy on training in a better way, the follow-
ing analysis includes both union density and bargaining coverage. A higher union density 
and bargaining coverage are seen as a sign for strong unions. These rationales lead to Hy-
pothesis 3a and b: 
The higher union density and bargaining coverage, the less do women train com-
pared to men (Hypothesis 3a).  
This relationship is more pronounced among employees without a university degree 
(Hypothesis 3b). 
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The educational system and the gender training gap 
Following the VoC approach, educational systems either focus on specific or general hu-
man capital. Specific human capital, which is supposed to be negatively related to gender 
equality, is mostly imparted in vocational programmes while general human capital, which 
is more gender neutral, is imparted at universities (Estévez-Abe et al., 2001). The focus in 
the initial education system should then be perpetuated in the continuous training.  
Since labour market attachment of lower educated women is assumed to be lower than of 
highly educated women, the latter are assumed to be more likely to drop out of the labour 
market (at least temporarily). Because lower educated women are less likely to return to 
their previous job after childbirth, they and their employers are less likely to invest in these 
women’s specific human capital. Highly educated women, in turn, are more likely to return 
to their former post, which makes investments in their specific human capital more likely. 
Estévez-Abe et al. (2001) suggest that the importance of the vocational system is reflected 
in the share of a cohort that participates in initial vocational training programmes. Coun-
tries with a high share of vocational participants are therefore assumed to appreciate spe-
cific human capital, which leads to more gender inequalities. Analogously, the importance 
of the university system may be mirrored in the rate of university graduates in a cohort. 
Countries with a high share of university graduates are assumed to appreciate general hu-
man capital, which is related to less gender inequalities. Overall, this leads to Hypothesis 
4a and b: 
The stronger the focus on specific human capital in the educational system (high 
share of vocational students, low share of university graduates), the less do women 
train compared to men (Hypothesis 4a). 
This relationship is more pronounced among employees without a university degree 
(Hypothesis 4b). 
Support for women and the gender training gap    
As Estévez-Abe (2005) points out, women need more institutional support than men to 
invest in specific training. Gender differences in the labour market in general and in train-
ing participation may be mitigated by policies providing incentives for women to return to 
the labour market early after childbirth. Estévez-Abe et al. (2001) postulate that affordable 
childcare is the most important institution leading to more gender equality on the labour 
market. Childcare, supporting mothers to return to their jobs early after childbirth, should 
lead to higher incentives to invest in female human capital. On the contrary, other family 
policies may widen inequalities between men and women in the labour market. Following 
Estévez-Abe (2005), it is argued that long maternity leaves give incentives for mothers to 
stay out of the labour market for a longer period of time. Child benefits could have a simi-
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lar effect as maternity leave policies. Especially for lower educated women who may have 
low expected labour market returns, generous benefits could be an incentive not to return 
to their job early after childbirth. Thus while high levels of childcare should support female 
labour market participation and reduce female disadvantages in terms of training, long ma-
ternity leaves and generous child benefits should lead to a training disadvantage for wom-
en. 
These effects are likely to differ for women with and without university degree. As labour 
market returns of lower educated women are usually lower, their time out of the labour 
market should be more strongly linked to public provision of childcare, maternity leave 
policies and child benefits. In contrast, highly educated women usually have a better bar-
gaining position at the labour market and do not depend as much on institutional support. 
This leads to Hypothesis 5a and 5b:  
The higher the incentives for women to return to the labour market early after 
childbirth (high levels of childcare, short maternity leaves, low child benefits), the 
more do women train compared to men (Hypothesis 5a).  
The relationship between these incentives and training is more pronounced among 
employees without a university degree (Hypothesis 5b). 
The previous hypotheses describing relationships between national institutions and training 
are based on socioeconomic arguments. However, there might also be systematic gender 
inequalities that are caused by underlying cultural effects not accounted for in the previous 
assumptions. The institutional support for women could also take other forms like general-
ly positive attitudes towards female labour market participation and success etc. which are 
difficult to assess but should have an impact on training participation of women as well. 
Here, observable gender differences in the labour market can serve as proxies for these 
underlying supportive institutions. Estévez-Abe (2006) states that employment equality can 
indirectly capture cultural effects which also affect other gender differences in the labour 
market. Likewise, Dieckhoff & Steiber (2011) interpret their finding of a lower gender 
training gap in Scandinavian countries as the consequence of high female labour market 
participation and a modern gender culture. In line with that, this study uses employment 
equality as a proxy for favourable overall labour market conditions for women (which may 
be constituted by a diverse range of policies in a particular country). Further, pay equality 
may reflect the overall conditions for women’s labour market success while educational 
equality between men and women may reflect attitudes towards women’s education in a 
country.  
Gender equality in terms of labour market participation, pay and education serve as proxies 
for labour market structures that facilitate gender equality in general. The measures may be 
also interpreted as reflecting attitudes towards traditional gender roles, especially concern-
ing women’s labour market participation and success. Therefore, they are assumed to be 
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related to training equality between men and women. They are included in the model to 
control for underlying cross-country differences not accounted for by the national institu-
tions referring to the support for women or the other two spheres. The relationships should 
be equally relevant for all women, since they depict a general pattern on the labour market. 
This is pointed out in Hypothesis 6: 
The higher the gender equality in the labour market, the more do women train com-
pared to men.  
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3 DATA AND METHOD 
This section describes the statistical basis of the empirical analyses performed in Chapter 
4. First, the micro and macro data used for the analysis are presented. After that, the differ-
ent methodological steps are explained in detail and the rationale for choosing a multilevel 
approach is outlined.  
3.1 Data  
To test the hypotheses on determinants of training participation referring to the micro- and 
macro-level, this study includes individual as well as institutional data. This section gives 
an overview of the dependent as well as the main independent variables used and describes 
their operationalization as well as their sources. A more detailed overview of all variables 
used, including definitions and sources is provided in Table 19 in the Appendix. 
3.1.1 Individual variables  
Individual training data from the first wave of the Adult Education Survey (AES), which is 
part of the EU statistics on lifelong learning, is analysed to test the hypotheses.
9
 This 
household sample survey contains information on training participation of individuals aged 
25 to 64 and was conducted in the European Union, the European Free Trade Association 
and candidate countries between 2005 and 2008.  
Cross-country comparisons on training are usually difficult to conduct since training is 
often defined in different ways (Brunello, 2004: 188). A major advantage of the AES is 
that the same questionnaire is adopted by the national data collection units in each partici-
pating country, which obviously increases comparability.
10
 Data for the following coun-
tries is currently publicly available: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slove-
nia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Due to data restrictions Italy, the Nether-
lands, Croatia and Slovenia are not included in the following analyses.
11
 This leads to a 
dataset containing complete information on 87,843 employees from 22 countries. 
                                                 
9
 The responsibility for the results and conclusions lies with the author and not with Eurostat, the European 
Commission or any of the national authorities whose data have been used. 
10
 Nonetheless, there is still the problem that the same question might be interpreted differently in different 
national contexts (Brunello, 2004: 188). 
11
 For individuals from Italy and Slovenia it is not possible to distinguish between full-time and part-time 
employed. Additionally, tenure cannot be controlled for Italians. The Dutch survey does not provide infor-
mation on the industry. For Croatia information is only available for six out of the twelve institutional varia-
bles analysed. 
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In the survey, individuals were asked about their training participation in the past twelve 
months. Although the AES also states the total number of training incidents, training par-
ticipation is considered as a binary variable as there is a substantial number of employees 
that did not take part in any training at all. Hence, it appears more important to scrutinise 
the differences between participants and non-participants than considering the amount of 
training. As a measure of participation in continuous training, the following survey ques-
tion is used (Eurostat, 2007: 20):  
“During the last 12 months have you participated in any of the following activities with the 
intention to improve your knowledge or skills in any area (including hobbies)?  
a. Private lessons or courses (classroom instruction, lecture or a theoretical and practi-
cal course)  
b. Courses conducting through open and distance education 
c. Seminars or workshops 
d. Guided on the job training”  
Since the aim of the study is to analyse training differences between men and women that 
may have an impact on labour market success, only work-related training should be taken 
into account. As the stated question mixes work-related training with non-work-related 
training, further information has to be considered to limit the outcome variable to work-
related training only. First of all, training that is imparted as guided on-the-job training 
(response “d.”) is work-related per definition. Further, the reason for participating is taken 
into account as well. For a randomly chosen training incident, participants were asked: 
“What was the main reason for participating in <<the name of the….activity>>? 1. Mainly 
Job related, 2. Mainly Personal/Non-job related reasons” (Eurostat, 2007: 23). If the indi-
vidual defined the training activity as mainly job related, the outcome variable “work-
related training” takes the value 1. Additionally, to cover other work-related training that 
might not be defined as strictly job-related, the outcome takes the value 1 as well if an em-
ployee agreed to one of the following purposes for training participation: “1. To do my job 
better and/or improve carrier prospects, 2. To be less likely to lose my job, 3. To increase 
my possibilities of getting a job, or changing a job/profession, 4. To start my own business, 
5. I was obliged to participate
12” (Eurostat, 2007: 23). To sum up, the outcome variable 
“work-related training” takes the value of 1 if the first training incident mentioned by the 
individual is guided on-the-job training, is explicitly defined as mainly job-related, or was 
done for purposes that refer to labour market activities.
13
  
                                                 
12
 Since the analyses only consider employees, training obligation most probably comes from the employer 
and is thus most likely work-related. 
13 
As the dependent variable takes the value of 1 only if the first training incident is defined as work-related, 
participation in work-related training may be underestimated: If an individual took for example two trainings, 
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The survey provides information about the individual’s gender and previous education, the 
main explanatory variables of interest. Education is categorised according to the Interna-
tional Standard Classification of Education (ISCED97), where levels 0-2 cover less than 
upper secondary education, level 3 upper secondary education, level 4 post-secondary non-
tertiary education and levels 5-6 tertiary education. In the following analyses, a distinction 
will only be made between individuals with ISCED97 levels 0-4 and levels 5-6 as the theo-
retical framework distinguishes between employees with and without university education. 
A more detailed distinction between the remaining educational levels is therefore not nec-
essary from a theoretical point of view. Moreover, it does not prove to be very practical 
either, as national education systems below university level are quite heterogeneous in 
terms of the prominence of the different levels. Especially the importance of ISCED97 
levels 1 and 4 considerably varies across countries as the AES data shows.  
Consistent with previous studies on training, further information provided by the survey is 
included as controls. Age is usually associated with lower levels of training (Mure, 2007). 
Warr & Birdi (1998) conclude that lower participation rates of older employees are partly a 
result of a lower mean level of education among older employees. Since female labour 
market participation is nowadays higher than in the past decades, labour market outcomes 
of young men and women are, though still different, more equal than in older generations 
(see e.g. Light & Ureta, 1990 or Pencavel, 1998). When analysing the effects of gender and 
previous education on training, it is therefore important to control for age in order to avoid 
mixing up gender, educational and age effects. To control for possible age effects on train-
ing, the year of birth is used to calculate the individual’s age by subtracting it from the year 
the individual was surveyed. As the minimum age of survey participants is 25, 25 is sub-
tracted from the actual age of the individual. Age is included in raw and squared form 
since it was found to have a positive impact on training participation for younger workers 
but a negative effect on older workers’ participation (see e.g. Thangavelu, Haoming, Che-
olsung, Heng, & Wong, 2011).  
The following analyses also control for occupational details that are supposed to be corre-
lated with the main explanatory variables gender and education. Tenure is included as it is 
                                                                                                                                                    
one work-related and one non-work-related, and stated the non-work-related first, this individual would be 
characterized as not having participated in training, though he or she actually did participate. However, only 
a very small share of individuals qualifies for such a possible underestimation of training: Only 1.5% of all 
individuals in the sample were found to take non-work-related training while having participated in more 
than one non-formal training incident. Further, as this study focusses on training differences, i.e. a relative 
measure, and not on absolute training levels, this underestimation of training participation would only be 
relevant if different groups of employees were affected differently by this phenomenon. In fact, about 3.4% 
of highly educated women in the sample might suffer from this underestimation while 2.1% of highly edu-
cated males might be underestimated in terms of training participation; among lower educated females the 
share is 1.3% while it is 0.7% among lower educated men. Relative female training participation might there-
fore be slightly underestimated among both highly and lower educated employees. Still, such possibility of 
underestimation does not mean that an underestimation really happened for these women. They might just as 
well have actually taken part in more than on training incident but none of these trainings was work-related. 
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found to have an impact on training (see e.g. Bassanini et al., 2007 or Jones et al., 2008) 
but may also correlate with gender and education because lower educated women are sup-
posed to have higher turnover and hence shorter tenure rates than men (Royalty, 1998). 
Further, a dummy for part-time employment is included to take into account the higher 
probability of women working in part-time employment. This is necessary to avoid con-
founding the effect of part-time on training with the gender effect as several studies find 
part-time employed to take part in less training than full-time employed (e.g. Büchel & 
Pannenberg, 2004; Bassanini et al., 2007; Maximiano, 2012).  
The incident of training differs between different occupations (Polachek, 1981; Desjardins, 
Rubenson, & Milana, 2006) and industries (O’Halloran, 2008; Evertsson, 2004; Veum, 
1996). Since individuals of different gender and education might not be equally distributed 
among different occupations and industries, the occupation is considered as ISCO-88 (In-
ternational Standard Classification of Occupations), coded at 2-digit level and the econom-
ic activity of the local unit is taken into account by the inclusion of dummy variables for 
different NACE (Nomenclature statistique des activités économiques dans la Communauté 
européenne) classes. Further, employees in small companies train less than employees in 
bigger companies (Dieckhoff & Steiber, 2011; Desjardins et al., 2006). Again, an equal 
distribution of women and people without tertiary education cannot be assumed. Unfortu-
nately, the AES does not include company size. Still, it asks for the number of persons 
working at the local unit. Therefore, dummies for different number of persons in the local 
unit are included in the models.  
The survey was conducted between the first quarter of 2005 and the second quarter of 
2008. However, the single national surveys usually only took a few months (between one 
and seven quarters between the first and the last individual surveyed). To avoid measuring 
effects of the overall economic cycle instead of actual country-effects, year dummies are 
included as controls. Previous studies suggest people living in densely populated areas 
have different training patterns than people in thinly populated ones (Desjardins et al., 
2006). Therefore, analyses also control for the degree of urbanisation. The survey inter-
views were conducted in different ways. Most countries used face-to-face interviews while 
others used a mix of different interview methods. To control for possible selection bias due 
to differences in the interview methods, dummies for the different types of interviewing are 
also included.  
Although the AES surveys individuals independently of their employment status, analyses 
are restricted to employees. Unemployed individuals also frequently participate in work-
related training. However, their training usually differs from training in companies and is 
often financed by the state. Self-employed individuals are excluded from the analyses, 
since their training behaviour is supposed to differ from the behaviour of employees 
(Pfeiffer & Reize, 2001). This might be due to specific characteristics of the self-
employed. Further, as this analysis focuses on inequalities, assumptions for employees and 
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self-employed should differ since training decisions of employees do not entirely depend 
on their own perceptions but also on the employer’s preferences. So employees may be 
affected by discrimination while self-employed may not.  
In summary, the AES offers the ideal data basis to answer the proposed research questions 
and to test the hypotheses. Most importantly, the survey refers to work-related training and 
includes the conventional variables necessary to control for when analysing the gender 
training gap. Further, the AES provides survey information that is comparable across 22 
European countries. This allows scrutinizing cross-country differences in the gender train-
ing gap and running multilevel models in the empirical analyses. Moreover, all country 
samples are large enough to allow limiting certain analyses to subsamples of employees of 
higher and lower education without fearing to loose representativeness due to too few ob-
servations.  
3.1.2 Institutional variables 
In addition to the AES, macro data on the different national institutions is taken into ac-
count. If available, data for 2006 is used since most national surveys were conducted in 
2006 and 2007 and therefore (mostly) refer to training incidents in 2006. 
To cover the characteristics of the labour market, mean tenure, union density, bargaining 
coverage and female union membership are used. Mean tenure is calculated on the basis of 
the AES data for every country as average years employees have been working for the 
same employer. Measures for union density and bargaining coverage are based on Visser 
(2011) and defined as “net union membership as a proportion [of all] wage and salary 
earners in employment” and as “number of employees covered by collective bargaining 
agreements as a percentage of all wage and salary earners” (data on bargaining coverage is 
not available for Romania). A higher union density and bargaining coverage are seen as a 
sign for strong industrial relations in a country.  
The proposition of a male training advantage in the presence of strong unions which based 
on the median voter theory requires a male dominance in trade unions. However, the share 
of women among union members strongly differs across European countries: While the 
share of women is well below 50% in many European countries, women in Scandinavia 
and the Baltic countries are more strongly represented in unions than men (see Table 26). 
Thus, data form the European Trade Union Institute (2012) serve to depict the percentage 
of women among union members. This is a proxy for women’s influence in trade unions 
and helps to verify assumptions based on the median voter theory. Unfortunately, data on 
female union participation is not available for all unions in the countries analysed.
14
 As the 
                                                 
14
 For Greece and Cyprus, no data is available. For Denmark, France, Hungary, Lithuania, Portugal, and 
Romania data for one union is always missing. Measures for these countries may therefore be biased. 
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share of female unionists in the country is only based on the available data, results based 
on this measure ought to be interpreted with caution. 
The educational system is described by two indicators. On the one hand, the rate of univer-
sity graduates in a cohort is taken as a sign for a more general human capital focus in the 
educational system. This data is provided by Eurostat (2011d). Moreover, as a measure of 
skill specificity in the educational system the share of a cohort that participates in initial 
vocational training is taken from the publicly available UNESCO (n.d.) data centre. 
Different measures of support for women in a country are considered. Most importantly, 
institutional support for mothers in terms of childcare, maternity leave and child benefits is 
taken into account. Levels of childcare are measured by two indicators provided by Euro-
stat: The share of children below the age of three in childcare for at least 30 hours per week 
(Eurostat, 2011c) and the share of children from the age of three to compulsory school age 
in childcare for at least 30 hours per week (Eurostat, 2011b). Maternity leave is defined as 
paid maternity leave for a single child in weeks and child benefits as the maximum amount 
paid per child in 100€ (European Commission, 2012). Additionally, employment equality, 
degree equality and pay equality serve to measure means of support for women that are not 
captured by the previous variables. These three more indirect measures of support should 
provide an understanding for overall gender equality on the labour market. Gender em-
ployment equality is measured as the employment gap in percentage of the working men, 
multiplied by (-1) (Eurostat, 2011a). Gender degree equality serves to take into account 
differences in qualification patters of men and women in the national contexts and is meas-
ured as the gender degree gap in percentage of men with a degree in tertiary education, 
multiplied by (-1) (Eurostat, 2013). Furthermore, gender pay equality is included to opera-
tionalize gender differences in labour market outcomes. It is calculated on the basis of data 
by Eurostat (2012) as hourly pay of men minus hourly pay of women in percentage of 
men’s pay, multiplied by (-1).  
3.2 Applied method 
Table 1 describes the methodological procedure. The analysis will follow three basic steps, 
leading to a multilevel analysis. First, individual (level-1) data on participation in work-
related training is analysed for each country. Effects for women with and without higher 
education are separated by the inclusion of an interaction term for females without a uni-
versity degree. Afterwards, the difference in training participation between men and wom-
en in a country will be explained by national institutions, summarizing the three potentially 
relevant areas deduced in the previous chapter: the labour market, the educational system, 
and the support for women. This country-level (level-2) analysis gives a first impression of 
the relationships between the theoretically proposed variables and continuous training. As 
it uses both macro and aggregated micro data, it can be seen as the first step to a multilevel 
analysis. This stepwise proceeding helps to introduce the concepts underlying a multilevel 
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analysis, which is finally conducted in the third step. Contrary to the second step, multi-
level analysis allows including individual data in a non-aggregated form. This way indi-
vidual and country data can be analysed simultaneously. More specifically, multilevel logit 
models are developed to explain work-related training by gender, education and national 
institutions. Initially, this is done on the basis of the entire sample. However, as the im-
portance of the institutional variables is supposed to differ for men and women with differ-
ent educational backgrounds, eventually, this process is repeated for employees with and 
without a degree separately.  
Table 1: Methodological procedure 
 Level Dependent variable Method Independent variables 
1 individual (level-1) work-related training  logit (by country) 
gender, education & 
interaction gen-
der*education 
2 country (level-2) 
linearly transformed 
female OR of work-
related training by 
country 
simple OLS-
regressions 
national institutions  
3 
individual & country 
(level-1 & level-2) 
work-related training  
multilevel logit (all 
employees & by 
education)  
gender, education, na-
tional institutions & 
interactions gen-
der*institution   
The multilevel approach is appropriate because the theoretical models include assumptions 
on characteristics at individual- as well as at country-level. Since individuals living in one 
country are likely to be more similar in unobserved characteristics than randomly chosen 
individuals from different countries, error terms within a country are likely to be correlat-
ed. As Kreft & Leeuw (2007: 9) put it: “The sharing of the same context is a likely cause 
of dependency among observations.” In this case, a simple logit-estimation, which assumes 
individual observations to be independent, would lead to biased standard errors. Standard 
errors would be underestimated for country-level variables because simple logit models do 
not control for the fact that the within-country-variance of these variables is zero, i.e. the 
value of these variables is equal for all individuals in the same country. On the other hand, 
standard errors would be overestimated when looking at individual-level covariates where 
the between-country-variance is zero, i.e. the mean value of the variables at country-level 
is equal to the overall mean of that variable (E.g. the age composition of employees may be 
fairly similar across all European countries. Country means should therefore not differ 
much from the overall mean.).
15
 Thus, assuming an ordinary regression model when a mul-
tilevel model is true can lead to too small p-values for variables at country-level, and to too 
large p-values for variables at individual-level (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2008: 130).          
                                                 
15
 For a formal discussion of this problem see Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal (2008: 129-130). 
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Another method of challenging the problems caused by the data structure would be to use 
clustered standard errors. Nevertheless, this method treats the structure of data as a nui-
sance and not as a matter of interest. It delivers the correct standard errors and accounts for 
the fact that level-1 units are not independent. However, it does not allow the examination 
of the residual between-cluster-variability in the model. On the contrary, multilevel analy-
sis does not only lead to correctly estimated standard errors, but it also explicitly models 
the clustered nature of the data. This way, it allows investigating the possible sources of 
variations within and across countries and provides the possibility to analyse which varia-
bles explain individual differences and which variables explain country-level differences. 
Moreover, it permits statements on the scope of the cross-country variation that can be 
explained by the model variables (Carle, 2009: 1-2).
16
  
Applied to this study, when analysing differing effects of gender in different national set-
tings, multilevel analysis allows estimating a “fixed” gender effect (included in the “fixed 
part” of a model) that depicts the mean gender effect on training across all countries. This 
coefficient is the comparable to the one usually estimated in ordinary regression analysis. 
In addition to that, multilevel models can compute a “random effect” (included in the “ran-
dom part” of a model) that defines the cross-country variation of the gender effect. Further, 
the multilevel analysis shows how these random effects may be explained by interactions 
of national institutions with individual variables. To sum up, multilevel analysis is used 
because it permits to consider the micro-macro structure of the data and describe the inter-
action of individual and national characteristics in one empirical model.  
To get a better overview of the data and its structure, a stepwise approach, based on the 
“two-step-analysis” by Kreft & Leeuw (2007), is performed in the first place. Therefore, 
individual-level data is scrutinized by country. After that, results of the individual country 
models are regressed on macro-level data. This can be seen as a first step towards multi-
level modelling and provides a first impression on the relationships between national insti-
tutions and the gender training gap. Only after that, a multilevel analysis is performed. The 
following subsections describe each of the three analytical steps leading to a multilevel 
analysis.   
3.2.1 Individual-level  
The individual-level data can provide a picture of the individual determinants of training 
participation in different countries. Therefore, separate logistic regressions are run for each 
country. First, as usually found in the literature, models are estimated without distinguish-
ing between women of different educational backgrounds. Afterwards, models distinguish 
                                                 
16
 A more detailed description of the method and the interpretation of its results will be given in chapters 
3.2.3 and 4.4.  
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between women with and without a university degree by including an interaction term for 
females without tertiary education. Formally, the models can be described as  
                                         ̃       (1)17  
                                                  ̃       (2)  
with yi=1 indicating an individual’s training participation in the past 12 months, x1 indicat-
ing the individual being female and x2 having no degree, while  ̃ is a matrix covering a 
number of control variables (age (simple and squared), tenure, part-time employment, oc-
cupation, industry, size of the local unit, year of the survey, degree of urbanization, and 
interview method) and  i is the logistically distributed error term. Equation (1) shows the 
conventional model without distinguishing between women with and without a degree. 
Equation (2) specifies the extended model which includes the interaction between gender 
and education ß3x1x2, representing an additional effect on training for women without a 
degree.   
3.2.2 Country-level 
To explore possible connections between the gender training gap and institutional settings, 
estimates for female training participation previously calculated in the country regressions 
are used as outcome for simple regressions with institutional variables. These country-level 
variables cover the potentially relevant institutions deduced in Chapter 2.2. Similar to the 
“two-step-analysis” explained by Kreft & Leeuw (2007: 35-47) this is a first step towards 
multilevel modelling. In the two-step-analysis, separated models with individual variables 
are first estimated for each country. The parameters estimated in the first step, are then 
used as outcome variables to be explained by macro-variables.  
The two-step-analysis usually predicts all level-1 coefficients by macro variables. Never-
theless, as the primary interest of this study lies in gender differences in training, the two-
step procedure will only be used to explain the differences in the training probability of 
women compared to men. Thus, applied to this study, the gender coefficients estimated for 
each country will be explained by institutional variables referring to the labour market, the 
educational system or the support for women. Even so, the underlying principles outlined 
by Kreft & Leeuw (2007) still apply.  
                                                 
17
 The following interpretation of the empirical results of the individual-level and multilevel analyses will be 
based on odds ratios instead of log odds which are implied by the formulas displayed in this section. This is 
because the interpretation of the results as odds ratios fits well with the statements in the proposed hypothe-
ses (advantages of the use of odds ratios will be discussed in detail in Section 4.2). However, as odds ratios 
are only a different way to express the empirical results of logit regressions and logit formulas are usually not 
expressed in odds ratios, the above stated way is chosen to formalize the assumed relationships.  
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Usually, two-step-analysis uses OLS as an estimation method for the micro as well as for 
the macro-level regressions. However, since training participation is a binary variable, in 
this study, logit regressions will be used at the micro-level. Compared to OLS outcomes, 
they cannot be directly used as dependent variables in the macro-level OLS regressions, 
since they do not follow a linear distribution. Therefore, estimates are transformed into a 
linear pattern first.
18
 The macro-level regressions of the transformed estimates on national 
institutions can provide a first impression on which institutions might explain the differing 
gender training gaps across Europe. Formally, the regressions can be illustrated as 
                  (3) 
with ßj representing the training participation of females relative to comparable males in a 
specific country, zj representing an institutional characteristic of the country referring to the 
labour market (mean tenure, union density, bargaining coverage, share of female unionist), 
the educational system (university graduates, vocational students) or the support for wom-
en (childcare, maternity leave, child benefits, employment equality, degree equality, pay 
equality) and  j being a normally distributed error term. In line with the individual-level 
analysis, the country-level analysis first considers institutional effects for women in gen-
eral and then for women of different educational backgrounds. For all women, independent 
of their education, ßj is represented by the country specific coefficients for ß1 estimated by 
Equation (1). When distinguishing by previous education, for women holding a university 
degree ßj takes the country specific values for ß1 estimated by Equation (2). For women 
without a degree, the difference to equally qualified men is composed by the estimates for 
ß1 and ß2 from Equation (2). Therefore, for these women, values for ßj equal the country 
estimates for (ß1 + ß2).  
The two-step-analysis is useful to obtain a first overview of the impact of the macro deter-
minants on individual training participation and to introduce the concepts of multilevel 
modelling. However, it has some disadvantages. As it analyses each country as a separate 
cluster, it is a good way to represent the uniqueness of each country. However, it ignores 
the fact that European countries have many things in common, most importantly for this 
study, shared goals concerning lifelong learning, gender equality and other labour market 
related issues (European Commission, 2010; European Parliament & Council of the Euro-
pean Union, 2006a; 2006b). In the two-step-analysis, information on individuals of differ-
ent countries is not connected because the countries are perceived as being completely iso-
lated entities. As this is an unrealistic assumption, the approach does not properly specify 
the error structure at individual-level and leads to p-values that are somewhat questionable. 
Further, calculating separate regressions for each country leads to level-1 estimates that 
differ in their standard errors, e.g. the “Female” dummy may be highly significant in one 
                                                 
18
 The transformation process will be described in Chapter 4.3. 
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country while being insignificant in another country. The two-step-analysis does not ac-
count for that. In the second step of the analysis, country-values of the level-1 variable of 
interest are included in the level-2 regressions, regardless whether their coefficients are 
significant or not. Thereby, they are treated as if they were equally significant (Kreft & 
Leeuw, 2007: 39, 47).  
The multilevel analysis described in the following paragraph has the advantages of the 
two-step-analysis but also takes into account the possible similarities between European 
countries. It avoids the statistical inaccuracies of the two-step-approach and as the multi-
level model does not estimate unique parameters for every country-context, it is statistical-
ly more parsimonious.  
3.2.3 Multilevel  
To combine individual and institutional data in one model, ultimately a multilevel analysis 
is performed. The underlying assumptions are similar to the ones outlined for the two-step-
analysis. Most importantly, both methods allow supposing that the effects of certain deter-
minants vary systematically across countries. However, one main advantage of multilevel 
models is that although they allow different intercepts and slopes for each country, coeffi-
cients are not estimated separately for each country. Multilevel models rather estimate 
common parameters across all countries. In addition, they can take into account the macro-
level variances of micro-level parameters. These variances are expressed in the “random 
part” of the models – opposed to the “fixed part” which includes the common parameter 
estimates for the coefficients (Kreft & Leeuw, 2007: 41).  
This structure turns multilevel models into an intermediate solution between a standard 
regression, which is highly restricted and ignores the common context within the countries, 
and the two-step-analysis, which is completely unrestricted but defines the context too 
strictly and hence ignores similarities between the countries. In practice, while standard 
regression would interpret individuals from different European countries as completely 
identical, the two-step-analysis would treat them as if they had nothing in common. Statis-
tically, multilevel models therefore lay in the middle of these two poles as they estimate 
more parameters than standard regression but fewer parameters than the two-step-models. 
Thus, to take into account the possible variance in the impact of certain micro-level param-
eters between the countries, instead of estimating models for each country separately, mul-
tilevel models can estimate “fixed effects” (as in ordinary regressions) next to “random 
effects” for micro-level parameters. The latter then represent the countries’ deviation from 
the mean solution (Kreft & Leeuw, 2007: 39, 43). 
The decision to include the variance of a parameter, i.e. to estimate a “random effect” in 
addition to its “fixed effect”, can be taken separately for each parameter. In their simplest 
form, multilevel models only suppose a “random intercept”. In such a model, the regres-
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sion equation is calculated assuming different intercepts for the considered clusters. In oth-
er words: The differences between the clusters are expected to manifest in terms of the 
mean value of the explained variable. In this study, it would mean that countries differ by 
the overall probability in which training provided. In multilevel models, these differences 
are expressed by the intercept variance, which characterises the countries’ deviation from 
the fixed intercept. Thus, the random intercept is a country-level error component, which 
expresses the joint effects of omitted country characteristics or unobserved heterogeneity 
(Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2008: 95). 
In addition to that, “random slope” (also called “random coefficient”) models assume one 
or more other coefficients to vary across the different clusters. This implies differing ef-
fects of certain determinants on individuals from different countries. Graphically, the slope 
of a particular variable differs between the countries, i.e. there is no common slope for all 
individuals in the data set but a different one for each country. To take into account these 
differences, in addition to the variable’s ordinary coefficient (fixed effect), random slope 
models compute the parameter’s standard deviation across countries (random effect). This 
way, the countries’ deviation from the estimated coefficient is expressed by the level-2 
variance of that coefficient. Applied to the gender training gap in Europe, a random slope 
model would account for differing gender effects across countries by assuming varying 
gender coefficients across countries. Thus, country differences in gender effects can be 
modelled by including a random slope for gender (see e.g. Snijders & Bosker, 2012). For-
mally, such a model can be written as: 
      {  (    |             )}  = 
(                )  (                )        ̃         = 
                                    ̃                         (4) 
 
where the first parenthesis represents the parameters that refer to the country specific inter-
cept, i.e. the baseline training probability in a country and the second parenthesis depicts 
the country specific slope which represents the gender effect on training in a country.  
The lower line where the brackets are solved can be interpreted as follows:  00 is a random 
parameter which defines the mean value of the intercept (i.e. the baseline probability of 
training for individuals across all countries).  01zj is the effect of a country specific institu-
tion, explaining part of the intercept variance (i.e. explaining country differences in the 
baseline probability of training).  10x1j defines the effect of the main explanatory variable 
on the individual-level which is gender.  11zjx1j represents the cross-level interaction, more 
specifically the interaction between the individual and the institutional variable, explaining 
part of the slope variance (i.e. explaining country differences in the gender effect on train-
Fixed part Random part 
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ing). The effects of other explanatory variables (age (simple and squared), tenure, part-time 
employment, occupation, industry, size of the local unit, year of the survey, degree of ur-
banization, and interview method) are illustrated by   ̃. These five terms denote the fixed 
part of the multilevel model.  
The random part of the model is composed of three parts: U0j is a logistically distributed 
random variable. The variance of this level-2 residual represents the remaining intercept 
variance across the countries, which is not explained by  01zj. U1jx1j is the interaction of the 
gender variable and a country specific residual (where U1j is a logistically distributed ran-
dom variable). Its variance characterizes the remaining slope variance that cannot be ex-
plained by the cross-level interaction term  11zjx1j.  ij is the logistically distributed individu-
al-level error term.
19
  
In order to detect the institutions relevant for explaining the gender training gap, Equation 
(4) is run including one institutional variable at the time. This rather pragmatic approach is 
chosen due to the limited number of countries (and hence degrees of freedom at country-
level) in the data set. As a result not all theoretically relevant variables may be included in 
the model at once. After that, a comprehensive model is estimated, including all institu-
tional determinates that showed statistically significant coefficients in the single-
institutions-models. This model building process is done for all employees, before it is 
repeated for employees with and without university education separately and leads to three 
different models: One for all employees, one for employees with university education and 
another one for employees without university education. 
Table 2 relates the described methods and data to the hypotheses derived in the theoretical 
section. Preliminary evidence will be drawn from the first two stages of analysis where 
individual and country data is inspected separately. After that, the hypotheses will be tested 
using multilevel analyses as this allows considering individual and country information 
simultaneously and analysing complex structure of the data. 
                                                 
19
 For a detailed description of the underlying assumptions of random slope models see Snijders & Bosker 
(2012: 74-77). 
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Table 2: Summary of hypotheses and method 
Hypothesis Identification strategy 
Differences between women with and without university degree 
H1a: There is a gender training gap 
among employees without a university 
degree. 
H1b: The gender training gap among 
employees with a university degree is 
smaller than among employees without a 
university degree. 
Training odds for women without a degree should be lower 
than training odds for men without a degree. Among employ-
ees with a degree, odds ratios for women should be higher 
than among employees without a degree.   
 Individual-level analyses by country 
 Multilevel analyses by educational groups 
Labour market  
H2: The longer the mean tenure in a 
country, the less do women train com-
pared to men. 
Training odds for women should decrease compared to train-
ing odds for men when mean tenure increases.  
 Regression of country-level odds ratios for females 
on mean tenure  
 Multilevel analyses for all employees 
H3a: The higher union density and bar-
gaining coverage, the less do women 
train compared to men. 
H3b: This relationship is more pro-
nounced among employees without a 
university degree. 
Training odds for women should decrease compared to train-
ing odds for men when union density and bargaining coverage 
increase. The effects should be stronger for women without a 
university degree. 
 Regression of country-level odds ratios for females 
on industrial relations indicators 
 Multilevel analyses by educational groups 
Educational system  
H4a: The stronger the focus on specific 
human capital in the educational system 
(high share of vocational students, low 
share of university graduates), the less 
do women train compared to men. 
H4b: This relationship is more pro-
nounced among employees without a 
university degree. 
Training odds for women should decrease compared to train-
ing odds for men when the share of vocational students in-
creases and the share of university graduates decreases. The 
effects should be stronger for women without a university 
degree. 
 Regression of country-level odds ratios for females 
on educational system indicators 
 Multilevel analyses by educational groups 
Support for women  
H5a: The higher the incentives for wom-
en to return to the labour market early 
after childbirth (high share of childcare, 
short maternity leaves, low child bene-
fits), the more do women train compared 
to men.  
H5b: The relationship between these 
incentives and training is more pro-
nounced among employees without a 
university degree. 
Training odds for women should increase compared to train-
ing odds for men when levels of childcare increase and ma-
ternity leaves and child benefits decrease. The effects should 
be stronger for women without a university degree. 
 Regression of country-level odds ratios for females 
on different incentives to return to the labour market 
 Multilevel analyses by educational groups 
H6: The higher the gender equality in 
the labour market, the more do women 
train compared to men. 
Training odds for women should increase compared to train-
ing odds for men when gender equality in terms of payment, 
employment and degree increase.  
 Regression of country-level odds ratios for females 
on equal opportunity indicators 
 Multilevel analyses for all employees 
 
 
  
 58 
 
As the data used for the analyses mainly consists of survey data, the question of proper 
weighting of the data comes up (see Särndal, Thomsen, Hoem, Lindley, Barndorff-Nielsen, 
& Dalenius, 1978). However, in the following analyses, raw data is used. This is done for 
various reasons: Most importantly, because simulation work and analyses with real data 
show that findings from weighted data diverge only slightly from findings based on un-
weighted data. Weighted and un-weighted data do not seem to diverge widely and there-
fore do not lead to different inferential decisions. Further, estimates become less biased as 
cluster sizes increase (Carle, 2009). Carle (2009: 3) suggests “that with sufficiently sized 
clusters, an analyst may worry less about scaling the weights.” The country-subsamples in 
this analysis range, depending on the specification, from 358 to 11,475 individuals and 
may therefore be concerned as quite large.  
Although several weighting methods for unequal probability of selection have been pro-
posed for multilevel models, there is no well-established estimation method that generates 
consistent parameter estimates (Asparouhov, 2006). More importantly, there is no estab-
lished method or best practice on how to handle the sampling weights in multilevel anal-
yses when only a subgroup of the sampled population is analysed and it is unclear if the 
available methods lead to unbiased results. Besides, little is known about the role of miss-
ing data in multilevel analysis and in addition there is no established method to follow in 
this case (Carle, 2009). Carle (2009: 3) warns against use sampling weights without 
properly adopting them to the data as this could lead to biased parameters. He recommends 
analysing the data without weighting it as the next best option.  
In the following analyses training behaviour of employees is scrutinised, leaving economi-
cally inactive, unemployed and self-employed individuals aside. Further, a considerable 
number of individuals had to be left out of the analyses due to missing data. Most im-
portantly, hypothesis-testing requires separate estimating for employees of different levels 
of education. Since it appears far from clear that the available methods to adapt the AES 
survey weights would lead to unbiased estimates when analysing these subsamples, sample 
weights will not be taken into account.  
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4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
This section presents the empirical findings. After illustrating some descriptive statistics, 
the analysis proceeds as described in the previous chapter: Individual data is first examined 
by country, then institutional variables referring to the suggested institutional spheres la-
bour market, educational system as well as support for women are taken into account to 
explain differences in the gender training gap. Eventually, the multilevel analysis inte-
grates both micro and macro variables. A multilevel model is developed for all employees 
before separating the data set into two subsamples depending on previous education. This 
allows contrasting different institutional determinants for the gender training gap between 
employees of differing educational backgrounds. These models serve as the principal basis 
for the discussion and the evaluation of the hypotheses. 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
The dataset contains complete information for 87,843 employees, including 44,236 men 
and 43,607 women. 25,625 employees have a degree of tertiary education (ISCED97 5 or 
6) while 62,218 do not have a university degree or similar (for sample sizes by country and 
employee groups see Table 20 in the Appendix). Table 3 gives an overview of the sample. 
For each country, the table illustrates the proportion of employees who took part in training 
by country and employee group. About 37% of all employees in the sample received work-
related training in the past twelve months. Overall, European women seem to be more like-
ly to train than men, and employees with a university degree train considerably more often 
than other employees. A t-test indicates that these differences are statistically significant 
(both at p=0.000). 
Nevertheless the incidence of training varies substantially between the countries. Employ-
ees in Sweden are the ones who are most likely to receive training. In the previous twelve 
months 73% of the Swedish employees in the sample received training. By contrast, in 
Romania, Hungary and Greece, only a small minority of employees received any training 
(8%, 13%, and 17% respectively). These findings are similar to the results by Bassanini et 
al. (2007).  
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Table 3: Overall training participation by country and employee group 
Country 
Training participation 
Males Females Degree No degree All 
AT 0.45 0.44 0.63 0.39 0.46 
BE 0.43 0.42 0.55 0.31 0.45 
BG 0.55 0.54 0.60 0.52 0.55 
CY 0.40 0.38 0.54 0.30 0.43 
CZ 0.50 0.41 0.62 0.43 0.47 
DE 0.52 0.52 0.69 0.45 0.53 
DK 0.45 0.48 0.59 0.38 0.47 
EE 0.39 0.49 0.62 0.36 0.46 
ES 0.32 0.34 0.46 0.25 0.33 
FI 0.50 0.55 0.64 0.44 0.54 
FR 0.41 0.39 0.58 0.33 0.41 
GR 0.16 0.19 0.30 0.12 0.17 
HU 0.11 0.16 0.23 0.11 0.13 
LT 0.34 0.47 0.65 0.28 0.42 
LV 0.27 0.45 0.62 0.27 0.36 
NO 0.57 0.61 0.68 0.53 0.59 
PL 0.24 0.31 0.51 0.19 0.28 
PT 0.26 0.29 0.59 0.22 0.28 
RO 0.07 0.09 0.17 0.06 0.08 
SE 0.69 0.70 0.82 0.62 0.73 
SK 0.57 0.51 0.63 0.51 0.55 
UK 0.41 0.44 0.48 0.39 0.46 
Total 0.35 0.38 0.54 0.30 0.37 
N 44,236 43,607 25,625 62,218 87,843 
 
Country codes: AT = Austria, BE = Belgium, BG = Bulgaria, CY = Cyprus, CZ = Czech 
Republic, DE = Germany, DK = Denmark, EE = Estonia, ES = Spain, FI = Finland, FR = 
France, GR = Greece, HU = Hungary, LT = Lithuania, LV = Latvia, NO = Norway, PL = 
Poland, PT = Portugal, RO = Romania, SE = Sweden, SK = Slovak Republic, UK = United 
Kingdom. Estimates based on the AES 2005-2008. 
In most countries, women are more likely to participate in training than men. The female 
training advantage is especially pronounced in the Baltic countries Latvia, Lithuania and 
Estonia (0.45 vs. 0.27, 0.47 vs. 0.34, and 0.49 vs. 0.39). Nonetheless, in the Czech and the 
Slovak Republic, France, Cyprus, Bulgaria, Austria, Belgium and Sweden, the share of 
male employees trained in the past twelve months is higher than the share of female em-
ployees. Hence, figures indicate that the link between gender and training participation 
varies across European countries. The same is true for education. While training participa-
tion of employees with and without a university degree in Bulgaria and the UK differs by 
less than 10 percentage points, the difference in participation in Portugal and Lithuania is 
as high as 37 percentage points. Again, these findings are in line with previous research 
(Arulampalam et al., 2004; Dieckhoff & Steiber, 2011; Roosmaa & Saar, 2010). 
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Figure 2: Probability of training of males and females by education and country 
 
Country codes: AT = Austria, BE = Belgium, BG = Bulgaria, CY = Cyprus, CZ = Czech 
Republic, DE = Germany, DK = Denmark, EE = Estonia, ES = Spain, FI = Finland, FR = 
France, GR = Greece, HU = Hungary, LT = Lithuania, LV = Latvia, NO = Norway, PL = 
Poland, PT = Portugal, RO = Romania, SE = Sweden, SK = Slovak Republic, UK = United 
Kingdom. Estimates based on the AES 2005-2008.  
Figure 2 summarises training participation by country, gender and education. Employees 
are divided into four groups: males that have a university degree, males without one as 
well as females with and without a degree. The black Xs indicate the overall likelihood of 
training participation in each country. Countries are sorted by this indicator. The figure 
shows that differences between the groups exist in all countries. However, there are coun-
tries where training participation differs to a greater extent than in others. Again, it is the 
Baltic countries Latvia and Lithuania that show the greatest training gap between the group 
that is most likely to participate (females with a degree) and the group that is least likely to 
participate (males without a degree). The figure also shows that the gender training gap 
varies across different educational levels. In nine countries (Portugal, Spain, Austria, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Bulgaria, Slovak Republic, and Sweden) the relation-
ship between gender and training is actually reversed between employees with and without 
a degree. This is a first indication that a distinction between different educational levels is 
important when analysing the gender training gap. 
Additional descriptive statistics of all model variables and correlations of the main varia-
bles are provided in the Appendix (Tables 21-27). 
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4.2 Individual-level regressions by country   
This section presents the results of the individual-level analysis by country, described as 
the first analytical step in Chapter 3.2. Table 4 contains the results of the logistic regres-
sions on work-related training for 22 European countries. The model follows the specifica-
tion typically found in previous work without distinguishing between women of different 
educational backgrounds (e.g. Draca & Green, 2004, Green & Zanchi, 1997 or Pischke, 
2001). The estimated coefficients are reported in odds ratios which are generated by expo-
nentiating logit-coefficients. As Buis (2010: 306) states: “Odds have a bad reputation for 
being hard to understand”. Nonetheless, odds ratios are used in the following analyses, as 
their interpretation relative to the baseline perfectly fits the questions raised. Odds ratios 
are a convenient way of analysing inequalities between different groups because they allow 
expressing the odds of training participation of female employees relatively to the training 
participation of males (see also Roosmaa & Saar, 2010: 191). They represent “the ratio by 
which the dependent variable changes for a unit change in an explanatory variable; that is, 
the effect is presented on a multiplicative scale” (Buis, 2010: 305). More specifically, for 
“a unit change in xk, the odds are expected to change by a factor of exp(ßk), holding all 
other variables constant. For exp(ßk)>1, you can say that the odds are ‘exp(ßk) times larg-
er’; for exp(ßk)<1, you can say that the odds are ’exp(ßk) times smaller’” (Freese & Long, 
2006: 178).  
The constant, or baseline odds, is not an odds ratio but the odds when all covariates are 
zero (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2012: 506). It indicates how often an event happens 
(training) relative to how often it does not happen (no training) for the reference group 
(Long, 1997: 51). In Table 4 the baseline odds are the odds of training participation of a 
newly hired, 25 year old male employee with a university degree, working full-time as a 
technician or associate professional in a workplace with 50 or more employees in the man-
ufacturing industry, living in a densely populated area.
20
 For example, in Austria the base-
line odds are 0.969 meaning that within this category, we expect to find about 97 employ-
ees participating in training for every 100 employees that do not participate in training. The 
odds ratio for “Female” means that the odds of training for women are lowered by the fac-
tor 0.785 compared to men (see Buis, 2010). 
 
                                                 
20
 See Tables 23-25 in the Appendix for the distribution of males and females across industries, occupations 
and establishment sizes. 
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Table 4: Conventional country models without interaction (odds ratios) 
 AT BE BG CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR 
Female 0.785** 0.882 1.072 0.775** 0.736*** 0.958 0.982 1.054 1.004 0.923 0.860*** 
No degree 0.784* 0.661*** 0.888 0.872 0.741*** 0.704*** 0.722** 0.721*** 0.673*** 0.863 0.646*** 
Age 1.049*** 1.000 0.980 1.018 1.016 1.024 1.100*** 1.010 1.026*** 1.024 1.003 
Age² 0.998*** 0.999 1.000 0.999** 1.000 0.999*** 0.997*** 0.999** 0.999*** 0.999** 0.999*** 
Tenure 1.000 1.003 1.000 1.011* 1.010*** 1.001 0.999 1.011* 1.007** 1.011** 1.005* 
Part-time 0.928 0.851 0.561** 0.544** 0.711** 0.649*** 1.120 0.692* 0.636*** 0.406*** 0.749*** 
Constant 0.969 2.766*** 1.679** 1.361 1.251 3.804*** 0.787 1.465 0.957 1.380 1.797*** 
Pseudo R² 0.133 0.097 0.040 0.130 0.076 0.125 0.081 0.158 0.088 0.090 0.095 
N 2,602 2,479 3,026 2,649 5,308 3,393 1,847 2,548 8,821 2,444 9,377 
 
 
 GR HU LT LV NO PL PT RO SE SK UK 
Female 1.015 1.238* 0.938 1.505*** 0.934 0.962 0.917 0.910 0.843 0.782*** 1.151 
No degree 0.705** 0.678** 0.562*** 0.765 0.852 0.523*** 0.632*** 0.714** 0.731** 0.816* 0.972 
Age 0.998 1.001 1.050*** 1.032 1.012 1.036*** 0.995 0.978 1.039** 1.037** 0.996 
Age² 0.999 0.999 0.998*** 0.999** 0.999* 0.999*** 0.999 1.001 0.999** 0.999*** 1.000 
Tenure 1.008 0.991 1.028*** 1.004 1.007 1.003 1.010** 0.997 1.000 1.010** 1.004 
Part-time 1.693* 0.565* 0.963 1.531 0.966 0.900 0.939 1.115 0.746** 1.173 0.621*** 
Constant 0.534** 0.288*** 2.144 0.626 1.283 0.939 1.712*** 0.217*** 2.146*** 2.184*** 0.754 
Pseudo R² 0.111 0.068 0.227 0.209 0.087 0.136 0.162 0.101 0.091 0.064 0.042 
N 2,579 4,103 2,222 1,386 2,209 11,450 5,063 6,395 2,477 3,105 2,164 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Models further control for industry, occupation, size of the local unit, degree of urbanization, year of the survey and interview 
method. Country codes: Country codes: AT = Austria, BE = Belgium, BG = Bulgaria, CY = Cyprus, CZ = Czech Republic, DE = Germany, DK = Denmark, EE = 
Estonia, ES = Spain, FI = Finland, FR = France, GR = Greece, HU = Hungary, LT = Lithuania, LV = Latvia, NO = Norway, PL = Poland, PT = Portugal, RO = 
Romania, SE = Sweden, SK = Slovak Republic, UK = United Kingdom. Sizes of the country samples partly differ from the information given in Table 20 because 
in some countries certain industries or occupations had to be dropt as they predicted no variation in the outcome.   
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The findings for the gender training gap are heterogeneous across the European countries. 
In most countries, the estimated odds ratios are roughly around a value of 1 without being 
statistically significant. In Austria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, France and the Slovak 
Republic, the statistically significant odds ratios below 1 indicate a gender training gap for 
women. However, there is evidence for a reverse gender training gap in other countries. 
The female odds ratios in Hungary and Latvia are above 1 and statistically significant. This 
suggests that women in these countries are more likely to train than men. 
The “No degree” dummy is below 1 in all countries and significantly so in 16 out of the 22 
countries indicating a clear training disadvantage for employees lacking university educa-
tion. The control variables show the previously expected signs in nearly all countries (the 
only exception is the significantly positive coefficient for part-time employment in 
Greece). 
The regressions reported in Table 4 follow the conventional model. To examine the gender 
training gap for women with and without a degree separately, regressions in Table 5 in-
clude the variable “Female x no degree”, representing the interaction between the “No de-
gree” dummy and the “Female” dummy. The inclusion of interaction terms in logistic re-
gressions can lead to serious problems in the interpretation of marginal effects (Ai & Nor-
ton, 2003). However, these problems do not occur when using odds ratios because odds 
ratios depict “the multiplicative effects…relative to the baseline odds in their own catego-
ry” (Buis, 2010: 307). Contrary to marginal effects, the “interpretation of the odds ratio 
assumes that the other variables have been held constant, but it does not require that they 
be held at any specific values” (Freese & Long, 2006: 179). 
The odds ratio for “Female x no degree” in Table 5 measures the effect of the interaction 
after controlling for both the “Female” and the “No degree” dummy. In other words, the 
“Female” dummy now represents the odds ratio of women holding a university degree 
while the “No degree” dummy stands for the odds ratio of men without university educa-
tion. The interaction term indicates the additional effect on training participation of lower 
educated women, i.e. it measures how much the effect of having a degree differs between 
men and women. The findings thus shed light on the idea that the gender training gap may 
be higher for women without a university degree.   
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Table 5: Extended country models including interaction for females with no degree (odds ratios) 
 AT BE BG CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR 
Female 0.897 1.110 1.168 0.897 1.206 1.072 0.909 1.404* 1.084 0.810 0.867* 
No degree 0.834 0.885 0.950 1.020 0.982 0.767* 0.670** 0.995 0.722*** 0.748* 0.650*** 
Female x no degree 0.838 0.592*** 0.888 0.761 0.541*** 0.846 1.149 0.648** 0.859 1.286 0.988 
Age 1.049*** 1.001 0.980 1.019 1.018 1.023 1.099*** 1.011 1.027*** 1.023 1.003 
Age² 0.998*** 0.999 1.000 0.999** 0.999* 0.999*** 0.997*** 0.999** 0.999*** 0.999** 0.999*** 
Tenure 1.000 1.002 1.000 1.010* 1.009** 1.001 0.999 1.011* 1.007** 1.011** 1.005* 
Part-time 0.933 0.856 0.560** 0.549** 0.708** 0.653*** 1.114 0.694 0.637*** 0.407*** 0.749*** 
Constant 0.923 2.411*** 1.598** 1.252 0.999 3.630*** 0.826 1.194 0.920 1.522* 1.789*** 
Pseudo R² 0.133 0.100 0.040 0.130 0.078 0.126 0.082 0.159 0.088 0.090 0.092 
N 2,602 2,479 3,026 2,649 5,308 3,393 1,847 2,548 8,821 2,444 9,377 
 
 
 GR HU LT LV NO PL PT RO SE SK UK 
Female 1.027 1.748*** 1.128 1.772** 1.069 1.148* 0.875 0.889 0.784 1.077 1.346** 
No degree 0.712* 0.932 0.685* 0.895 0.956 0.620*** 0.609*** 0.697** 0.691** 1.045 1.150 
Female x no degree 0.978 0.592** 0.727 0.772 0.781 0.745*** 1.061 1.042 1.118 0.636** 0.739 
Age 0.998 1.002 1.050*** 1.032 1.013 1.036*** 0.995 0.978 1.038** 1.039*** 0.995 
Age² 0.999 0.999 0.998*** 0.999** 0.999* 0.999*** 0.999 1.001 0.999** 0.999*** 1.000 
Tenure 1.008 0.990 1.028*** 1.004 1.007 1.003 1.010** 0.997 1.000 1.010** 1.004 
Part-time 1.695* 0.568* 0.965 1.534 0.981 0.905 0.937 1.114 0.744** 1.187 0.628*** 
Constant 0.532** 0.238*** 1.928 0.576 1.174 0.852 1.762*** 0.219*** 2.241*** 1.834*** 0.690 
Pseudo R² 0.111 0.069 0.228 0.209 0.087 0.137 0.162 0.101 0.091 0.065 0.042 
N 2,579 4,103 2,222 1,386 2,209 11,450 5,063 6,395 2,477 3,105 2,164 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Models further control for industry, occupation, size of the local unit, degree of urbanization, year of the survey and interview 
method. Country codes: AT = Austria, BE = Belgium, BG = Bulgaria, CY = Cyprus, CZ = Czech Republic, DE = Germany, DK = Denmark, EE = Estonia, ES = 
Spain, FI = Finland, FR = France, GR = Greece, HU = Hungary, LT = Lithuania, LV = Latvia, NO = Norway, PL = Poland, PT = Portugal, RO = Romania, SE = 
Sweden, SK = Slovak Republic, UK = United Kingdom. Sizes of the country samples partly differ from the information given in Table 20 because in some coun-
tries certain industries or occupations had to be dropt as they predicted no variation in the outcome.  
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Only for Denmark, Finland, Portugal, Rumania and Sweden are the estimated odds ratios 
of the interaction above 1 but none of these coefficients is statistically significant. For the 
remaining 17 countries, the odds ratios for “Female x no degree” are below 1. The effect is 
statistically significant for Belgium, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and the 
Slovak Republic. This means that in these countries, the combination of being female and 
lacking a university degree reduces the training odds on top of the main effects “Female” 
and “No degree”. The findings show that the gender training gap differs for employees of 
different educational backgrounds and suggest a training disadvantage for women without 
a university degree. 
In the new specification, the odds ratios for the “Female” dummy – now representing only 
women with a university education – are generally larger than the ones for the convention-
al models in Table 4, representing all women. Although for eight countries (Austria, Cy-
prus, Denmark, Finland, France, Portugal, Romania and Sweden) the estimated coefficient 
is still below 1, it is only significantly so for France. In France, it seems, women holding a 
university degree have a disadvantage in training and for women without university educa-
tion the odds are only slightly (and not significantly) lower than for women holding a de-
gree. The odds ratios for highly educated women in the remaining 14 countries are above 
1. For five countries the coefficients are statistically significant (Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Poland and the UK) indicating a training advantage of highly educated women over men.  
The comparison with Table 4 reveals that for some countries not only the size but also the 
implied direction of the “Female” dummy changes when distinguishing between women of 
different education. Austria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, which 
have significantly lower training odds of women compared to men in general, do not show 
a significant disadvantage for women with university education. Further, in Poland and the 
UK, training odds for women with a university degree are significantly higher than for 
equally educated men while this is not true for women in general in these countries. 
In most countries, the estimated odds ratios for the “No degree” dummy – now represent-
ing only the values for men without a degree – are larger than in Table 4 but for most 
countries the odds ratios are still below 1, indicating a disadvantage for male workers 
without a degree compared to males holding a degree. However, this disadvantage is 
smaller than the one for the entire group including women and in many countries the coef-
ficients are not significant anymore. While in the conventional model, in which the dummy 
“No degree” represents both men and women, odds ratios are significantly lower than 1 in 
16 countries, models in Table 5 show significantly lower odds for men without a degree in 
only eleven countries. The “No degree” dummy becomes statistically insignificant for Aus-
tria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary and the Slovak Republic. Only for 
Finland does the formerly insignificant odds ratio become significantly lower than 1, indi-
cating a training disadvantage for lower educated men compared to highly educated men 
even though results for all employees in Table 4 do not indicate statistically significant 
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differences between all employees of different education. This suggests that in many coun-
tries, the negative relationship between lower education and training is driven by women 
without a university degree and not significantly by men.  
Overall, the results in Table 5 show that, outside of France, women holding a degree are 
not less likely to train than men. In fact, in some countries, they even have a training ad-
vantage over men. It appears that the combined effect of being a women and having no 
university degree drives an important part of the gender training gap in many countries. 
Essentially, the analyses revealed that, in most countries, women holding a degree are less 
disadvantaged (or in some cases even more advantaged), compared to equally educated 
men, than women without a degree compared to men without a degree. The distinction 
between the two groups of women may be important to understand the pattern of the gen-
der training gap. 
Figure 3: Female training participation compared to male training participation  
 
Country codes: AT = Austria, BE = Belgium, BG = Bulgaria, CY = Cyprus, CZ = Czech Re-
public, DE = Germany, DK = Denmark, EE = Estonia, ES = Spain, FI = Finland, FR = 
France, GR = Greece, HU = Hungary, LT = Lithuania, LV = Latvia, NO = Norway, PL = Po-
land, PT = Portugal, RO = Romania, SE = Sweden, SK = Slovak Republic, UK = United 
Kingdom. 
The regression findings allow for decomposing the training gap for women in general into 
one gap relating to women with a university degree and another one for women without a 
degree. In Figure 3, the estimated odds ratios inferred from the regressions in Table 5 are 
summarised. The hollow circles depict the “Female” dummy from Table 5. Here, the indi-
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cated odds ratios only concern women that have a university degree. Values state the train-
ing odds of women with a university degree relatively to equally qualified men. The solid 
circles define the odds ratios of women without a university degree relatively to men with-
out a university degree. As odds ratios are expressed on a multiplicative scale, for each 
country these values are calculated as the product of the “Female” dummy and the interac-
tion term “Female x no degree” as displayed in Table 5. Countries are sorted by this meas-
ure. 
The figure visualises the finding that the gender training gap differs depending on the level 
of education level: While the odds ratios of women with a degree are usually above the 
value of 1, the odds ratios of women with no degree are mostly below the value of 1. In 17 
countries, women lacking a degree face a stronger disadvantage (compared to similar men) 
than women holding a degree (compared to similar men). In other words, odds ratios of 
lower educated women are lower than odds ratios of highly educated women. Only in five 
countries (Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Hungry and Latvia), women lacking a degree are 
estimated to have higher odds of training than men lacking a degree. Conversely, in 15 
countries, women lacking a degree are estimated to have lower odds of being trained than 
men without a degree (in Greece and the UK the odds ratio is almost exactly 1). In other 
words, a gender training gap still exists in most countries for lower educated women. In 
contrast, the gap is not present in most countries for highly educated women. 
The results show that the gender training gap for women with and without a university 
degree clearly differs. In fact, in half of the countries the gender gap is actually reversed 
for the two educational groups. In nine countries, (Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany, 
Estonia, Spain, Lithuania, Norway, Poland and the Slovak Republic), women with a uni-
versity degree have higher odds of training compared to men with a university degree, 
meanwhile among employees without a degree women have lower training odds than men. 
In Denmark and Finland though, we see the opposite relationship: The training odds of 
women without a degree are slightly higher than the odds of men without a degree while 
the odds of women with a degree are slightly lower than for men with a degree.  
Overall, the results of the individual-level analyses show a consistent pattern. The interac-
tion term “Female x no degree” in Table 5 exerts a negative effect on the odds of training 
participation in most countries. Hence, there is a positive interaction of the two presumed 
disadvantages: Lacking a degree decreases the likelihood of training for women more 
strongly than for men. As this implies, the conventional model as proposed in Table 4 
glosses over a possible negative gender training gap by failing to account for the difference 
between women with and without a degree. Summarizing the results in Figure 3 confirms 
that decomposing the gender training gap between women with and those without a degree 
shows a gender training gap for women lacking a degree in most European countries. A 
distinction between women of different educational levels seems therefore important when 
measuring the gender training gap. 
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4.3 Country-level regressions on national institutions 
The previous section revealed important differences in the gender training gap in different 
European countries. The aim of this section – representing the second step of the analysis 
described under 3.2 – is to find a systematic pattern that may explain these differences. 
Before doing this, however, it is useful to get a better understanding of the country differ-
ences that have been found. Figures 4 and 5 graphically display the relationship between 
gender and training by education in different European countries as displayed in Table 5 
after controlling for other individual and occupational variables. While the representation 
of the impact of a nominal variable like gender in the form of a continuous line is meth-
odologically objectionable, it is convenient to explain the further proceeding of the study 
and the need for a multilevel approach. The figures depict the finding that not only the 
overall levels of training differ strongly across European countries but also the relationship 
between gender and training. This is mirrored in the country specific differences in the 
intercepts and slopes of the lines.  
The different interpretations of slopes and intercepts in a multilevel context can be neatly 
illustrated by the two bottom lines (Romania and Hungary) and the two top lines (Germany 
and Belgium) in Figure 4. While the regression lines for Romania and Hungary are quite 
similar in their intercepts (OR of 0.219 and 0.238), i.e. in their training odds for men hold-
ing a degree, they clearly differ in their slopes: Highly educated women in Hungary have 
higher training odds compared to highly educated men (OR of 1.748) while highly educat-
ed women in Romania are slightly less likely to train than their male counterparts (OR of 
0.889). This means, that while the baseline levels of training in both countries are similar, 
the relationship between gender and training clearly differs across these countries. On the 
other hand, while the absolute training probabilities of men (as well as women) holding a 
degree considerably differ between Germany and Belgium (OR of 3.630 and 2.411), the 
training differences between highly educated men and women are fairly similar as indicat-
ed by the roughly parallel slopes of the regression lines for the two countries (OR of 1.072 
and 1.110). Thus, in these countries, gender seems to have a very similar impact on train-
ing probability of highly educated employees although overall levels of training are differ-
ent. When comparing Figure 4 and Figure 5, it becomes obvious that training levels of 
highly educated employees vary to a higher extent between European countries than levels 
of lower educated employees. 
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Figure 4: Training odds of employees with university degree in European countries
21
  
 
 
Figure 5: Training odds of employees without university degree in European countries  
 
                                                 
21
 Training odds in Figures 4 and 5 refer to newly hired employees who are 25 years old, work full-time as 
technicians or associate professionals in local units of more than 50 employees in the manufacturing industry. 
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As the aim of this study is to identify and explain training differences between men and 
women, these relationships are in the centre of interest. The focus of this section will con-
sequently lie on these training differences while ignoring the absolute training probability 
of the different groups. Therefore, only the odds ratios for women relative to men of the 
same educational group, as represented by the slopes of the country lines in Figures 4 and 
5 (and the “Female” dummy in Table 4 for all women), will be considered in the following 
analyses. The female odds ratios (i.e. the relative training odds of women compared to 
men) will serve as dependent variable in the regression analyses on country-level, while 
differences in the intercepts (i.e. the absolute training odds of men) are ignored at this 
point. The aim is to give a first impression of which institutional variables are relevant to 
explain the gender training gap, independently of the overall probability of training. This 
procedure is the first step to a multilevel analysis, as it is similar to the two-step-analysis. 
Analogous to the two-step-analysis, after estimating different slopes for each country, pa-
rameter estimates for slopes are taken as dependent variables in macro-level regressions 
including country-level explanatory variables (see Kreft & Leeuw, 2007: 38). 
To run OLS regressions at country-level, the odds ratios of women compared to men (as 
summarised in Figure 3 and represented by the “Female” dummy in Table 4) have to be 
transformed into linear patterns first. For odds ratios between 0 and 1 the counter values 
are calculated (i.e. instead of odds for women compared to men, the odds for men com-
pared to women were used). This makes sense, since the “[m]agnitudes of positive and 
negative effects should be compared by taking the inverse of the negative effect (or vice 
versa)” (Freese & Long, 2006: 179). After that, all values are centred at 0 by subtracting 1. 
The values previously calculated as counter values are finally multiplied by (-1) to depict a 
training disadvantage for women.
22
  
The transformed odds ratios are then used as dependent variables in single regressions test-
ing associations with indicators of cross-country differences in terms of labour market, 
educational system and support for women. To avoid very small coefficients, all independ-
ent variables except mean tenure and child benefits are divided by 100. As odds ratios are 
constant across the distribution of independent variables in logistic regressions and a high-
er estimated odds ratio consistently indicates a female advantage, this procedure provides a 
convenient way of linking micro relations to explanatory macro variables. Since the data 
set contains only 22 countries, simple regressions, instead of multiple regressions, are cal-
culated. Findings should therefore be interpreted with caution as some of the institutional 
indicators are correlated (see Table 27 in the Appendix). Thus, significant results may be 
biased because of a “clustering” of institutional variables (Deeg, 2007). 
                                                 
22
 For example, among the highly educated, the odds ratio for Swedish women is 0.784. The counter value is 
1.276; subtracting 1 and multiplying the result by (-1), leads to a value of -0.276 for Sweden. The odds ratio 
for highly educated women in Germany is 1.072; as it is above 1 it transformed in a value of 0.072 by sub-
tracting 1. 
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Table 6 shows the regression coefficients for the estimated training gap for women com-
pared to men. Column (1) resumes the results for all women while columns (2) and (3) 
contain the regression coefficients for the estimated training gap of women holding and 
those lacking a university a degree.   
The long-term orientation of the labour market, as measured by mean tenure, seems to 
hamper women’s training participation compared to men’s. While the coefficient for all 
women slightly misses the 10% significance-level for women holding a university degree, 
it clearly indicates a negative impact of mean tenure on the relative training participation 
compared to men. Regressions on the measures concerning industrial relations show an 
interesting pattern. While union density and bargaining coverage do not seem to have an 
impact on the relative training odds of women without a degree, women holding a degree 
train comparatively less in the presence of strong unions. As men have a training disad-
vantage among employees holding a degree, the findings support the view that unions 
strive for equality among employees. However, when looking at employees without higher 
education there is no evidence for union effects on training equality: Women’s training 
disadvantage among employees without a degree is not balanced by union strength. The 
median voter argument may explain this phenomenon. Since the median union voter is 
usually male, unions primarily support training interests of men. This should be especially 
the case when men are at risk of falling behind women, as it is true among highly educated 
workers. Findings for the female union ratio marginally miss the 10% significance-level 
but generally support this idea: The higher the share of women among union members, the 
more training do women receive compared to men. This is especially true for the more 
disadvantaged women lacking a university degree. The finding indicates that the more im-
portant women are in unions the more do disadvantaged women benefit from union poli-
cies in terms of training. 
Findings on the education and skill system widely support previous assumptions. Women 
train more in countries with strong university systems that are supposed to support the gen-
eration of general human capital while they train less in countries with strong vocational 
systems which are supposed to support more specific skills. While the signs of the 
measures are equal for women with and without a degree, the importance of the determi-
nants seems to vary depending on educational background. The vocational system appears 
to disproportionally handicap women without a degree while the negative coefficient for 
this indicator is not statistically significant for women holding a degree. 
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Table 6: Country-level factors and the gender training gap 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Female vs. male Female, degree vs. 
male, degree 
Female, no degree vs. 
male, no degree 
Labour market    
Mean tenure -0.026 -0.055** -0.015 
 (0.115) (0.020) (0.436) 
R² 0.119 0.243 0.031 
Union density -0.232 -0.652** -0.092 
 (0.236) (0.015) (0.684) 
R² 0.069 0.260 0.008 
Bargaining coverage -0.309** -0.677*** -0.175 
(N=21) (0.034) (0.000) (0.314) 
R² 0.216 0.507 0.053 
Fem. union members 0.810 0.681 0.901 
(N=20) (0.111) (0.380) (0.111) 
R² 0.135 0.043 0.135 
Educational system   
University 0.408* 0.299 0.383 
 (0.084) (0.396) (0.161) 
R² 0.141 0.036 0.096 
Vocational -0.865** -0.826 -0.893* 
 (0.035) (0.179) (0.059) 
R² 0.205 0.089 0.167 
Support for women    
Childcare < 3 0.050 -0.618 0.326 
 (0.866) (0.138) (0.328) 
R² 0.001 0.107 0.048 
Childcare ≥ 3 0.129 0.143 0.102 
 (0.563) (0.660) (0.691) 
R² 0.017 0.010 0.008 
Maternity leave -0.148 -0.240 -0.035 
 (0.649) (0.611) (0.926) 
R² 0.011 0.013 0.000 
Child benefits -0.037 -0.077* -0.022 
 (0.189) (0.056) (0.502) 
R² 0.085 0.170 0.023 
Employment equality 0.382 -0.211 0.791 
 (0.504) (0.800) (0.219) 
R² 0.023 0.003 0.074 
Degree equality 0.396*** 0.285 0.461*** 
 (0.008) (0.216) (0.006) 
R² 0.307 0.076 0.318 
Pay equality 0.580 -0.286 0.653 
 (0.396) (0.775) (0.403) 
R² 0.036 0.004 0.035 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; p-values in parentheses; all regressions are simple regressions with N=22 
if not specified otherwise; the regression on bargaining coverage does not include Romania; the regression 
on female union membership does not include Greece and Cyprus.  
Most of the measures for the institutional support of women show no significant coeffi-
cients. For all women, only the “Degree equality” indicates higher female training partici-
pation the higher the gender equality in terms of education is. As the dependent variable 
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was generated from the country regressions, which controlled for the educational level on 
an individual basis, this effect cannot be interpreted as a simple aggregated effect of wom-
en’s individual education. Gender degree equality can rather be seen as a proxy for atti-
tudes towards female education. Such attitudes are not only relevant for initial but also for 
continuous education and training. The finding of a significantly positive coefficient for 
females without a degree supports this idea: In countries, where the share of highly educat-
ed women is high, training participation among women that do not hold a degree them-
selves is also high (compared to men without a degree). Hence, in line with previous as-
sumptions, gender degree equality appears to reflect a general positive attitude towards 
female education that favours work-related training of women. 
The second indicator of women’s support that suggests an effect on training is the one 
measuring child benefits. The higher child benefits are in a country, the lower the training 
participation of highly educated women is. The effect is in line with the previous assump-
tion that child benefits incentivise women to stay away from the labour market after child-
birth and hence invest less in their continuous training. However, contrary to the findings, 
effects on women without a university degree have been assumed to be stronger than for 
women holding a degree, as opportunity costs of the former are lower when leaving the 
labour market.  
Although a number of the coefficients of the simple regressions are not statistically signifi-
cant, they generally show the previously expected signs and give a first indication on the 
importance of the different institutional variables for female training participation and the 
gender training gap: High tenure and strong industrial relations are negatively linked to 
relative training participation of highly educated women, whereas a strong initial vocation-
al training system is negatively related to training of lower educated employees. High child 
benefits are negatively connected to the relative training participation of highly educated 
women and degree equality appears to especially favour training of lower educated wom-
en. In the following chapter, female training will be further scrutinised in different multi-
level models.  
4.4 Multilevel analysis  
After analysing individual and country data separately, which allowed looking into the 
single countries in greater detail, in the third step a multilevel analysis is performed. This 
way, theoretical underpinnings concerning the micro-macro structure of the data can be 
considered in a more accurate way. It further allows including more than one institutional 
variable at a time, controlling for cluster effects and taking into account the complex data-
structure in one model. Another advantage is that the multilevel logit models permit inter-
preting not only the direction but also the size of the indicated effects, which, due to the 
logit regression at individual-level, was not possible in the previous analysis. 
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The multilevel models are estimated with the xtmelogit command as implemented in 
STATA 12 which provides log likelihood estimates by using Gaussian adaptive quadrature 
as approximation method for the integrals involved (Hamilton, 2011; Rabe-Hesketh & 
Skrondal, 2008). During the process of model fitting the Laplacian approximation (i.e. the 
application of one quadrature point only) is chosen as an option for the estimation proce-
dures. This is convenient to speed up the computational processes. As Hamilton (2011) 
points out, odds ratios and their standard errors are usually well approximated by the La-
placian procedure. Although estimates of the random part might exhibit bias, the resulting 
model log-likelihoods and likelihood-ratio tests should be close to the actual ones. Simula-
tion studies support that idea (Pinheiro & Chao, 2006). Further, asymptotic theory indi-
cates that this approximation improves with larger clusters. In the following analyses, clus-
ter sizes range from 358 to 11,475 individuals, depending on the specification. Hence, the 
Laplacian option is used during the model building process, when competing models are 
compared by using likelihood-ratio tests. However, once the final models are identified, 
the number of quadrature points will be increased to obtain more accurate estimates of var-
iance components for further study.
23
  
The multilevel analysis proceeds in three steps. Initially, the basic model with the individ-
ual-level variables and its fixed and random part is set up. This step provides insights into 
the structure of the gender training gap. More specifically, it helps to answer two ques-
tions. First: Is there a statistically and economically significant gender training gap in Eu-
rope? And second: If there is, are there statistically significant differences in this gender 
training gap between European countries (as indicated by the results in Chapter 4.2)? The 
first question can be answered looking at the fixed parts of the estimated models. The sec-
ond question is addressed when interpreting the random parts of the models. 
In the next step, institutional determinants of the gender training gap are analysed. Country 
variables defining the labour market, the educational system and the support for women as 
well as their interaction terms for female employees are included one-by-one to help ex-
plaining cross-country differences in overall training levels as well as the gender training 
gap. Statistically significant or economically important effects are interpreted and dis-
cussed at that point.  
The two steps are done for all employees and are repeated afterwards for employees of 
different educational backgrounds separately because national institutions are assumed to 
have differing effects on men and women with and without university education. Finally, 
based on these findings, different multilevel models are estimated including all institutional 
variables and cross-level interactions that have been found to be related to training in a 
                                                 
23
 In the final models, 30 quadrature points are used. As these results are almost identical to the ones by La-
placian approximation (only very few estimates and p-values change by at most 0.003), it can be assumed 
that the size of the dataset leads to largely unbiased estimates in the model development process as well.   
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statistically significant way. This is a pragmatic approach for developing a comprehensive 
multilevel model on training and the gender training gap as the limited number of countries 
in the data set does not allow including all institutional variables that might be of theoreti-
cal relevance at once.  
4.4.1 All employees 
Table 7 illustrates the stepwise model development as proposed by Snijders & Bosker 
(2012: 102-108), explaining participation of work-related training for the whole sample of 
European employees. Model 1 depicts the empty model (also: unconditional model or null 
model) with no explanatory variables but a random intercept at country-level. The model 
serves as a baseline for comparison with more elaborated models and allows statements 
about the model fit and the explanatory value of the added variables (see Kreft & Leeuw, 
2007: 63-64). The constant in the empty model indicates that the unconditional odds of 
training for all individuals in the sample are 0.638 to 1: For every 100 employees that do 
not train about 64 employees participate in training. However, the statistically significant 
standard deviation of the random intercept indicates that these training levels vary across 
European countries. The highly significant likelihood-ratio test (which in this case com-
pares the empty multilevel model to the empty simple model) shows that a multilevel mod-
el is indicated as it fits the data structure better than a conventional logit model. 
Table 7: Model development for all employees – level-1 
 1 2 3 4 
FIXED PART     
Female  0.924*** 0.955 0.954 
No degree  0.704*** 0.706*** 0.706*** 
Level-1 controls     
Constant 0.638*** 0.830 0.801 0.847 
RANDOM PART 
SD slope    0.197*** 0.197*** 
SD intercept 0.735*** 0.693*** 0.736*** 0.746*** 
Corr. slope-int.    -0.600*** 
MODEL STATISTICS 
Log likelihood -53441.2 -48948.1 -48900.7 -48897.1 
Parameters 2 42 43 44 
LR test  *** *** *** *** 
Individuals  87,843 87,843 87,843 87,843 
Countries 22 22 22 22 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1;  means that level-1 controls 
are included; reference model for the likelihood-ratio test of 
Model 1: conventional logit model, reference model for Models 
2 to 4: always the previous model.  
In Model 2 in Table 7, level-1 variables are included based on theoretical considerations. 
In line with the logit models in the Chapter 4.2, these are gender and education as well as 
additional variables controlling for age (raw and squared), tenure, part-time employment, 
 77 
 
 
occupation, industry, size of the local unit, degree of urbanization, year and interview 
method. Using the Wald test, all sets of dummy variables included in the model are found 
to be significantly related to training participation (not displayed). Not surprisingly, the 
model fit significantly improves compared to the empty model, which is the reference 
model in this case. Moreover, the standard deviation of the random intercept is reduced. 
This reflects the fact that the inclusion of level-1 variables accounts for some of the cross-
country variation in training levels. That is reasonable, since the composition of job-related 
characteristics like occupation, industry and establishment size that are controlled for in 
Model 2 are likely to differ across European countries. The model further suggests that, in 
contradiction to the impression given by the descriptive statistics, being a woman does not 
result in a higher probability of training participation. Odds ratios even point to a negative 
link between being a women and training participation: Women’s training odds are 0.924 
times lower than men’s training odds. Thus, the fact that female employees are more likely 
to participate in training than men appears to be caused by gender differences in other in-
dividual or firm characteristics such as occupation, industry or establishment size. Despite 
controlling for other variables, employees without university education still seem to be 
clearly disadvantaged when it comes to training. Compared to employees holding a degree, 
training odds of lower educated employees are lowered by the factor 0.706.  
After the level-1 variables are included, the option of allowing for random slopes is con-
sidered. Although random slopes are possible for all level-1 variables, parsimonious mod-
els are preferred (see Snijders & Bosker, 2012: 105). This has not only a theoretical reason 
of the general preference for simpler models but also a practical one. Data usually contain 
less information about random effects than about fixed effects. Therefore, including many 
random slopes can lead to long iteration processes of the estimation algorithm. In some 
cases, the algorithm may even fail to converge. Consequently, a variable should only be 
considered as having a random slope when theoretical reflections indicate that its effect on 
the outcome varies across different contexts. In this case, this is true for the gender variable 
as previous theoretical arguments indicate the gender training gap to differ across coun-
tries. Thus, Model 3 in Table 7 includes a random effect for the “Female” dummy. The 
standard deviation at country-level is 0.197 and highly statistically significant, indicating 
that training odds of women compared to men differ across countries. The inclusion of the 
random effect not only improves the model fit but also affects the fixed coefficient of the 
variable: Including the random slope leads to a statistically non-significant fixed coeffi-
cient of the “Female” dummy. This indicates that being a woman does not have a negative 
effect on training per se, i.e. there does not seem to exist a general gender training gap. 
Instead, the association between being female and training participation varies considera-
bly across countries which leads to significantly different gender effects in different coun-
tries. 
The range of these country differences in the gender training gap can be illustrated, when 
taking into account the fixed and random part of the “Female” dummy (see Snijders & 
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Bosker, 2012: 77-78). A variable with a random slope can be interpreted as a logistically 
distributed random variable with a mean equal to its fixed effect and a country-level stand-
ard deviation as depicted by its random effect. These measures can serve to describe the 
scope of the variance between countries, since in large samples, the logistic distribution 
converges to the normal distribution, and 95% of the probability of a normal distribution 
lies within 1.96 standard deviations from the mean. When expressed in log odds, the fixed 
part of the female dummy coefficient takes the value of ln(0.954)=-0.047.
24
 Consequently, 
95% of the slopes range from (-0.047-(1.96*0.197) to (-0.047+(1.96*0.197)) log odds. 
Expressed in odds ratios, this means that in most of the countries, odds ratios of women 
compared to men should lie between the value of exp(-0.047-(1.96*0.197))=0.648 and 
exp(-0.047+(1.96*0.197))=1.404. That is a considerable variation as it means that women 
train between 0.648 times less than men and 1.404 times more than men. Though generally 
in line with the results in Section 4.2, multilevel analysis hints to slightly more negative 
“Female” effects than the separate country regressions. Here the odds ratios of the “Fe-
male” dummy ranged from 0.782 in the Slovak Republic to 1.505 in Latvia (Table 4).  
Model 3 does not consider the covariance structure between the random parts of the model, 
i.e. assumes all covariance parameters to take the value of zero. Snijders & Bosker (2012: 
79) warn of making this strong assumption since in social sciences the origin of the majori-
ty of variables is arbitrary. Therefore, they claim the intercept-by-slope covariance in ran-
dom slope models to be a free parameter. It should not be a priori assumed to be zero but 
should be estimated from the data. For that reason, the model is re-estimated including a 
covariance parameter for the random effects, in particular the correlation between the ran-
dom slope and the random intercept. The new Model 4 shows a better model fit than Mod-
el 3, which is indicated by the highly significant likelihood-ratio test. The correlation be-
tween random intercept and slope turns out to be significantly negative. This negative cor-
relation suggests that in countries with high baseline levels of training (i.e. male training 
odds, represented by the intercept) the effect of being a woman (represented by the slope) 
tends to be more negative than in countries with low levels of training.  
In the further process of model development, Model 4 will serve as the reference model for 
the interpretation of the random part. This is useful, because the definition of a coefficient 
of determination R² to express the explanatory qualities of a model is problematic in the 
suggested multilevel models. Opposed to single-level models where there is only one 
source of variance, in a two-level model as proposed in this study, “two potential sources 
of variation may be ‘explained’ by explanatory variables” (Kreft & Leeuw, 2007: 64): The 
individual-level differences and the country-level differences. As coefficient of determina-
tion for multilevel models, Snijders & Bosker (2012: 111-113) therefore suggest a measure 
of the proportional reduction in total residual variance compared to the empty model which 
                                                 
24
 As odds ratios are the exponentiated logit coefficients, log odds can be generated by taking the natural 
logarithm of the odds ratio (Buis, 2010). 
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is calculated as an index of the reduction in individual-level variance and country-level 
variance as well as the residual variance. Alternatively, Raudenbush & Bryk (2002) pro-
pose to estimate the proportional reduction in the variance for both levels separately, lead-
ing to one coefficient of determination at the individual- and another one at the country-
level. However, in multilevel models including a random slope, such coefficients of deter-
mination cannot be defined straightforwardly. This is the case because including a random 
slope leads to a total residual variance that is not constant (as it is in random intercept 
models) but depends on the value of the explanatory variable (here the gender variable) 
and is therefore heteroskedastic (for a more detailed description see Rabe-Hesketh & 
Skrondal, 2008: 150-153). But most importantly, the measures suggested by Snijders & 
Bosker (2012) and Raudenbush & Bryk (2002) refer to linear models. While a STATA 
code allowing calculating these measures has recently become available (Möhring & 
Schmidt, 2013), hitherto they have been neither comparable measures nor codes available 
to calculate coefficients of determination for multilevel logit models. The interpretation of 
the changes in explained variance in this study can therefore only be based on the observed 
changes in the estimates for random intercepts and slopes between simpler and more com-
plex models. 
After including all level-1 variables that appear to be relevant, level-2 variables are consid-
ered as well. Level-2 variables can serve to explain the random intercept variance as they 
may account for differences in training levels between the countries. Further, cross-level 
interactions, i.e. the interaction of an individual- and a country-level variable, can serve to 
explain the slope’s variance at country-level as the cross-level interactions account for dif-
fering macro-level effects on the outcomes of different groups of individuals. In this study, 
we assume that certain institutions have different effects on the training of men and wom-
en. This difference can be modelled by the inclusion of an interaction term between the 
institution and the “Female” dummy. In such a model, the regression coefficient of the 
institutional variable represents the effect on male employees (the main effect). The differ-
ence in the institution’s training effects on men and women is represented by the coeffi-
cient of the interaction term.  
As interaction terms are correlated with the original variables, they are a source of multi-
collinearity and are hence likely to lead to instability in the models (Snijders & Bosker, 
2012: 105-106). Therefore, in the multilevel models, they will be introduced one-by-one 
for those variables that are theoretically assumed to interact. To model the theoretical as-
sumptions that the labour market, the educational system and the support for women have 
an impact on the gender training gap, the variables describing these institutions and their 
interactions with the “Female” dummy are considered in the process of the model devel-
opment.  
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Table 8 summarizes the results of different models including one institution at the time.
25
 
For every institution, either the model with only the institution or the model with the insti-
tution and its interaction with the “Female” dummy are displayed, depending on which of 
the two models showed a better fit in terms of the likelihood-ratio test. Whenever the mod-
el includes only the institutional variable without the interaction, the coefficient of the in-
stitution refers to a change in training levels of all employees in the sample. In models in-
cluding the institutional variable next to its interaction with the “Female” dummy, the insti-
tution’s coefficient represents the “main effect” of the institution, which in this case is the 
effect on men’s training. The coefficient of the interaction term represents the additional 
effect of the institution on women, i.e. the difference in the institution’s effect on men and 
women. The statistical and economic significance of this interaction suggests the im-
portance of the institutional variable for the gender training gap. The entire institutional 
effect that is supposed to influence women’s training is composed by the coefficient of the 
institution multiplied by the coefficient of the interaction term.  
Concerning the institutions referring to the labour market, only “Mean tenure” is statisti-
cally and economically significantly related to overall training levels: For every year mean 
tenure rises, training is lowered by the factor 0.840, ceteris paribus. The relevance of the 
effect can be illustrated by taking into account the standard deviation of the variable 
(SD=2.504, see Table 22): A change in “Mean tenure” by one standard deviation is related 
to a decrease in training levels by the factor 0.8402.504=0.646 which can be considered a 
strong and economically significant relationship.
26
 This strong relationship is also reflected 
in the random part of the model: When “Mean tenure” is included, the standard deviation 
of the random intercept decreases considerably compared to the reference model without 
any institutional variables (Model 4 from Table 7). This indicates that variations in mean 
tenure explain part of the cross-country difference in the overall training levels.  
The other institutions depicting the labour market do not relate to overall training levels. 
Nevertheless, the ratio of female union members is positively related to training participa-
tion of women and thus affects the gender training gap: For every percentage point the 
share of female unionists rises, training odds of women increase by the factor 1.009 while 
training odds of men are not significantly influenced. A change of one standard deviation 
(SD=8.718) of the variable is, ceteris paribus, related to a rise in women’s training by the 
factor 1.0098.718=1.081, which can be interpreted as a moderate effect. 
                                                 
25
 The complete tables documenting the process of the level-2 model development for all employees can be 
found in the Appendix (Tables 28-31). 
26
 In the course of this analysis, odds ratios between 1.1 and 1/1.1=0.91 per standard deviation are interpreted 
as moderate effects, odd ratios above 1.1 or below 1/1.1=0.91 as intermediate effects and odds ratios above 
1.25 or below 1/1.25=0.80 as strong effects. 
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Table 8: Summary of the level-2 model development for all employees 
 Labour Market Educ. System Support for Women 
Model M. ten. U. dens. Bar cov. F. u. m. Uni Vocat. Chc. <3 Chc. ≥3 M. leave Ch. ben. Empl. e. Deg. e. Pay e. 
FIXED PART              
Female 0.954 0.954 0.957 0.962 0.954 0.954 0.954 0.954 0.954 0.954 0.953 0.954 0.954 
Institution 0.840*** 1.007 0.998 1.005 0.998 1.042*** 1.007 1.012* 1.031*** 0.921 1.057*** 1.002 0.971 
Female x Inst.    1.009* 1.004* 0.989***   0.995     
RANDOM PART             
SD slope  0.198*** 0.197*** 0.203*** 0.190*** 0.183*** 0.166*** 0.197*** 0.198*** 0.188*** 0.196*** 0.196*** 0.197*** 0.198*** 
SD intercept 0.623*** 0.722** 0.645*** 0.746* 0.745* 0.635*** 0.734** 0.698** 0.634*** 0.752* 0.728** 0.750** 0.709** 
Corr. slope-int.              
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1;  means that a correlation between slope and intercept is considered;  models control for previous education, age (raw and squared), 
tenure, part-time employment, occupation, industry, size of the local unit, degree of urbanization, year and interview method; the complete level-2 model develop-
ment is displayed in Tables 28-31 in the Appendix. 
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Both institutions defining the educational system are related to training participation, and 
for both institutions the training effects seem to differ between men and women. Interest-
ingly, when the vocational system is included without its cross-level interaction (see Table 
29 in the Appendix), i.e. without distinguishing between the effects for men and women, 
the coefficient for “Vocational” is statistically insignificant and of moderate size. Howev-
er, including the cross-level interaction reveals that the former model masks two signifi-
cantly different effects on men and women. A highly statistically and economically signifi-
cant coefficient of the institutional variable indicates a strong and positive effect on train-
ing odds of men while a statistically highly significant cross-level interaction of intermedi-
ate size indicates that in the presence of strong vocational systems, women are disadvan-
taged compared to men. For every percentage point the ratio of students in vocational pro-
grammes increases, training odds for men increase by the factor 1.042. Meanwhile, for 
every unit change in “Vocational”, female training odds compared to males are lowered by 
the factor 0.989. However, even for women, the overall effect of the vocational system on 
training still seems to be positive: For every percentage point the ratio of students in voca-
tional programmes increases, female training odds increase by the factor 
1.042*0.989=1.031. Taking into account that the variable “Vocational” has a standard de-
viation of 9.983, for men a change of one standard deviation is associated with a training 
increase by the factor 1.0429.983=1.508, which can be interpreted as a strong and economi-
cally significant relationship. For women a change in one standard deviation is associated 
with a considerably lower increase in training odds, namely only by the 
tor (1.042*0.989)
9.983
=1.350. A change in the vocational system can consequently have a 
substantial impact on the gender training gap. 
While strong vocational systems seem to disproportionally favour men, strong university 
systems appear to favour women without having a significant impact on training for men. 
Women are significantly more likely to train than men when university education is strong: 
With every percentage point the share of university graduates rises, women’s training odds 
rise by the factor 1.004. The economic effect is moderate, though: A change in one stand-
ard deviation rises women’s training odds compared to men’s odds by the 
tor 1.00417.599=1.073. Still, as men’s training odds are not significantly related to the uni-
versity system, a change in this institutional characteristic can have some impact on the 
gender training gap. This effect is opposed to the one of the vocational system, as women 
seem to benefit here whereas the vocational system appears to favour men. 
In the random part of the model, the inclusion of the variables of the educational system 
lead to a decrease in standard deviation of the random intercept compared to the reference 
model. This indicates that the university system and – even more so – the vocational sys-
tem explain part of the cross-country variation in overall training levels. Further, in both 
models, the slope variance is reduced by the inclusion of the cross-level interaction. This 
indicates that part of the cross-country differences in the gender effects on training can be 
explained by differences in the strength of the university and the vocational system. This 
 83 
 
 
reflects the finding that the vocational system is more positively related to the training of 
men than of women and that the university system is positively related to female training 
but does not seem to have an effect on male training participation. Overall, the results on 
the educational system are in line with the results of the country-level regressions in Table 
6. 
In terms of support for women, childcare for children between three and schooling age is 
statistically significantly related to overall training levels. When childcare increases one 
percentage point, overall levels of training rise by the factor 1.012. At first sight, this 
change may appear economically unimportant. However, when taking into account the 
rather high standard deviation of the variable (SD=19.265), the economic relevance of the 
factor becomes obvious: A change in one standard deviation is associated with an increase 
in training levels by the factor 1.01219.265=1.258. This strong effect is reflected in the con-
siderable decrease of the random intercept, indicating that the cross-country variance in 
childcare for children below the schooling age explains part of the cross-national variation 
in overall training levels. However, as implied by the fact that a cross-level interaction be-
tween “Female” and “Childcare ≥3” does neither improve the model nor turn out to be 
significant (see Table 30 in the Appendix), women do not especially benefit from high 
levels of childcare. 
Maternity leave is positively related to training levels. The relationship is statistically and 
economically highly significant: Results suggest that when paid maternity leave is extend-
ed by one week, training increases by the factor 1.031. When maternity leave changes by 
one standard deviation, overall training levels even increase by the factor 1.03113.232=1.500 
Though not significantly so (p=0.16), maternity leave is negatively related to women’s 
relative training participation compared to men: One week increase in maternity leave is 
related to a decrease in training by the factor 0.995. The overall effect of maternity leave 
on women’s training appears still positive, though less than on men’s training: One week 
of paid maternity leave appears to increase training for women by the factor 
1.031*0.995=1.026; a change in one standard deviation by (1.031*0.995)
13.232
=1.402. The 
result is in line with the previous assumption that long paid maternity leaves provide incen-
tives for employers and employees to invest less in female than in male human capital. 
Again these findings are mirrored in the random part of the model: The decrease in the 
standard deviation of the random intercept indicates that cross-national differences in ma-
ternity leave policies account for part of the cross-country differences in training levels 
while the decrease in the random slope suggests that differences in maternity leave policies 
explain part of the cross-national differences in the gender training gap. 
Employment equality is strongly positively related to training levels. The results indicate 
that a one percentage point increase in employment equality increases training levels by 
the factor 1.057; an increase by one standard deviation increases training levels 
by 1.0577.52=1.517. As the standard deviation of the intercept is reduced by the inclusion 
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of the variable, employment equality seems to explain cross-country differences in training 
levels. In summary, some variables referring to the support of women in a country are re-
lated to training participation but none of them are found to have significantly differing 
effects on men and women. 
4.4.2 Employees with university education 
After explaining training participation by micro and macro variables for all employees, a 
separate analysis scrutinizes training participation of the 25,625 employees with university 
education. Results of the model development including level-1 variables are displayed in 
Table 9. Model 1, depicting the “empty model”, shows that for highly educated employees, 
the unconditional odds of training are 1.242. That means that in this group, for 100 em-
ployees that did not train, there are about 124 employees that participated in training in the 
past 12 months. When compared with the results for all employees in Table 7, it becomes 
obvious that training participation among the higher educated is considerably higher than 
among employees in general, where only 64 employees trained for every 100 who did not. 
A multilevel model is appropriate as indicated by the highly significant likelihood-ratio 
test. 
Model 2 confirms the results from the previous analyses in Section 4.2, indicating that 
among the highly educated employees, women are in fact significantly more likely to train: 
Women’s odds to train are 1.064 times higher than men’s. The inclusion of level-1 varia-
bles reduces the cross-country variance in training probability and the model fit improves. 
The inclusion of a random slope for the “Female” dummy in Model 3 further improves the 
model fit. The highly significant parameter estimate indicates that the gender effect varies 
across countries. Again, the size of the cross-country variation can be illustrated: Ex-
pressed in log odds, the fixed part of the “Female” dummy coefficient takes the value of 
ln(1.085)=0.082. Hence, 95% of the slopes range from (0.082-(1.96*0.137)) to 
(0.082+(1.96*0.137)) log odds, which means that in most of the countries’ odd ratios of 
women compared to men lie between exp(0.082-(1.96*0.137))=0.830 and 
exp(0.082+(1.96*0.137))=1.420. This interval is somewhat narrower than indicated by the 
results from the separate country regressions in Table 5 which show odds ratios for the 
“Female” dummy ranging from 0.784 to 1.772. 
In Model 4, the intercept-slope correlation is included. However, neither is the estimated 
correlation statistically significant nor does the model fit improve. This means that in con-
trast to the results for all employees, among highly educated employees there is no rela-
tionship between overall levels of training in a country and the gender training gap. There-
fore, the intercept slope correlation will not be further considered in the model develop-
ment process. Model 3 will hence serve as reference for further model comparisons.  
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Table 9: Model development for employees with degree – level 1 
 1 2 3 4 
FIXED PART 
Female  1.064** 1.085* 1.085* 
Level-1 controls     
Constant 1.242 0.570** 0.551*** 0.543*** 
RANDOM PART 
SD slope    0.137*** 0.135*** 
SD intercept 0.668*** 0.632*** 0.627*** 0.624*** 
Corr. slope-int.    0.087 
MODEL STATISTICS 
Log likelihood -16689.5 -16118.7 -16115.3 -16115.3 
Parameters 2 41 42 43 
LR test  *** *** *** n.s. 
Individuals  25,625 25,625 25,625 25,625 
Countries 22 22 22 22 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1;  means that level-1 controls 
are included; reference model for the likelihood-ratio test of 
Model 1: conventional logit model, reference model for Models 
2 to 4: always the previous model. 
Table 10 summarizes the level-2 model development for employees with university educa-
tion. Again, for every institution either the model including the institution alone or includ-
ing the institution and its cross-level interaction is displayed, depending on which of the 
two models showed the better model fit in terms of the likelihood-ratio test.
27
  
Among the institutions characterizing the labour market, “Mean tenure” is strongly nega-
tively related to overall training levels. In addition differences in mean tenure appear to 
relate to the gender training gap. A rise in mean tenure by one year is related to a decrease 
in training for men by the factor 0.874; a rise in one standard deviation by 
0.8742.504=0.713. The negative effect seems even stronger for women as they appear to 
suffer from an additional negative effect of 0.963. Their training odds decrease by the fac-
tor 0.874*0.963=0.843 for every year, and by (0.874*0.963)
2.504
=0.649  for every standard 
deviation that mean tenure rises. These strong effects are reflected in the random part of 
the model: A comparison with the random part of Model 3 in Table 9 reveals that the 
standard deviations of the intercept and slope decrease considerably, indicating that a sub-
stantial part of the differences in the gender training gap as well as the level of training in 
general can be explained by mean tenure and its distinct effects on men and women. 
Union density is not statistically significantly related to training of male employees. How-
ever, high union density appears to reduce women’s training participation: With every per-
centage point union density increases, training participation of highly educated women 
                                                 
27
 The complete tables documenting the process of the level-2 model development for employees with a uni-
versity degree can be found in the Appendix (Tables 32-35). 
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decreases by the factor 0.996. However, as women generally hold an advantage among this 
group, union density does not lead to female disadvantage until union density rises more 
than 18.970 percentage points.
28
 Considering that the standard deviation of the variable is 
SD=21.652 reveals that women’s training advantage would be consumed within an in-
crease of union density of less than one standard deviation. With every increase of union 
density by one standard deviation, women’s training odds decrease by the factor 
0.99621.652= 0.917, which can be interpreted as an effect of moderate size that causes a 
male advantage in the presence of strong unions. The random part of the model shows that 
part of the standard deviation of the slope can be explained by the interaction term, which 
confirms the assumption that gender differences in training can be explained by union den-
sity.   
A similar pattern can be observed when bargaining coverage is included in the model. 
While the main effect of bargaining coverage is insignificant, the significant interaction 
term between the “Female” dummy and bargaining coverage indicates that among highly 
educated employees, for every percentage point that bargaining coverage rises, female 
training compared to male is lowered by the factor 0.996. However, to consume the female 
training advantage in this employee group, bargaining coverage has to increase by more 
than 23.1 percentage points.
29
 As the standard deviation of this variable is 29.377, female 
training advantage vanishes when bargaining coverage increases by less than one standard 
deviation. For every standard deviation bargaining coverage increases, women’s training 
odds decrease by the factor 0.99629.377= 0.889. This suggests that cross-country differences 
in bargaining coverage are related to the gender training gap, more specifically to women’s 
training disadvantage compared to men. Further, a comparison of the random parts of the 
model with and without the cross-level interaction shows that the standard deviation of the 
slope is reduced by 64% when the cross-level interaction is included (SD slope=0.139 vs. 
SD slope=0.050, see Table 32 in the Appendix). Supporting the findings from the fixed 
part of the model, this indicates that a major part of the cross-country variation of the gen-
der training gap among highly educated employees can be explained by differences in bar-
gaining coverage. Thus, when analysing the effect of union strength on training participa-
tion, it appears important to distinguish between men and women of higher education.  
Results on variables of the educational system indicate, that the importance of the universi-
ty system in a country is not significantly related to training. Nevertheless, a strong voca-
tional system appears to increase training levels of the higher educated: For every percent-
age point the share of vocational students rises, training participation increases by the fac-
                                                 
28
 When union density increases 18.970 percentage points, the female training advantage of 1.079 (indicated 
by the coefficient of the “Female” dummy) is consumed by women’s disadvantage of 0.996 (relative to 
men’s training odds of 1.009) that is related to every percentage point unions density increases: 
1.009x=1.079*(1.009*0.996)x  x=18.970. 
29
 1.003x=1.097*(1.003*0.996)x  x=23.1. 
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tor 1.029. A change in one standard deviation is related to a change in training levels by 
the factor 1.0299.983=1.330 which can be considered a rather strong effect. This finding is 
also reflected in the considerable decrease in the standard deviation of the intercept com-
pared to Model 3 in Table 9. Thus, cross-country differences in the importance of the voca-
tional system appear to explain part of the cross-country variation in overall training levels 
among highly educated employees. However, in contrast to the findings for all employees 
displayed in Table 8, the variables of the educational system in Table 10 do not appear to 
explain cross-country differences in the gender training gap.  
Institutions depicting the support for women appear to be related to training levels as well 
as to the gender training gap. While the coefficient of the main effect of childcare for chil-
dren below the age of three is not statistically significant, the odds ratio of the interaction 
term turns out to be significant. Opposed to previous assumptions, the odds ratio indicates 
a negative effect of the level of childcare on female training odds: For every percentage 
point the level of children in day care rises, the training odds for women compared to men 
are lowered by the factor 0.933. But, not only do training odds of women decrease com-
pared to men. Multiplied by the main effect, training odds for women still seem to be nega-
tively influenced by the provision of childcare: The overall female training odds decrease 
by the factor 0.944. This means that the female training advantage is balanced when levels 
of childcare rise by 1.070 percentage points.
30
 Compared to the variable’s standard devia-
tion of 14.622, that is a very small increase. For every standard deviation childcare for 
young children increases, women’s training participation compared to men’s decreases by 
the factor 0.93314.622=0.363, which indicates a very strong negative effect of childcare on 
training for women of higher education. The strong interaction is also reflected in the de-
crease of the standard deviation of the slope and shows that part of the cross-country dif-
ferences in the gender training gap can be explained by differences in the provision of 
childcare.  
  
                                                 
30
 1.012x=1.077*(1.012*0.933)x  x=1.070. 
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Table 10: Summary of the level-2 model development for employees with degree 
 Labour market Educ. system Support for women 
Model M. ten. U. dens. Bar cov. F. u. m. Uni Vocat. Chc. <3 Chc. ≥3 M. leave Ch. ben. Empl. e. Deg. e. Pay e. 
FIXED PART              
Female 1.084** 1.079* 1.097*** 1.096* 1.085* 1.087* 1.077* 1.084* 1.085* 1.086* 1.083* 1.085* 1.085* 
Institution 0.874*** 1.009 1.003 1.011 1.003 1.029** 1.012 1.012 1.020** 1.023 1.042** 1.000 0.977 
Female x Inst. 0.963** 0.996** 0.996***    0.933***   0.953***    
RANDOM PART             
SD slope  0.091*** 0.127*** 0.050** 0.145*** 0.136*** 0.141*** 0.098*** 0.135*** 0.139*** 0.076*** 0.132*** 0.137*** 0.131*** 
SD intercept 0.532*** 0.610*** 0.523*** 0.612*** 0.625*** 0.563*** 0.617*** 0.591*** 0.577*** 0.629*** 0.571*** 0.626*** 0.614*** 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; models control for age (raw and squared), tenure, part-time employment, occupation, industry, size of the local unit, degree of urbani-
zation, year and interview method; the complete level-2 model development is displayed in Tables 32-35 in the Appendix.
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Maternity leave is positively related to overall training levels: For every week maternity 
leave rises, training odds rise by the factor 1.020. For every standard deviation maternity 
leave rise training odds rise by the factor 1.02013.232=1.300 which can be interpreted as a 
strong effect. This effect is similar for men and women. On the contrary, child benefits do 
not influence overall levels of training. Yet, as previously assumed, high child benefits are 
negatively related to female training participation and explain part of the cross-country 
variation in the gender training gap among highly educated employees. The female training 
advantage is consumed when child benefits rise more than 171.38€, ceteris paribus.31 The 
variable’s standard deviation is 1.481 which represents a variation of 148.10€. Thus, child 
benefits have to increase more than one standard deviation to consume women’s training 
advantage. An increase of child benefits of one standard deviation is related to a decrease 
in women’s training odds by the factor 0.9531.481=0.931. 
Employment equality appears to raise the overall level of training: For every unit change in 
employment equality, training odds of employees holding a degree increase by the factor 
1.042. With every standard deviation in employment equality, training levels increases by 
the factor 1.0426.265=1.294. Intercept variance is reduced, which means that gender em-
ployment equality explains part of the country-level variation in the overall odds of train-
ing. However, women do not benefit from this to a higher extend than men. Neither does 
the cross-level interaction turn out to be statistically significant, nor does the model fit im-
prove when an interaction between the institution and the “Female” dummy is included 
(see Table 35 in the Appendix). Thus, a distinction of the institutional effect on men and 
women does not appear to be relevant. Degree and pay equality do neither seem to make a 
difference for training levels of highly educated employees nor for training differences 
between men and women. 
4.4.3 Employees without university education 
Analogue to the previous section analysing training of employees of higher education, in 
this section, institutional determinants for the gender training gap among employees with-
out university education are examined. Table 11 shows that a multilevel approach is ap-
propriate for the data of this subsample as well, and that model fit improves with increas-
ing complexity from Models 1 to 4. Model 1 shows that among the lower educated, only 
about 46 employees train for every 100 employees that do not take part in training. This 
shows that employees without a degree train considerably less than employees with univer-
sity education where 124 employees train for every 100 employees who do not train. 
  
                                                 
31
 1.023x=1.086*(1.023*0.953)x  x=1.7138. The variable “Child benefits” is measured in 100€. 
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Table 11: Model development for employees with no degree – level 1 
 1 2 3 4 
FIXED PART     
Female  0.846*** 0.886** 0.885** 
Level-1 controls     
Constant 0.462*** 0.717 0.700 0.721 
RANDOM PART 
SD slope    0.205*** 0.205*** 
SD intercept 0.776*** 0.726*** 0.773*** 0.796*** 
Corr. slope-int.    -0.681*** 
MODEL STATISTICS 
Log likelihood -34626.3 -32641.8 -32603.6 -32598.9 
Parameters 2 41 42 43 
LR test  *** *** *** *** 
Individuals  62,218 62,218 62,218 62,218 
Countries 22 22 22 22 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1;  means that level-1 controls 
are included; reference model for the likelihood-ratio test of 
Model 1: conventional logit model, reference model for Models 
2 to 4: always the previous model. 
Contrary to employees holding a degree, among lower educated employees, females are 
less likely to train than men. Model 4 indicates women’s training odds are 0.885 times 
lower than the odds of men. The statistically significant parameters in the random part of 
the model further suggest that in this employee group, overall training levels as well as the 
gender training gap significantly vary between countries. In contrast to the results for high-
ly educated employees, both random measures are negatively correlated. This suggests 
that, for this specific employee group, countries with higher overall levels of training tend 
to show lower training odds for women compared to men. Taking into account the random 
and the fixed part of the “Female” dummy leads to the conclusion that for this employee 
group, at country-level, 95% of the odds ratios for women lie between 0.593 and 1.324. 
These results are slightly more pessimistic for women than the results displayed in Figure 
3, which indicate the lowest female odds ratio to be 0.652 for the Czech Republic and 
highest to be 1.368 for Latvia. 
Table 12 shows the results of the models including the institutional variables.
32
 It appears 
that labour market institutions, while being related to overall levels of training among the 
lower educated do not have an impact on gender differences in training. High mean tenure 
appears to be strongly negatively related to training of employees without university edu-
cation: For every year that mean tenure rises, training odds are lowered by the factor 0.852; 
for every change in one standard deviation women’s training is lowered by the factor 
0.8522.504=0.670. High union density seems to be related to higher overall training levels 
                                                 
32
 The complete tables documenting the process of the level-2 model development for employees without a 
university degree can be found in the Appendix (Tables 36-39). 
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among employees without university education: For every standard deviation union density 
increases, training odds increase by the factor 1.01321.652=1.325. The strong effects of 
mean tenure and union density are reflected in the random part of the models. The consid-
erable drops in the intercepts’ standard deviation suggest that differences in mean tenure 
and union density account for cross-country differences in training levels. While bargain-
ing coverage is not related to training of the lower educated, a high share of female union 
members is. Although the model including this institutional measure reveals that overall 
levels of training do not significantly increase with high shares of female unionists, the 
cross-level interaction with the “Female” dummy – although only significant at 11% – 
supports the assumption that a high rate of women in unions has a positive impact on fe-
male training participation: For every standard deviation the share of female unionist rises, 
training odds for women increase by the factor 1.0108.718=1.090, which can be interpreted 
as an effect of moderate size. 
When comparing these findings to the results for highly educated employees in Table 10, it 
becomes obvious that correlations between training and labour market characteristics vary 
for employees of different educational backgrounds. High mean tenure, which is generally 
related to lower training levels, appears to present an additional disadvantage for women of 
higher education compared to men, while it does not have significantly differing effects on 
men and women of lower education. While for the lower educated, a high union density is 
consistently related to a higher training probability, among the highly educated, union 
strength basically favours men. Moreover, while a high share of women in trade unions is 
positively related to female training participation among the lower educated, it is neither 
significantly related to training levels nor gender differences among university graduates.  
The results on the educational system reveal that the importance of the university system is 
not related to training participation of employees without a degree. On the contrary, the 
importance of the vocational system appears to have an effect on both the overall level of 
training and the gender training gap, as indicated by the statistically significant odds ratios 
of the institutional coefficient and the interaction term as well as the reduction of the ran-
dom parameters. For every percentage point the share of pupils in vocational programmes 
rises, male training odds rise by the factor 1.052; for every standard deviation by the factor 
1.0529.983=1.659. However, women benefit significantly less from vocational systems as 
their training odds compared to men are lowered by the factor 0.990. Still, the overall rela-
tionship between the vocational system and training is strongly positive for women as well: 
With every increase in standard deviation women’s training increases by 
(1.052*0.990)
9.983
=1.500. Overall, the results on the educational system are similar to the 
results for employees with a degree displayed in Table 10.  
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Table 12: Summary of the level-2 model development for employees with no degree 
 Labour Market Educ. System Support for Women 
Model M. ten. U. dens. Bar cov. F. u. m. Uni Vocat. Chc. <3 Chc. ≥3 M. leave Ch. ben. Empl. e. Deg. e. Pay e. 
FIXED PART              
Female 0.886** 0.887** 0.884** 0.894** 0.885** 0.884*** 0.885** 0.886** 0.886** 0.885** 0.883** 0.884** 0.885** 
Institution 0.852*** 1.013* 1.000 1.002 1.002 1.052*** 1.014 1.012 1.027*** 0.927 1.037 0.997 0.971 
Female x Inst.    1.010  0.990**     1.010 1.003  
RANDOM PART             
SD slope  0.206*** 0.203*** 0.209*** 0.196*** 0.205*** 0.179*** 0.204*** 0.205*** 0.205*** 0.204*** 0.191*** 0.191*** 0.206*** 
SD intercept 0.657*** 0.770*** 0.695*** 0.805*** 0.801*** 0.655*** 0.786*** 0.747*** 0.676*** 0.798*** 0.777*** 0.788*** 0.751* 
Corr. slope-int.              
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1;  means that a correlation between slope and intercept is considered; models control for previous education, age (raw and 
squared), tenure, part-time employment, occupation, industry, size of the local unit, degree of urbanization, year and interview method; the complete level-2 model 
development is displayed in Tables 36-39 in the Appendix.
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The measures of support for women do not show many statistically significant relation-
ships to training. Maternity leave seems to raise overall levels of training considerably, 
without differing in the effects on men and women. For every standard deviation paid ma-
ternity leave increases, training odds of lower educated employees increase by the factor 
1.02713.232=1.423. 
When included without a cross-level interaction term, employment equality appears to 
raise overall levels of training participation (see Table 39 in the Appendix). However, as 
model fit improves with the interaction term for females, the model including the interac-
tion is preferred and thus displayed in Table 12. The odds ratios indicate a strongly positive 
relationship for men (significant at 13%) but an even stronger positive effect for women 
(significant at 12%): With every change in standard deviation, men’s training odds in-
crease by the factor 1.03726.663=2.635 while women’s training odds even increase by the 
factor (1.037*1.010)
26.663
=3.435. Degree equality is not significantly related to training 
levels. The interaction between the “Female” dummy and degree equality is significant at 
12% error probability, indicating that in countries where the level of women holding a uni-
versity degree is high, training odds for women without a degree rise in comparison to 
equally qualified men. The effect appears moderate in size (1.0036.265=1.019). Still, it re-
flects the result on this indicator from the country-level analyses shown in Table 6.  
Overall, the result on the indicators for women’s support slightly differ to the ones for em-
ployees with university education displayed in Table 10: While childcare for children un-
der the age of three is related to a comparative training disadvantage of women with uni-
versity education, it does not have an impact on gender equality among the lower educated. 
However, for employees of lower education, childcare for children aged three and older 
appear to raise overall training levels while it does not seem to have an impact on training 
levels of the highly educated. Child benefits appear to be negatively related to relative 
training participation of highly educated women but not of lower educated women. 
4.4.4 Final multilevel models 
Table 13 summarizes the results of the multilevel analyses of the three different samples. 
The most striking findings concern the “Female” dummy: While there is no significant 
difference between men and women in general in terms of training, there is a female train-
ing advantage among employees of higher education and a female disadvantage among 
employees without university education. However, the random part of the regressions im-
plies that for all three samples, the gender effects significantly vary across countries. The 
same is true for the overall levels of training (indicated by the significant random inter-
cept). While there is a negative correlation between the overall level of training and female 
training odds among employees without a degree, there is no such association among high-
er educated. 
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Table 13: Summary of the multilevel results 
 All Degree No degree 
FIXED PART    
Female 0 + - 
Mean tenure - - - 
Mean tenure x f. 0 - 0 
Union density 0 0 + 
Union density x f. 0 - 0 
Bargaining coverage 0 0 0 
Bargaining coverage x f. 0 - 0 
Female union membership 0 0 + 
Female union membership x f. + 0 0 
University 0 0 0 
University x f. + 0 0 
Vocational + + + 
Vocational x f. - 0 - 
Childcare <3 0 0 0 
Childcare <3 x f. 0 - 0 
Childcare ≥3 + 0 + 
Childcare ≥3 x f. 0 0 0 
Maternity leave + + + 
Maternity leave x f.  0 0 0 
Child benefits 0 0 0 
Child benefits x f. 0 - 0 
Employment equality + + (+) 
Employment equality x f. 0 0 (+) 
Degree equality 0 0 0 
Degree equality x f. 0 0 0 
Pay equality 0 0 0 
Pay equality x f. 0 0 0 
RANDOM PART    
SD slope  + + + 
SD intercept + + + 
Corr. slope-int. - 0 - 
0= no significant relationship, + = statistically significant positive rela-
tionship, (+) = statistically insignificant but economically significant posi-
tive relationship, - = statistically significant negative relationship.   
The previous analyses indicate that the training of employees with a degree is explained by 
other institutions than training for employees without a degree: While for highly educated 
“Mean tenure”, “Vocational”, “Employment equality” and “Maternity leave” explain over-
all levels of training, training of employees without a degree can be explained by “Mean 
tenure”, “Union density”, “Female union membership”, “Vocational”, “Childcare ≥3”, 
“Maternity leave” and “Employment equality”. 
Similarly, the gender training gap is explained by different institutions. Differences in the 
training odds of men and women with university education can be explained by “Mean 
tenure”, “Union density”, “Bargaining coverage” and “Childcare ≥3” (indicated by the 
statistically significant interactions between these institutions with the “Female” dummy). 
For employees without a degree, differences are only explained by cross-country differ-
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ences in the variable “Vocational”. 
The variables that were found to be significantly related to training in the previous analyses 
are now combined into one model for each employee group. Whenever an interaction was 
found to be statistically significant, both the interaction and the main effect are included. 
Regression results are presented in Table 14. Columns (1) and (2) display the results for all 
employees, columns (3) and (4) for employees with a university degree and columns (5) 
and (6) for employees without university education. In columns (1), (3) and (5), models 
include only those institutional variables that are available for all countries; that is, neither 
the ratio of women in unions nor bargaining coverage is considered. Columns (2), (4) and 
(6) display the models including all variables that are found to be correlated with training, 
including the ratio of female unionists or bargaining coverage if relevant. These models 
consequently refer to a smaller set of countries (the ratio of female unionists is not availa-
ble for Greece and Cyprus while bargaining coverage is not available for Romania).   
The table shows that the direction of the implied effects basically stays the same as in the 
separate analyses. However, many of the coefficients lose their significance. This may ei-
ther be due to the few degrees of freedom at the macro-level or due to correlations between 
the macro variables. For all employees, the variables “Mean tenure” as well as “Vocation-
al” and their interactions for women turn out to be statistically significantly related to train-
ing. More specifically, results in column (1) indicate that long mean tenure is significantly 
related to lower training odds: For every year that mean tenure rises, training odds are low-
ered by the factor 0.825. Moreover, for every percentage point the ratio of students in vo-
cational training programmes rises, training probability of all employees is raised by the 
factor 1.047. However, male and female training odds do not rise equally, as for every per-
centage point the vocational student ratio increases, female training odds compared to 
males are lowered by the factor 0.990. However, this turns into a positive effect on training 
for women as well: Although female training odds rise significantly less than male, they 
still rise by the factor 1.037. Every increase in standard deviation of the variable “Voca-
tional” is related to an increase in the training odds of men by the factor 1.0479.983=1.582 
and by the factor 1.047*0.990
9.983
=1.431 for women. For both men and women, this indi-
cates a strong positive effect, though it is significantly lower for women than for men. A 
comparison of the random part of the model with Model 4 from Table 7 reveals that the 
interaction terms included in the model are able to explain part of the cross-country varia-
tion in the gender training gap, while the included main effects explain part of the cross-
country variation in the training levels. The inclusion of the interaction between the ratio of 
women in unions and the “Female” dummy in column (2) does not change the results: Nei-
ther does the variable itself show a significant relation to training participation, nor does it 
change any of the implications for any of the other variables.  
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Table 14: Final multilevel models for the different employee groups 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All  Degree No degree 
FIXED PART       
Female 0.954 0.975 1.077** 1.075** 0.889*** 0.907** 
 (0.229) (0.526) (0.017) (0.027) (0.010) (0.031) 
No degree 0.706*** 0.700***     
 (0.000) (0.000)     
Mean tenure 0.825*** 0.827*** 0.857*** 0.988 0.832*** 0.829*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.875) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mean ten. x f.   0.965** 0.948*   
   (0.011) (0.052)   
Union density   1.006 0.998 1.006 1.004 
   (0.402) (0.843) (0.136) (0.560) 
Union dens. x f.   0.999 0.999   
   (0.586) (0.592)   
Bargaining cov.     1.009   
    (0.205)   
Bar. cov. x f.    1.000   
    (0.883)   
F. union mem.  0.989    0.992 
  (0.637)    (0.622) 
F. u. mem. x f.  1.005     
  (0.304)     
University  0.992 0.999     
 (0.191) (0.949)     
University x f. 1.003 1.001     
 (0.127) (0.836)     
Vocational 1.044*** 1.053*** 1.028** 1.009 1.048*** 1.055*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.040) (0.518) (0.000) (0.000) 
Vocational x f. 0.990** 0.987***   0.990** 0.986*** 
 (0.011) (0.003)   (0.020) (0.003) 
Childcare <3    1.003 0.996   
   (0.740) (0.658)   
Childc. <3 x f.   0.994** 0.993**   
   (0.021) (0.032)   
Childc. ≥3  0.996 0.998   0.996 0.998 
 (0.421) (0.849)   (0.411) (0.812) 
Maternity leave 1.009 1.010 1.004 1.010 1.011* 1.012* 
 (0.173) (0.192) (0.656) (0.219) (0.082) (0.084) 
Child benefits   1.121 0.958   
   (0.149) (0.652)   
Child ben. x f.   0.972* 0.977   
   (0.050) (0.174)   
Employ. equ. 1.019 1.022 1.012 1.053*** 1.013 1.023 
 (0.226) (0.384) (0.434) (0.006) (0.364) (0.396) 
Constant 0.865 0.858 0.693* 0.750 0.775* 0.747* 
 (0.307) (0.301) (0.068) (0.121) (0.098) (0.065) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; p-values in parentheses; models further control for the lev-
el-1 variables identified in the previous models. 
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 Table 14 (continued): Final multilevel models for the different employee groups 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All  Degree No degree 
RANDOM PART 
SD slope 0.156*** 0.145*** 1.24e-08 3.81e-07 0.177*** 0.163*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (1.000) (1.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SD intercept 0.390*** 0.368*** 0.398*** 0.339*** 0.405*** 0.376*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Corr. slope-int. -0.636*** -0.519**   -0.766*** -0.675*** 
 (0.000) (0.014)   (0.000) (0.004) 
MODEL STATISTICS 
Individuals 87,843 82,485 25,625 24,279 62,218 58,629 
Countries 22 20 22 21 22 20 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; p-values in parentheses; models further control for the lev-
el-1 variables identified in the previous models. 
Column (3) presents the results for highly educated employees without taking into account 
the measure of bargaining coverage. “Mean tenure”, its interaction for females, “Vocation-
al” and the interactions “Childcare <3 x female” and “Child benefits x female” are signifi-
cantly related to training participation of highly educated employees. For every year that 
mean tenure rises, training odds are lowered by the factor 0.857 for men and by 
0.857*0.965=0.827 for women. A change in one standard deviation should lower men’s 
training odds by 0.8572.504=0.679 and women’s by 0.857*0.965
2.504
=0.621. This suggests 
strong negative effects of mean tenure on both men and women. Still, the negative effects 
on women are significantly stronger. All else equal, mean tenure has to rise 2.082 years
33
 
to balance the female training advantage among highly educated employees. This is less 
than one standard deviation of the variable. From that point on, rising mean tenure trans-
lates into a male training advantage.  
A strong vocational system is related to higher overall levels of training of highly educated 
employees: For every percentage point the ratio of vocational students rises, training odds 
for both men and women rise by the factor 1.028. As assumed, child benefits are negative-
ly associated with training for female employees: For every 100€ child benefits are raised, 
women’s training odds relative to men’s are lowered by the factor 0.972. For every stand-
ard deviation, women’s training odds decrease by the factor 0.9721.481=0.959 compared to 
men’s odds. This indicates an effect of moderate size. If child benefits rise more than 
261.20€34, ceteris paribus, highly educated women become disadvantaged compared to 
men. Child benefits have to rise almost two standard deviations to compensate women’s 
training advantage over men. Controlling for other factors, this relationship appears weaker 
than assumed by the single-institution-model displayed in Table 10. 
                                                 
33
 0.857x=1.077*(0.857*0.965)x  x=2.082. 
34
 1.121x=1.077*(1.121*0.972)x  x=2.612. The variable “Child benefits” is measured in 100€. 
 98 
 
 
Contrary to the assumed direction, childcare for children under the age of three is negative-
ly related to training of women holding a university degree: For every percentage point the 
ratio of children under the age of three in childcare rises, the training odds of highly edu-
cated women compared to highly educated men are lowered by the factor 0.994. This leads 
to a female training disadvantage when childcare rises more than 12.326 percentage 
points
35
, ceteris paribus. This relationship is considerably weaker than indicated in the sin-
gle-institution-model in Table 10. Now, for every standard deviation, women’s training 
odds are only lowered by the factor 0.99414 622=0.916, which indicates a moderate effect 
size instead of a strong one. The effects of other institutions correlated with high levels of 
childcare, which are controlled in the final model, might have led to the strong results in 
Table 10. However, though the negative relationship of childcare and women’s training is 
weaker than suggested by the single-institution-model, it still opposes theoretical argu-
ments outlined in section 2.2.2.3, which assumed a female training advantage in the pres-
ence of high levels of childcare. A reason for this surprising finding might be that in coun-
tries with high levels of childcare, women return to their jobs early after childbirth, while 
in other countries, women with young children stay out of the labour market. Though hav-
ing childcare available may enable women to return to their jobs, they may still have not as 
much time to spare for the participation in training as men. In contrast, in countries with 
low levels of childcare, many mothers do not return to their jobs while their children are 
small. These women are then not included in this analysis since it only covers individuals 
in employment. It is thus conceivable that in countries with low levels of childcare the 
sample contains fewer mothers of small children than in countries with high levels of 
childcare. Such a difference could explain the negative relationship between childcare and 
training of women.  
To verify this interpretation, a variable is generated that measures the ratio of women un-
der the age of 40 who live with children below the age of three, among all employees of a 
country.
36
 In this case the AES provides data for all countries except Greece, Poland and 
the UK. Linking this measure with childcare for children below the age of three reveals a 
highly significant correlation of 0.787. There are different explanations for this: Either high 
levels of childcare enable women to return to the labour market early after childbirth or 
high levels of childcare allow women to reconcile family and job issues, instead of forcing 
them to choose between children and career. In other words, low levels of childcare could, 
on the one hand, hinder mothers from returning to the labour market after childbirth but 
also may initially have an impact on women’s fertility decision: Women in countries with 
high levels of childcare may just be more likely to become mothers in the first place. Either 
way, this obviously has an impact on the analysed country samples: In countries with high 
levels of childcare, we appear to find more mothers of small children in the sample than in 
                                                 
35
 1.003x=1.077*(1.003*0.994)x  x=12.326 
36
 Though this measure does not clearly indicate that the woman is the mother of the child, it may serve as a 
proxy since women at this age living with small children are usually their mothers.  
 99 
 
 
countries with lower levels of childcare. It therefore very well may be that these women 
manage to go back to employment but do not have enough time left to invest in training.   
Column (4) displays the results of the model for the highly educated including the measure 
for bargaining coverage. Though neither the main effect nor the interaction indicate a sig-
nificant effect on training participation of men or women, the inclusion of the variables 
changes the implication of some other variables. This might be due to clustering of the 
macro variables or due to the different sample composition, since in this specification Ro-
manian data is no longer included. Romania is an outliner in terms of very high mean ten-
ure (19.02 years, while all other countries’ mean tenures range from 7.50 to 13.57 years, 
see Table 26 in the Appendix) combined with the lowest training rate of all countries in the 
dataset. In the model including bargaining coverage but excluding the Romanian data, the 
variables “Mean tenure” and “Vocational” do no longer show a significant relationship to 
training participation. However, the interaction between mean tenure and being female still 
indicates that women are significantly disadvantaged compared to men, when mean tenure 
rises. The same is true for the interaction between childcare for children under the age of 
three and being a woman. Unlike the previous model, the effect of employment equality on 
training is found to be significantly positive while the interaction “Child benefits x female” 
loses its statistical significance. 
The most striking finding in columns (3) and (4) is however found in the random part: Not 
only does the standard deviation of the random slope in column (3) shrink to 
0.0000000124, it also turns out to be not significant any more. This indicates that the in-
cluded interaction terms basically explain the entire cross-country variation in the gender 
training gap for highly educated employees. Compared to Model 3 in Table 9, the standard 
deviation of the random intercept of the model in column (3) is reduced as well. This fur-
ther implies that part of the variation in overall training levels is explained by the macro 
variables. 
In columns (5) and (6), referring to employees without a degree, no significant impact of 
union density, childcare or employment equality on training can be detected. Nevertheless, 
training odds seem to be positively related to strong vocational systems. Men seem to ben-
efit from these systems to a stronger extent than women: While for every percentage point 
students in vocational programmes rise, male training odds rise by the factor 1.048 where-
as female odds only rise by 1.048*0.990=1.038. Like for all employees, this indicates 
strong effects for lower educated men and women, which becomes obvious when the 
standard deviation of the variable is taken into account.
37
 However, it also indicates that 
the gender training gap increases with increasing importance of the initial vocational train-
                                                 
37
 Men’s training odds increase by 1.0489.983=1.597 with every standard deviation “Vocational” changes 
while women’s training odds increase by 1.048*0.9909.983=1.444. 
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ing system. High mean tenure is negatively correlated to training levels while long mater-
nity leaves are positively correlated. The variable “Female union members” added in the 
model in column (6) does neither show a significant odds ratio nor does its inclusion 
change the implications of the other variables.  
The results in column (4) raised the question if the findings might be driven by a specific 
sample composition since other institutional estimates changed when bargaining coverage 
was included and Romanian data was dropped. To find out if the previous results are ro-
bust to changes in the sample composition or are rather driven by the low training values of 
Romania, the multilevel analysis is repeated without Romania. A summary of the model 
development process can be found in Table 40 in the Appendix. The newly specified final 
models for the three employee groups are displayed in Table 15.  
The final models excluding data from Romania mainly reproduce the results of the previ-
ous analyses in terms of the institutions explaining the gender training gap. The only dif-
ference here is that the negative relationship between child benefits and female training 
participation previously found among the highly educated is no longer significant at the 
10% level. However, the models do suggest different overall effects of some institutions on 
training. Most importantly, the coefficient of the variable “Mean tenure” which was found 
to be negatively related to training participation in all specifications which included Roma-
nia, is only statistically significant for lower educated employees. It appears consequently, 
that the negative relationship between tenure and training among highly educated employ-
ees was mainly driven by Romania. Moreover, the vocational system no longer appears to 
be positively related to training levels of the highly educated. Most strikingly, the models 
suggest a highly significant positive relationship between employment equality and train-
ing across all employee groups, which was not found in the models including Romania. 
Further, degree equality appears to be negatively related to overall training levels of the 
lower educated. This last finding, however, appears to be caused by clustering with any of 
the other institutional variables, as “Degree equality” was not found to be statistically sig-
nificant in the single-institution-model (Table 12) but only included because its cross-level 
interaction appeared to be positively related to training. In the final model, though, the in-
teraction turned statistically insignificant, while the main effect turned significant. 
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Table 15: Final multilevel models for the different employee groups excluding Romania 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All  Degree No degree 
FIXED PART      
Female 0.952 0.973 1.075** 0.877*** 0.897** 
 (0.217) (0.496) (0.027) (0.003) (0.014) 
No degree 0.705*** 0.699***    
 (0.000) (0.000)    
Mean tenure 0.922 0.923 0.988 0.832*** 0.829*** 
 (0.118) (0.128) (0.875) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mean ten. x f.   0.948*   
   (0.052)   
Union density 1.003 1.000 0.998 1.005 1.004 
 (0.436) (0.990) (0.842) (0.185) (0.489) 
Union dens. x f.   0.999   
   (0.593)   
Bargaining cov.    1.009   
   (0.205)   
Bar. cov. x f.   1.000   
   (0.883)   
F. union mem.  0.987   0.993 
  (0.420)   (0.679) 
F. u. mem. x f.  1.005   1.004 
  (0.326)   (0.429) 
University  0.992 1.000    
 (0.165) (0.950)    
University x f. 1.003 1.001    
 (0.125) (0.827)    
Vocational 1.038*** 1.047*** 1.009 1.031*** 1.037*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.518) (0.006) (0.008) 
Vocational x f. 0.989*** 0.986***  0.989** 0.986*** 
 (0.007) (0.001)  (0.016) (0.004) 
Childcare <3    0.996   
   (0.658)   
Childc. <3 x f.   0.993**   
   (0.032)   
Maternity leave 1.008 1.011 1.010 1.015* 1.015** 
 (0.223) (0.111) (0.219) (0.024) (0.031) 
Child benefits   0.958   
   (0.652)   
Child ben. x f.   0.977   
   (0.174)   
Employ. equ. 1.034** 1.041* 1.053*** 1.052*** 1.053** 
 (0.030) (0.081) (0.006) (0.000) (0.040) 
Degree equality    0.991** 0.994 
    (0.018) (0.124) 
Degree e. x f.    1.002 1.001 
    (0.168) (0.641) 
Constant 1.063 1.001 0.750 1.012 0.973 
 (0.678) (0.997) (0.121) (0.938) (0.864) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; p-values in parentheses; models further con-
trol for the level-1 variables identified in the previous models. 
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Table 15 (continued): Final multilevel models for the different employee groups excluding Romania 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All  Degree No degree 
RANDOM PART 
SD slope 0.155*** 0.144*** 3.81e-07 0.163*** 0.149*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (1.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SD intercept 0.364*** 0.331*** 0.339*** 0.401*** 0.381*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Corr. slope-int. -0.664*** -0.523***  -0.788*** -0.713*** 
 (0.000) (0.007)  (0.000) (0.000) 
MODEL STATISTICS 
Individuals 81,440 76,082 24,279 57,161 53,572 
Countries 21 19 21 21 19 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; p-values in parentheses; models further con-
trol for the level-1 variables identified in the previous models. 
 
Overall, the multilevel analyses clearly support the idea that the gender training gaps 
among different employee groups vary across European countries. Most interestingly, 
these variations can be explained by interactions between gender and national institutions. 
As indicated by the extremely low and statistically insignificant standard deviation of the 
random slope, almost the entire cross-country variation of training differences among the 
highly educated can be explained by the cross-level interactions included in the model. In 
other words, the cross-country differences in the gender training gap among the highly 
educated can be explained by differing effects of mean tenure, union density, childcare and 
child benefits on men and women. The higher these measures are the lower is women’s 
training participation among highly educated employees.  
These findings can also be deducted from the results of the individual-level analyses in 
Section 4.2. Table 16 summarizes mean tenure, union density, childcare and child benefits 
for those countries for which individual-level regressions indicated a (usually not statisti-
cally significant) training disadvantage or a statistically significant training advantage of 
highly educated woman compared to men (see Table 5). Countries where highly educated 
women are somewhat disadvantaged show above average values in at least two of these 
measures. On the contrary, almost all countries, where highly educated women were found 
to have a statistically significant training advantage over men, score below average in all 
these institutions. This supports the finding from the multilevel analysis that mean tenure, 
union density, childcare and child benefits explain cross-country differences in the gender 
training gap among highly educated employees. 
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Table 16: Institutional indicators for countries with opposing gender gaps among employees with a 
degree 
 
Mean tenure Union density Childcare <3 Child benefits 
Countries with training disadvantage of highly educated women 
AT + - - + 
CY + + + + 
DK - + + + 
FI + + + + 
FR + - + + 
PT + - + - 
RO + + - - 
SE + + + - 
Countries with significant training advantage of highly educated women 
EE - - - - 
HU - - - - 
LV - - - - 
PL + - - - 
UK - - - - 
+ = value of the institutional variable above the mean across all countries in the data set, 
-  = value of the institutional variable below the mean across all countries in the data set, 
Country codes: AT = Austria, CY = Cyprus, DK = Denmark, EE = Estonia, FI = Fin-
land, FR = France, HU = Hungary, LV = Latvia, PL = Poland, PT = Portugal, RO = 
Romania, SE = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom. 
 
For employees without a university degree, only the vocational system explains part of the 
cross-country differences in the gender training gap: Women are disadvantaged compared 
to men in countries with strong vocational systems. However, differences in the gender 
training gap cannot be entirely explained by this institution. Though the interaction be-
tween gender and the vocational system explains part of the cross-country variation in the 
gender training gap, there still remains a significant random slope of the “Female” dummy, 
indicating significant unexplained cross-country variance in the effect of being female on 
training. With reference to the individual-level country regressions, this is mirrored in the 
fact that among lower educated there is not such a clear pattern of institutional values as 
for highly educated employees (see Table 41 in the Appendix compared to Table 16).  
4.5 Discussion  
In this section, results of the analysis are discussed the with reference to the previously 
stated hypotheses. Table 17 provides a fist overview before the most important findings 
concerning each of the hypotheses are pointed out in detail.  
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Table 17: Summary of the results 
Hypothesis Results 
Differences between women with and without university degree 
H1a: There is a gender training gap among 
employees without a university degree. 
 Individual-level analyses: Supported for most countries 
 Multilevel analyses: Supported 
H1b: The gender training gap among em-
ployees with a university degree is smaller 
than among employees without a university 
degree. 
 Individual-level analyses: Supported for most countries 
 Multilevel analyses: Supported  
Labour market  
H2: The longer the mean tenure in a coun-
try, the less do women train compared to 
men. 
 Country-level analyses: Supported for women with a 
university degree   
 Multilevel analyses: Supported for women with a uni-
versity degree 
H3a: The higher union density and bargain-
ing coverage, the less do women train com-
pared to men. 
 Country-level analyses: Supported for women with a 
university degree  
 Multilevel analyses: Supported only in the single-
institution-model for women with a university degree 
H3b: This relationship is more pronounced 
among employees without a university de-
gree. 
 Country-level analyses: Rejected   
 Multilevel analyses: Rejected   
Educational system  
H4a: The stronger the focus on specific 
human capital in the educational system 
(high share of vocational students, low share 
of university graduates), the less do women 
train compared to men. 
 Country-level analyses: Supported   
 Multilevel analyses: Supported in terms of the voca-
tional system (in terms of university system only in the 
single-institution-model) 
H4b: This relationship is more pronounced 
among employees without a university de-
gree. 
 Country-level analyses: Supported in terms of the voca-
tional system  
 Multilevel analyses: Supported in terms of the voca-
tional system  
Support for women  
H5a: The higher the incentives for women 
to return to the labour market early after 
childbirth (high levels of childcare, short 
maternity leaves, low child benefits), the 
more do women train compared to men.  
 Country-level analyses: Supported for women with a 
university degree in terms of child benefits  
 Multilevel analyses: Mixed results for females with a 
university degree (supported in terms of child benefits, 
rejected in terms of childcare below the age of three) 
H5b: The relationship between these incen-
tives and training is more pronounced 
among employees without a university de-
gree. 
 Country-level analyses: Rejected   
 Multilevel analyses: Rejected   
H6: The higher the gender equality in the 
labour market, the more do women train 
compared to men. 
 Country-level analyses: Supported for in terms of de-
gree equality  
 Multilevel analyses: Supported for in terms of degree 
equality in the single-institution-model when Romania 
is excluded 
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Hypotheses 1a and 1b: Women are different – and so are countries. 
The previous analyses showed clear differences in the gender training gap between highly 
and lower educated employees. These results obviously support Hypotheses 1a and 1b: 
While women without a university degree have a significant training disadvantage com-
pared to men (Hypotheses 1a), women holding a university degree have a smaller training 
disadvantage (Hypotheses 1b). In fact, highly educated women were even found to have a 
training advantage over men. In a first step, this could be shown for most of the analysed 
countries separately. Later, the result was confirmed by the multilevel analysis. This sug-
gests that arguments by Lazear & Rosen (1990) are not only relevant for human capital 
investments related to promotion decisions. The distinction between highly and lower edu-
cated women appears to be relevant for other training investments as well. It seems that 
human capital and statistical discrimination theory rationales predicting a female training 
disadvantage are valid for women without university education but not for highly educated 
women. Consequently, when analysing the gender training gap, arguments by Lazear & 
Rosen (1990) should be taken into account and higher and lower educated employees 
should be analysed separately. 
While the training disadvantage for lower educated women is in line with previous as-
sumptions, the finding that highly educated women hold a training advantage compared to 
men was not expected. The surprising finding might be explained by the results by Bassa-
nini et al. (2007) who found women to train more than men because they are more willing 
to pay for their own training. Such behaviour can be explained by signalling theory 
(Spence, 1973). Chatterji, Seaman, & Singell Jr., Larry D. (2003), analysing educational 
returns of British employees, find that women gain more from education than men. This 
difference largely occurs as a result of two reasons: On the one hand, for women, educa-
tion appears more important to get a job higher up in the hierarchy. On the other hand, 
holding this factor constant, signalling by educational achievement is significantly posi-
tively related to wages of women but not to wages of men. Thus, the authors conclude that 
“the signalling aspect of education appears to be more important for women relative to that 
of men” (Chatterji et al., 2003: 210). Chatterji et al. (2003) discuss education primarily as a 
signal of ability and explain part of the differences in the signalling requirements of men 
and women by differences in job types because jobs hold by females are more likely to 
require educational signals. However, interpreting education as a signal of labour market 
attachment could offer an additional way of explaining the gender differences. As men’s 
average labour market attachment is assumed to be higher than women’s, a woman has to 
send stronger signals to convince employers of her labour market attachment. Thus, by 
making strong investments in her own human capital, a woman may want to signal her 
(potential) employers that her labour market attachment is high and that the employers’ 
risks in investing in an employment relation with her are low. A woman, who decided to 
send such signals in terms of higher education, may be likely to continue this strategy 
throughout her employment career. This would explain why in most countries, women now 
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represent the majority of university graduates (see “Degree equality” in Table 26 in the 
Appendix) and why in most countries, women holding a university degree train more than 
equally educated men.   
In line with previous findings by Arulampalam et al. (2004) and Dieckhoff & Steiber 
(2011), this analysis further revealed considerable cross-country differences in terms of the 
gender training gap. Initially, the separated country estimations on individual data already 
suggested cross-country differences because some countries showed male whereas others 
showed female advantages in training. While the country-separated analyses could not 
make any statement concerning the significance of these differences, the multilevel anal-
yses could: The highly significant random slopes of the “Female” dummies in the multi-
level models (Model 3 in Tables 7, 9 and 11 respectively) confirmed that for all analysed 
employee groups, the gender training gap significantly varies across European countries. 
Thus, the next step was to answer the question: Which national institutions can explain 
these differences in the gender training gap between countries? 
Hypotheses 2, 3a and 3b: The labour market is related to training of men and women. 
The hypotheses concerning the labour market characteristics and the gender training gap 
received mixed support. The detrimental effect of long tenure rates on female training par-
ticipation as stated in Hypothesis 2 could be supported by the findings for women with 
university education. Their training participation is in fact significantly lower in compari-
son to the one of men when mean tenure rises. This result was found in the country-level 
analysis as well as in the multilevel analyses (including and excluding Romania) and sug-
gests that highly educated women have a comparative training disadvantage in labour mar-
kets with a long-term orientation. The results are strongly in line with arguments by Esté-
vez-Abe (2005) and may be explained by two simultaneous processes: On the one hand, 
maternity replacement becomes more expensive because the specific skills necessary for 
performing the job are not readily available on the labour market. Thus, employers can 
choose between training investments in maternity replacement workers or the redistribu-
tion of tasks between the remaining employees. However, the higher the percentage of 
young women a company employs, the higher the risk that this latter option is not feasible. 
On the other hand, the investments in specific skills that are needed in long-term oriented 
labour markets are at odds with women’s flexibility needs. Hence, while long-term orienta-
tion provides incentive for men to invest in specific human capital, it does not for women. 
In summary, this fuels a female training disadvantage. 
Hypothesis 3a, that assumes a negative effect of industrial relations on female training, is 
supported in the country-level regressions for women with university education. In the 
multilevel analyses, the result was repeated when the interaction terms of the “Female” 
dummy with the measures for union density and bargaining coverage were found to be 
negative related to female training odds in the single-institution-models. However, in the 
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final model, the coefficients of these interactions turned out to be insignificant. The reason 
for this may be a correlation with other institutions included in the model (industrial rela-
tions are significantly correlated to mean tenure, childcare and child benefits, see Table 27) 
or too few degrees of freedom at country-level, which make it difficult to detect the pre-
sumably complex and therefore imprecisely estimable effects of unions on the gender 
training gap. For women without university education, the analyses did not find any signif-
icant industrial relations effects. Consequently, Hypothesis 3b, which assumes a stronger 
negative effect on women without university education, can be clearly rejected by both 
country-level and multilevel analyses.  
The findings might be interpreted as an indication that unions strive for equality. Since 
among employees with university education men are the disadvantaged group, the negative 
union effect on women is really a reduction of their training advantage rather than an in-
crease of a disadvantage. In fact, overall training odds of highly educated women still 
slightly rise in the presence of strong unions, though less than training odds of men. How-
ever, as unions do not seem to have any equality effect when it comes to employees with-
out university education – here women being the disadvantaged group – median voter ra-
tionales may play a role as well: Unions foster equality where men – their traditional focus 
group – are disadvantaged but not where women are disadvantaged. This rationale is sup-
ported by the positive relationship between the ratio of females in unions and training for 
women that was found in the single-institution-model for all employees as well as for low-
er educated employees (though here, the positive relationship slightly missed the 10% level 
of significance when Romania is included). It seems that, when the importance of women 
in unions rises, unions support women’s training needs to a stronger extent than they sup-
port men’s. The fact that this result is mainly driven by union effects on lower educated 
women points to unions’ equality efforts again.  
The finding that gender differences between men and women of lower education are not 
influenced by strong industrial relations measures may also be explained by Waddington‘s 
(2000) conclusion that female influence in unions has increased – but is not yet comparable 
to male influence. Among employees of lower education, where unions’ influence can be 
assumed to be highest while gender differences in labour market attachment provide the 
strongest training disadvantages for women, unions may not have been successful in im-
proving women’s situation compared to men’s. However, they neither appear to favour 
men over women as observed among highly educated employees but appear to treat them 
equally to men. So there might be favourable union efforts for lower educated women in 
place which are just not strong enough to significantly reduce their training disadvantage. 
The results on industrial relations are in line with Rigby (2002). He finds that though union 
representatives are aware of the importance of training equality, actual union efforts to 
tackle the problem typically concentrate on training for lower qualified workers, without 
much addressing of the problem of the gender training gap. Moreover, though union repre-
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sentatives at higher levels seem to be determined to promote general training, at the work-
place level, unions do not follow a clear practice in promoting general training. Such union 
behaviour could explain the results for the different employee groups in the multilevel 
analyses. While the relationship between unions and training is not significant for the high-
er educated, there is a significantly positive relationship between union density and train-
ing odds for the lower educated in the single-institution-model (which misses the 10% lev-
el in the final model). These findings may be interpreted as union efforts to support train-
ing among the lower educated while training of the higher educated is not in the focus of 
union policies. The insignificant interactions of the “Female” dummy and the industrial 
relations indicators for the lower educated further suggest that there are no strong union 
efforts to support training for disadvantaged women. Moreover, if unions, through foster-
ing training, are not able to influence the type of the training as suggested by Rigby (2002), 
the training increase that unions might accomplish could be mainly concentrated on specif-
ic training. This is, as Edlund & Grönlund (2008) argue, because employers are likely to 
provide specific training if unions are not strong enough to enforce general training. Spe-
cific training would again be a source of gender inequality causing a relative disadvantage 
for women. Thus, a lack of union support for general training could provide an additional 
explanation for the relative male training advantage among highly educated employees in 
the presence of strong unions.  
Both tenure rates and union strength were assumed to raise overall levels of training, espe-
cially when it comes to specific skills (Hall & Soskice, 2001a). However, multilevel anal-
yses showed that high rates of mean tenure in a country are negatively related to training 
participation of employees. Nevertheless, this effect seemed to be mainly driven by Roma-
nia, which is an outliner in terms of extremely high mean tenure combined with the lowest 
levels of training among the 22 countries analysed. Excluding Romania resulted in non-
significant estimates for mean tenure for all employees. Further, the multilevel analyses did 
not show a clear relationship between union strength and overall levels of training. Only in 
the single-institution-model was union density positively related to training participation of 
the lower educated (see Table 12). However, when controlling for other institutions that 
proved statistically significant in the previous analyses, the estimate for union density was 
no longer significant at the 10% level. Bargaining coverage did not show a significant rela-
tion to overall training participation in any of the specifications. These results reflect pre-
vious findings by Bassanini et al. (2005) who find a positive but imprecisely estimated 
relationship between unions and training. An explanation for this might be as theoretical 
arguments by Streeck (1992) and Acemoglu & Pischke (1999b) as well as empirical find-
ings by Brunello (2004) suggest that unions’ effects on training are often rather indirect 
through compressed wage structures.  
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Hypotheses 4a and 4b: The educational system is related to training of men and women. 
Hypothesis 4a assumed that a stronger focus on specific human capital should lead to a 
training disadvantage of women compared to men. The hypothesis finds broad support in 
the country-level analyses where the rate of university graduates, indicating a general skill 
focus, is positively correlated with the relative training participation of women while the 
rate of vocational students, indicating a specific focus, is negatively correlated. In the mul-
tilevel analyses the single-institution-models confirm these results. However, in the final 
model the female interaction for the university system, though still indicating a positive 
relationship, is no longer significant. Nevertheless, a strong vocational system is still sig-
nificantly related to a female training disadvantage. Thus, the results strongly support 
Estévez-Abe‘s (2006) claim that “[t]he importance of vocational training…[is] expected to 
exacerbate the skill gap between the sexes by encouraging…male investments in specific 
skills.” Hypothesis 4a can therefore be supported in terms of the initial vocational training 
system: The higher the share of vocational students, the less do women train compared to 
men. 
Hypothesis 4b suggests that the negative relationship between skill specificity and training 
is stronger for lower educated women, as they are assumed to have a lower labour market 
attachment and thus to assumed to be more likely to leave the labour market and take long 
maternity leaves. Compared to highly educated women, this makes investments in lower 
educated women’s specific human capital more risky for the women themselves as well as 
for their employers. The results concerning the vocational system clearly support Hypothe-
sis 4b: Both country-level as well as multilevel analyses reveal that the negative relation-
ship between strong vocational systems and women’s training is basically driven by lower 
educated employees. While for highly educated women, the negative relationship is not 
statistically significant, it is highly significant for women without a university degree (see 
Table 6 for the country-level analyses and Table 14 for the multilevel analyses).  
In terms of overall training levels, the multilevel analyses revealed no significant impact of 
the share of university graduates in a country and the training probabilities of individuals. 
This finding differs from Brunello‘s (2004) results who found a positive relationship be-
tween a high supply of educated workers and training. The reason for this discrepancy 
might be that Brunello (2004) defined educated workers as those who attained at least up-
per secondary education which is a definition including a much greater share of the em-
ployees than the share of university graduates included in this study. Nevertheless, in this 
study, the vocational system was found to be significantly related to training participation: 
A high share of vocational students was positively related to employees’ training participa-
tion across almost all model specifications (except the model for highly educated employ-
ees including bargaining coverage and excluding Romanian data).  
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Hypotheses 5a, 5b and 6: Support for women is related to training of women – and men. 
Hypothesis 5a suggests that high levels of childcare, low child benefits and short maternity 
leaves provide incentives for women to return to the labour market early after childbirth, 
which in turn reduces the investment risks in female human capital for employers as well 
as employees. Consequently, these incentives should increase female training participation. 
In the country-level analysis, this was supported for women with university education in 
terms of child benefits. While this finding was reproduced in the multilevel analyses 
(though not when Romania is excluded), the models also revealed a negative relationship 
between childcare for children below the age of three and training for women. This clearly 
opposed the assumptions in Hypothesis 5a. A possible explanation for this finding is that 
the provision of childcare is correlated with the composition of the country sample: The 
more childcare is provided, the more mothers of young children are among the employees 
of the countries. Though childcare facilitated these women’s returns to the labour market, 
they may have less time left to participate in training than men. This interpretation was 
supported by the highly significant correlation between the share of young female employ-
ees living with a young child and the share of children in childcare. The strong correlation 
of 0.787 also supports Estévez-Abe’s (2005) claim that available childcare is one of the 
most important factors enabling women to return to the labour market after child bearing.  
Hypothesis 5b assumes lower educated women to be more likely to be incentivized to par-
ticipate in training by supportive institutions than highly educated women. This hypothesis 
can be clearly rejected. Neither in the country-level regressions nor in the multilevel mod-
els for lower educated employees do any of the direct institutional measures for women’s 
support show differing effects on men and women.  
However, contrary to highly educated women, lower educated women do not seem to train 
less than men when levels of childcare are high. One reason for this finding might be that 
the incentives to return to the labour market collide with the lower labour market attach-
ment of women with lower education. Though they may well depend on institutional sup-
port to a higher extent than women of higher education, they may in general be less deter-
mined to return to the labour market after child bearing than women of higher education. 
Their threshold for institutional support might therefore be higher than for women of high-
er education. Further, labour market return of lower educated women may also depend 
more strongly on other factors than the ones measured in the models, e.g. the costs and not 
only the extension of childcare. These assumptions can be supported when the relationship 
between female employees with small children and childcare is observed separately for 
women of higher and lower education: Although both correlations are highly significant, 
the correlation between childcare and employment of women without university degree is 
0.758 while it is 0.816 for women with university education. A similar pattern can be ob-
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served in the relationship between employment participation of women living with chil-
dren aged four to five and childcare for children above three:
38
 The share of highly educat-
ed female employees with children significantly correlates with the provision of childcare 
(0.569) while there is no statistically significant correlation for the employment of women 
with lower education and childcare.  
Hypothesis 6 assumed that higher gender equality in the labour market would lead to high-
er training participation of women. In the country-level analyses, this could be supported 
for degree equality, especially when it comes to lower educated women. In the multilevel 
analyses this finding was reproduced in the single-institution-model for lower educated 
employees when Romania was excluded (including Romania, the odds ratio of “Degree 
equality” of the same model was significant at 12%). However the estimate was rendered 
insignificant in the final model.  
Obviously there is no strong relationship between the equality measures and training for 
women. Thus, Dieckhoff’s & Steiber’s (2011) claim that the gender training gap is smaller 
in countries with high levels of female labour market participation cannot be supported. 
However, as the equality measures were merely proposed to capture a quite broad picture 
of the gender equalities in the labour market, these results may not be that surprising after 
all. In other words, the findings do not necessarily lead to the conclusion that general gen-
der equality in the labour market is not related to the gender training gap but rather, that the 
underlying processes may be too complex to be revealed by the previous analyses. This 
could be because the few degrees of freedom at country-level allow for capturing quite 
strong and precisely estimated relationships but might reach their limits when effects are 
more complex and imprecise. Such interpretation is backed by rationales by Estévez-Abe 
(2006: 164) who points out that cultural aspects are likely translate into gender differences 
in the labour market. She predicts traditional gender norms to reduce female labour market 
participation and to lead to a higher female specialization in non-market work. Such nega-
tive attitudes towards female labour market participation that should have an effect on ine-
quality between men and women in general aspects like labour market participation, pay or 
qualification, may also have an indirect effect on women’s training participation. However, 
as cultural effects are highly complex, these effects may be quite weak or varying and 
hence difficult to grasp within a small set of countries.  
The cultural interpretation of the gender difference in the labour market further offers a 
persuasive way to interpret the differences in the findings on the three equality measures. 
Women’s educational achievement should be related to cultural norms referring to the hu-
man capital of women. Similar norms could be valid when it comes to work-related train-
ing for women. On the contrary, female labour market participation and success in terms of 
                                                 
38
 Unfortunately the age ranges of the AES and the childcare data provided by Eurostat do not match exactly. 
However, these measures should provide an acceptable approximation. 
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payment might be related to additional sets of cultural norms that go far beyond a skill per-
spective. From this point of view, it may not be surprising to find degree equality to be 
more clearly related to the gender training gap than the other measures. Another argument 
why the cultural interpretation is quite tempting is that the relationship between the gender 
training gap and degree equality was found for lower educated women, i.e. among employ-
ees who do not hold a degree themselves. As models controlled for the educational level on 
individual basis, this effect cannot be interpreted as a simple aggregated effect of women’s 
individual education. By contrast, gender degree equality could be interpreted as a sign for 
attitudes towards female education. These attitudes should not only be relevant for initial 
but also for continuous education and training.   
The variables that measured the support for women were not assumed to explain country 
differences in the overall levels of training. Nonetheless, multilevel analyses on the single 
institutions indicated a positive training effect of childcare for children aged three and old-
er, maternity leave, employment equality as well as degree equality (the first only when 
Romania was included, latter only when Romania was excluded). In the final models, the 
positive relationship only remained significant for maternity leave among lower educated 
employees and, when Romania was excluded, it also remained significant for employment 
equality in all models. While there is no clear theoretical explanation for these findings, it 
might be argued that these “w men-f  end  ” policies are characteristics of modern labour 
markets designed to make the most of a country’s human capital. High levels of training 
would be strongly in line with the goals of such labour markets. 
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5 CONCLUSION 
5.1 Summary of the main results 
Economic literature finds continuous training to be highly relevant for employees’ labour 
market success, and training differences between men and women are discussed of being 
one reason for gender equalities in the labour market (Melero, 2010; Tomaskovic-Devey & 
Skaggs, 2002). This study focussed on the question of how previous education and national 
institutions can help explain training differences between men and women. To that end, 
first, standard economic theory referring to gender differences in human capital develop-
ment was reviewed. However, as human capital theory and discrimination theory consist-
ently predict a male training advantage neither was helpful in explaining the heterogeneous 
results of empirical studies on the gender training gap.  
Two additional approaches were identified that are based on traditional human capital and 
statistical discrimination theory, but suggest varying human capital investments in and by 
women depending on their ability and the national institutions of the country they are liv-
ing in. The first approach by Lazear & Rosen (1990) implies that while women of average 
ability fulfil the human capital prediction of a lower labour market attachment, women of 
high ability should be equally attached to the labour market as comparable men. In terms 
of continuous training, this would mean that though average women should be disadvan-
taged compared to men, highly able women should not. While ability is difficult to meas-
ure, it can be approximated by education. The second approach by Estévez-Abe (2005; 
2006; 2009; 2012) suggests gender equality to depend on the human capital focus of a 
country, which is reflected in its labour market and its educational system. A strong focus 
on specific skills is assumed to lead to female disadvantages in labour market participation 
and success because investments in specific human capital of women are more risky than 
in human capital of men. To lower these investment risks, institutional support for women 
is necessary. Applied to the prediction of gender differences in training, this indicates that 
women face training disadvantages in countries with labour markets and educational sys-
tems focussing on specific human capital. These training disadvantages could only be mit-
igated by institutional support for women.  
To test the hypotheses generated on this theoretical background, micro and macro data 
from 22 European countries was used. With the individual data at hand, separate country 
regressions were run to get a first overview of the gender training gap in the single coun-
tries. This unveiled that the gender training gap varies considerably across countries. Sepa-
rating the training gap by educational background further revealed that, in many countries, 
women of lower education are disadvantaged while women of higher education have a 
training advantage over men. In a second step, regressing the cross-country differences on 
national institutions of the labour market, the educational system and the support for wom-
en, indicated that these three spheres are relevant for explaining cross-country differences 
in the gender training gap. Consequently, the analysis preceded developing multilevel 
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models on the training participation of employees with and without university education 
including these three sets of variables.  
The multilevel approach allowed inclusion of micro and macro data simultaneously and 
thus permitted an analysis of the complex data structure as well as interactions between 
individual and institutional variables on a non-aggregated level. It further allowed state-
ments on the significance of the cross-country differences and the strength of the institu-
tional relationships. The multilevel analysis confirmed that while there is no clear relation-
ship between gender and training when analysing all employees together, there is a gender 
training gap for lower educated women and a reversed training gap for highly educated 
women: Among highly educated employees, women’s training odds are 1.077 times higher 
than men’s, while among lower educated employees women’s training odds are 0.889 
times lower than men’s. This underscores the importance of distinguishing between em-
ployees of different levels of education when analysing the gender training gap. 
Not only educational but also cross-country differences were found to have an impact on 
the gender training gap. In a first step, multilevel analysis showed that the gender training 
gap for all employee groups significantly varies across European countries. For all em-
ployees, the analysis indicated that women’s training odds are between 0.648 times lower 
and 1.404 times higher than men’s in different European countries (for highly educated 
employees these values rage from 0.830 to 1.420 whereas they range from 0.593 to 1.324 
for lower educated employees). In a second step, part of these differences could be ex-
plained by national institutions referring to the labour market, the educational system and 
support for women. Among highly educated employees, mean tenure, union density, child-
care for young children and child benefits were negatively related to women’s training 
participation. At certain levels these institutions even appear to compensate women’s train-
ing advantage and lead to a training disadvantage of highly educated women in some coun-
tries. Together, these measures were able to explain the entire cross-country variation of 
the gender training gap among highly educated employees. This reflects results from the 
individual-level analyses: Countries for which individual-level regressions indicated a 
(usually not statistically significant) training disadvantage of highly educated woman com-
pared to men showed above average values in at least two of these measures. On the con-
trary, almost all countries that had statistically significant training advantages of highly 
educated women showed values below average in all these measures.  
The most surprising finding was the negative relationship between childcare for children 
below the age of three and women’s training participation. A possible explanation for that 
finding is that the composition of the country samples differs according to the provision of 
childcare: In countries with high levels of childcare, there appear to be more working 
mothers with small children who may lower the women’s average training levels in a coun-
try.  
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The results further indicate that different national institutions are relevant for gender dif-
ferences among highly and lower educated employees. While measures of the labour mar-
ket and the support for women virtually explained the entire cross-country differences in 
the gender gap among the highly educated, cross-country differences among lower educat-
ed employees can be partly explained by differences in the educational system: Lower ed-
ucated women are disadvantaged in countries with strong initial vocational training sys-
tems. This relationship is strong and in line with previous assumptions. However, cross-
country differences in the gender training gap among lower educated employees cannot be 
entirely explained by this measure (nor by the other proposed institutions). A significant 
variation of the gender gap in this group remains unexplained.   
Overall, the different steps of the empirical analysis revealed that the gender training gap is 
clearly related to previous education as well as national institutions resuming characteris-
tics of the labour market, the educational system and the support for women. This way, the 
study helps to get a better understanding of training differences between men and women. 
5.2 Limitations and suggestions for further research 
Different types of training 
To assess cross-country differences in the gender training gap, it was necessary to include 
data from as many countries as possible. However, as national surveys varied in the depth 
of the questions referring to continuous training, an analysis including as many AES-
countries as possible could only refer to work-related training defined as a binary variable. 
This leads to some limitations of this study as well as suggestions for further research. 
Explaining differences in the gender training gap across different employee groups and 
countries, this study helps to understand the basis of training differences between men and 
women. Thereby, it strictly focuses on observed gender differences in training participation 
without distinguishing between the reasons that lead to these differences. This makes sense 
since the theoretical framework of this study refers to two possible causes of these differ-
ences: Women’s own preferences and employers’ statistical discrimination. Both explana-
tions are assumed to be caused by a lower labour market attachment of lower educated 
women and lead to the same results: A training disadvantage of lower educated women 
next to training equality among highly educated employees. A distinction between the two 
causes is therefore neither necessary for policy implications (both causes could be ad-
dressed by similar measures) nor feasible as they lead to the same observable training dis-
tribution. Still, the study is not able to rule out the possibility of taste discrimination by 
employers. With women holding a training advantage over men, there is indeed no obvious 
indication of employers’ taste discrimination against women. However, women might be 
more willing than men to pay for their own training (Bassanini et al., 2007). This could 
mask existing discriminatory practices by employers.  
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To get a clearer picture of the underlying causes of the training disadvantage of lower edu-
cated women and the training advantage of highly educated women, further research is 
necessary. Employer and employee financed training should be analysed separately to find 
out whether the gender training gap among the lower educated is driven by employee pref-
erences or employer discrimination. Such a distinction may also help to explain the train-
ing advantage of highly educated women found in the previous analysis. If results support 
Bassanini et al. (2007) and show that women are in fact more likely to pay for their own 
training, signalling theory offers an explanation for the higher training probability of wom-
en with university education.  
The theoretical underpinnings of this study assume a strong female preference for general 
opposed to specific training as the latter is much less flexible. Still, as the empirical dis-
tinction between general and specific training proved difficult based on the available data, 
information of all training incidents in the past 12 months was considered, without distin-
guishing between general and specific training. Further, restricting the outcome variable to 
a binary structure did neither allow distinguishing between employees that took part in one 
or more training incidents, nor between trainings of different durations. This might have an 
impact on the results. O’Halloran (2008) finds women to be more likely to participate in 
training while among those employees who take training, men are the ones who participate 
in more training incidents and trainings of longer duration. The latter finding is also mir-
rored in findings by Barron et al. (1993). Such a pattern would lead to an overestimation of 
women’s training compared to men’s in the results of this study. The training disadvantage 
of lower educated women may thus be underestimated in the previous analysis and the 
training advantage of highly educated women might be overestimated. Nevertheless, as 
long as differences between lower and higher educated women are not affected by the def-
inition of the outcome variable, the theoretical framework of this study is even more 
strongly supported if such training pattern is present in the analysed sample. In this case, 
the previous results should be considered conservative.  
In summary, in order to make more precise statements on the reasons for the gender train-
ing gap, it would be interesting to analyse employer- and employee-financed as well as 
general and specific training separately. Controlling for training frequency and length 
would allow estimating the gender gap more precisely.  
Determinants at the individual-level 
Data of the AES did not provide information on the sector in which an employee works. 
As public sector employees were found to participate in more training than private sector 
employees and women are more likely to be public sector employees (Jones et al., 2008), 
sector is an often included control in the analyses of training (e.g. Bassanini et al., 2007;  
Brunello, 2001; Büchel & Pannenberg, 2004; Draca & Green, 2004). A large part of this 
effect should be captured by the occupational and industry dummies in the previous anal-
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yses. Still, not taking into account the sector could lead to an overestimation of female 
training participation. Nevertheless, this would again mean that the female training disad-
vantage among lower educated employees was underestimated whereas the female training 
advantage among highly educated employees was overestimated, which would still be in 
line with the theoretical framework. 
The results of this study indicate that women are not the heterogeneous group economic 
theory takes them for. While the distinction between women with a university degree and 
other women revealed opposing gender gaps, the group of women without university edu-
cation is still heterogeneous in terms of education and vocational qualifications. As these 
differences may give rise to varying levels of training participation, future studies should 
examine the group of women without a university degree more closely.  
Determinants at the country-level  
In the final multilevel models, some of the coefficients that have been found significant in 
the single-institution-models turned out to be insignificant. This was especially true for 
measures of industrial relations and the support for women. Reasons for that may be the 
correlation of the variables (see Table 27 in the Appendix) or the few degrees of freedom 
that make detecting weak or imprecise effects rather difficult. Analyses looking at a greater 
number of countries could help answer the question, which one of these explanations is 
more likely to be true.  
Moreover, in-depth analyses of selected countries may offer interesting insights in the rela-
tionship between national characteristics and the gender training gap. Denmark and Fin-
land, where training odds of lower educated women are higher than the odds of men and 
the odds of highly educated women are lower than those of men, may be contrasted with a 
selection of the countries where the opposite relationships have been found (Belgium, the 
Czech Republic, Germany, Estonia, Spain, Lithuania, Norway, Poland and the Slovak Re-
public). Another interesting case is France, which is the only country where highly educat-
ed women train significantly less than highly educated men. Conversely, lower educated 
women train significantly more than comparable men in Hungary and Latvia. Case studies 
on the institutional settings of these countries might explain these remarkable findings.  
Apart from the gender training gap, the analyses also provided some insights on the institu-
tional determinants of the overall levels of training in a country. However, as the focus of 
this study is the gender training gap, institutions were selected concerning the expected 
difference in the training effects on men and women. Although a number of these institu-
tions appeared to be related to overall training participation, there may be additional de-
terminants relevant for training participation in general. For future research, it would be 
interesting to develop a comprehensive multilevel model on continuous training participa-
tion of employees and to test this model empirically on a cross-national data set. 
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5.3 Implications for theory and practice 
This study sheds light on the determinants of the gender training gap, which have not been 
analysed so far, and offers explanations for the highly heterogeneous results of empirical 
studies on gender differences in training (see Table 18 in the Appendix). First, the finding 
that lower educated women hold a training disadvantage while highly educated women 
have an advantage, may explain why many empirical studies did not find any significant 
difference in training participation of men and women (e.g. Veum, 1996, Warr & Birdi, 
1998 or Draca & Green, 2004). As empirical studies usually do not distinguish between 
highly and lower educated employees, a non-significant gender training gap may mask two 
opposing effects: Training disadvantages of lower educated women next to training ad-
vantages of higher educated women. However, depending on the actual sample composi-
tion in terms of previous education, these opposing effects can also lead to the finding that 
gender differences do exist. A good example is the widely cited study by Lynch (1992). 
Analysing training participation of non-college graduates, she finds that women are less 
likely to train than men. Nevertheless, studies referring to her results often do not discuss 
the specific sample composition but cite the study as an indication of a female disad-
vantage in training (see e.g. Veum, 1996, Sicilian & Grossberg, 2001 or Fahr & Sunde, 
2009). The previous analysis however shows that results on the gender training gap among 
highly and lower educated employees may not be comparable.  
Second, in line with previous results, this study shows that the gender training gap differs 
across different European countries (Arulampalam et al., 2004; Dieckhoff & Steiber, 
2011). It goes beyond existing studies, as it is able to explain cross-country differences in 
the gender training gap by national institutions. Differences in the gender training gap 
among highly educated employees can be nearly entirely explained by labour market char-
acteristics and the support for women. More specifically, gender differences can be ex-
plained by differing effects of mean tenure, union density, childcare and child benefits on 
training of men and women: The higher these measures are, the lower is the relative train-
ing participation of highly educated women compared to men. The gender training gap for 
the lower educated can be partly explained by differences in the educational system. Here, 
a strong focus on specific human capital (measured by the share of students in vocational 
programmes) is related to a considerable training disadvantage of women compared to 
men. 
The study therefore indicates that traditional economic arguments of human capital and 
discrimination theory, predicting gender differences in training, should be complemented 
by additional approaches when analysing the gender training gap. On the individual level, 
the point by Lazear & Rosen (1990) that though women of average ability have a lower 
labour market attachment than men, labour market attachment of highly able women is not 
different from the labour market attachment of highly able man, should be taken into ac-
count. Education appears a valid proxy for ability in this context. Although the authors 
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apply this rationale to promotion decisions, the previous findings indicate that it is equally 
valuable to predict other training decisions. This means that human capital and discrimina-
tion theory rationales are valid for the prediction of gender training differences among in-
dividuals of average ability (or education) but not among individuals of higher ability (or 
education). The empirical finding of a female advantage in training among highly educated 
further suggests that signalling theory may play a role explaining gender differences 
among highly educated employees. The reason for this could be that women aim to con-
vince employers of their high labour market attachment by investing in their own human 
capital. On the institutional level, the results of this study imply that arguments by Estévez-
Abe (2005; 2006; 2009; 2012), suggesting that the skill focus of a country, mirrored in its 
labour market and educational system, as well as the institutional support for women have 
an impact on women’s labour market success, should be taken into account when analysing 
the gender training gap.  
More generally, this study contributes to the comparative literature on continuous training. 
It shows that not only the gender training gap but also the overall level of training is related 
to a country’s national institutions. Most prominently, a strong vocational education sys-
tem is strongly positively related to overall levels of training for all employees (though 
more strongly for men than for women). In addition, strong unions and long maternity 
leaves appear to be positively related to training participation of the lower educated.  
The study offers some policy implications as well. The finding that there is a considerable 
gender training gap among the lower educated while highly educated women have a train-
ing advantage suggests that policy makers should focus their efforts on training for the 
lower educated women. As the training disadvantage of these women is assumed to be 
caused by their lower labour market attachment, measures should be designed to strength-
en these women’s attachment to the labour market. The previous analyses indicate that 
labour market participation of highly educated mothers is more strongly related to the 
share of children in childcare than labour market participation of lower educated mothers. 
One reason for this finding may be that although available, childcare might be too expen-
sive for lower educated women as they usually earn less than highly educated women. 
Thus, the provision of free childcare might especially help women of lower education to 
return to the labour market early after childbirth.  
Though the measure of pay equality did not turn out to be statistically significant, the posi-
tive odds ratio of the cross-level interaction still suggests a moderately positive relationship 
between pay equality and training of lower educated women (see Table 39 in the Appen-
dix). One reason for this might be that the higher labour market returns of women in coun-
tries with a more equal pay structure lead to a higher labour market attachment of women. 
Nevertheless, women in virtually all countries in the world still earn considerable less than 
men. In the European Union, the unadjusted gender pay gap in 2006 was 17.7%. Though 
the European average is slowly decreasing there are still several countries where the gap 
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exceeds 20% (e.g. Germany, Austria and the UK, Eurostat, 2012). Part of this gap may be 
explained by employment interruptions of female employees (which could be reduced by 
provision of subsidized childcare, see Arulampalam et al., 2007) while another part is 
caused by labour market segregation and low wages of typical “female” occupations (Pe-
tersen & Morgan, 1995). Because gender differences persist even after controlling for job 
requirements, it has been argued that this is due to an undervaluation of female work 
(Johnson & Solon, 1986). Sorensen (1990) for example finds that 20 to 23% of the gender 
pay gap can neither be explained by differences in job requirements nor by personal char-
acteristics (including work experience and time spent out of the labour market). Findings 
like this gave rise to a demand for “comparable worth policies” that are aimed to pay equal 
wages to employees performing comparable jobs (in terms of skill, effort, responsibility, or 
working conditions, Hartmann & Aaronson, 1994: 71). Comparable worth policies that 
raise pay equality between men and women may also raise women’s labour market at-
tachment and ultimately their training participation as well. 
The results of this study further suggest that unions may be a helpful partner in supporting 
equality efforts. Though strong unions did not appear to have an impact on the gender 
training gap among lower educated, they seem to be positively related to overall training 
participation of lower educated employees, and high shares of female unionists appear to 
support female training in this group. As women and equality issues gain importance in 
unions (Heery, 2006), the support for women’s training may strongly agree with future 
union goals and make unions a potentially strong partner for policy makers fighting gender 
inequality.   
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APPENDIX 
  
 
Table 18: Empirical studies on gender and training 
Study Dependent Variable Controls Dataset Results on gender & training 
Male training advantage     
Booth (1993) Dependent variable is a 
dummy variable 
“CURTRN” that indi-
cates whether the worker 
received any form of 
training. 
Age, marital status, number of 
children, race, education, firm 
characteristics, months out of 
workforce/unemployed,  
Paper uses the 1986 British Na-
tional Survey of graduates from a 
university or polytechnic in 1980. 
The sample consists of 2294 men 
and 1305 women who were, at the 
survey date, in a full-time paid job 
expected to last at least three 
months. Graduates over 35 years 
of age at graduation as well as 
those with missing birth date, 
training data and earnings were 
excluded. 
General result; Men graduates are more likely to 
receive training than otherwise identical wom-
en. More precise, for an average man, the prob-
ability to receive training is 76 % and for an 
identical woman 21 %. Further, in case the same 
individuals shift to an organisation employing at 
least 5000 workers, the training probability 
increases for a man to 96 % but for an identical 
women only to 44 %. Moreover, men with a 
first class degree are more likely to be trained 
than identically qualified women.   
Dieckhoff & Steiber 
(2011) 
During the last twelve 
months, have you taken 
any course or attended 
any lecture or conference 
to improve your 
knowledge or skills for 
work? 
Workers’ age, education, 
household income, part-time or 
full-time status, past unem-
ployment experience, firm size 
and sex of boss/supervisor, 
workers’ career orientation and 
gender attitudes 
European Social Survey (ESS), 
fielded in 2004/05: 2,392 women 
and 2,565 men, aged 25–45, in 
dependent employment (non-
executive) and living in co-
residential union with a partner 
Women are less likely to train than men, all else 
being equal. 
Evertsson (2004) Annual earnings (derived 
from the income tax 
return form and compris-
es wage income and 
wage-dependent social 
benefits) 
Survey year, industry, socio-
economic status,  
Swedish Survey of Living Condi-
tions (interviews with a random 
sample from the population in the 
age range 16-84., Survey from 
1994-1998 
More men then woman take part in on the job 
training; if they do receive training, they are less 
likely to take part in training that increases 
promotion opportunities and earnings. Women 
are more likely than men to take part in indus-
try-specific training and less likely to take part 
in general training. 
Georgellis & Lange 
(1997) 
Dummy variable for the 
probability of training 
participation for men and 
women 
Age, age², income, children, 
marital status, education, firm 
size, industry, occupation, un-
employment experience 
For the empirical analysis, the 
1984 and 1992 cohorts of the 
GSOEP are used. The sample 
includes workers between the age 
of 19 and 51 who were employed 
in 1984. The sample then consists 
of 1262 males and 719 females.  
The results suggest that male workers are more 
likely to participate in training than female 
workers. Further, the number of training spells 
completed has a strong positive effect on the  
probability of training participation mainly for 
men rather than women. 
  
 
Study Dependent Variable Controls Dataset Results on gender & training 
Male training advantage     
Pischke (2001) Training incidence and 
duration 
Occupation, industry and part 
time status 
German Socio Economic Panel, 
1986-1989, training questions for 
respondents ages 16-64 
Training incidence is lower for women; they 
also have shorter training spells 
Lynch (1992) Probability of receive 
training 
Industry and Occupation NLSY Data (National Longitudi-
nal Survey youth cohort); 12,686 
males and females, 14-21years of 
age at the end of 1978 
Women are much less likely receive training 
within a firm 
Pfeiffer & Reize (2001) Probability of participat-
ing in formal and infor-
mal training  
Job experience (and its 
squared), tenure (and its 
squared), employment interrup-
tions, education, industry, firm 
size, marital status, children, 
region, employee vs. self-
employed 
Survey “Qualifikation und 
Berufsverlauf” (“Bundesinstitut 
für Berufsbildung” & “Institut für 
Arbeitsmarkt und 
Berufsforschung”), years 1991 
and 1992  
Female employees have a 5.3% lower probabil-
ity of training participation than males with 
similar socio-economic characteristics. Howev-
er, there are no significant gender differences 
when looking at self-employed.  
Edlund & Grönlund 
(2008) 
Firm specific skill (On-
the-job-training) 
Class, workplace size and age. European Social Survey (ESS), 
2004, a weighted sub-sample 
comprising employees only is 
used (n=17,056). 
Men tend to have more firm-specific skills than 
women. No results concerning the incidence 
and intensity of on-the-job training for women. 
Fahr & Sunde (2009 Participation in formal 
further training 
Age, education, marital status, 
part-time employment, children 
age <6, type of shift, nationality 
(German (yes/no)), living area, 
change of occupation 
Data from the 1998 to 1999 cross-
section of the Qualification and 
Career Survey data (Qualifikation 
und Berufsverlauf) 
Gender differences pertain to the use of appren-
ticeship skills in the aftermath of the apprentice-
ship at least for occupation movers. Women 
form less new human capital than men after 
having completed apprenticeship. This is partic-
ularly the case when they leave their initial 
occupation. 
  
  
 
Study Dependent Variable Controls Dataset Results on gender & training 
Female training advantage 
Jones et al. (2008)  Gender decomposition Age, marital status, number of 
dependent children (if head of 
household or their spouse), 
disability, ethnicity and highest 
qualification, together with job- 
and employer-related character-
istics such as tenure, full-
time/part-time and perma-
nent/temporary employment 
status, second job-holding, 
occupational group, industrial 
sector, employer ownership 
(public/private sector), employ-
er size and region 
Labour Force Survey (Winter 
quarters of 1994–1995 and 2000–
2001) 
Women are more likely to receive job-related 
education than men. Women may receive ‘fa-
vourable treatment’ in respect of training.  
Simpson & Stroh 
(2002) 
Training incidence Age, race, education, income, 
probability of layoff 
Adult Education Data File of the 
National Household Education 
Survey (NHES) of 1995 (US 
Department of Education 1996); 
The survey for the National Cen-
ter for Education Statistics 
(NCES) was a random digit dial 
(RDD) telephone survey. For the 
adult education (AE) component, 
information was collected on 
participation in adult education 
based on interviews with 19,722 
adults, 16 years and older; Data 
were collected from January 
through Februar y 1995. 
Levels of training participation were higher for 
women than for men in 1995. Women’s partici-
pation rate in employer-supported off-the-job 
training was higher than for men. 
  
  
 
Study Dependent Variable Controls Dataset Results on gender & training 
Effects depend on model 
Altonji & Spletzer 
(1991) 
Participation in training 
(indicator for whether the 
individual received or 
participated in employer-
provided training bene-
fits or training pro-
grammes on the current 
or last job). 
Another model tests the 
quantity, measured in 
hours, of the training 
received (dependent 
variable) 
Region, city size, race, job ex-
perience, job experienced 
squared, year and year squared, 
vocational education, occupa-
tion, education. 
The NLSHS72 is a Department of 
Education survey of 22,652 peo-
ple who were high school seniors 
during the 1971-72 academic 
year. 12,841 individuals were re-
surveyed in 1986. The sample was 
restricted, first, to the 16,683 
individuals from the schools that 
participated in the base year sur-
vey; then, further, to 15,680 per-
sons for whom high school test 
information was available; then to 
the 12,980 individuals who were 
surveyed in each of the 1973, 
1974, 1976 and 1979 follow-ups. 
Information from the 1986 fol-
low-up was then added, and only 
those 7,358 persons who were in 
the earlier 12,980 sample were 
included. 
They find that the intensity of training and the 
duration of training were negatively related; the 
incidence of training was slightly higher among 
women than among men, but the amount of 
training was higher among men. The results for 
the composite measure D86SUM indicate that 
women receive about 90 hours less training than 
men, which is 58% of the sample mean of 
D86SUM. A slightly smaller gender difference 
with regard to the incidence is obtained when 
controls for aptitude and high school curriculum 
are added, and controlling for occupation fur-
ther reduces the gender difference. 
Bassanini et al. (2007) Probability of training 
(different models: overall 
training, employer fi-
nanced training, employ-
ee financed training; 
separate models for 
overall training by coun-
try; models with national 
institutions) 
Upper secondary education, less 
than upper secondary education, 
tenure (+ squared), married, 
age-group, public sector, part-
time, fixed-term contract, casual 
job, other type of contract, 
country, firm size, occupation, 
industry, and country by year 
effects 
European Community Household 
Panel, waves 1995 to 2001 
Women have a greater probability of taking 
training than men, although the differences 
associated with gender are small (0.6 percentage 
points). However, when focusing on employer-
sponsored training only, the advantage of wom-
en disappears. Women are ready to pay for their 
own training more often than men, but firms are 
not ready to train them more often. Women 
have higher training demands. However, young 
women at ages when career interruptions are 
more frequent get training comparatively less 
frequently than men. This is essentially due to 
employer-sponsored training: on average, the 
probability of receiving employer-sponsored 
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Effects depend on model 
training is 1.5 percentage points smaller for 
young women than for their male peers. Gender 
effects vary across countries: In Anglo-Saxon 
countries, women take training more frequently 
than men; in Greece, the opposite is true. 
Boeren (2004) Participation in adult 
learning by gender 
 The Flemish Eurostat Adult Edu-
cation Survey (Contract number 
AES/2009/02) conducted in 2007 
is used.   
In the analysis, men and women have on aver-
age equal participation, but the participation 
differs by type of learning activity. Men’s par-
ticipation is clearly stronger in non-formal job-
related settings. More precise, it is demonstrated 
that men and women have comparable partici-
pation rates in ‘adult education and training’, 
but that significant differences appear at the 
level of the learning type, referring to formal, 
non-formal and informal adult learning. 
Büchel & Pannenberg 
(2004) 
Probability of participat-
ing in courses or semi-
nars (separate models for 
overall training, training 
during working hours 
and employer financed 
training) and total vol-
ume of training hours 
Age 45–64, vocational educa-
tion, tertiary education, foreign-
er, women with children, part-
time employed, white collar-
worker, self-employed, public 
sector, large firm (>200 em-
ployees), commuter, has a car 
“Sozio-oekonomisches Panel 
(SOEP)“, year 2000 
 
No significant gender effects when looking at 
overall training, but significantly lower rates of 
training of women when it comes to training 
participation during working hours and partici-
pation in employer financed training. 
Holtmann & Idson 
(1991) 
Training participation by 
gender 
Education, marital status, union 
membership 
1972-1973 Quality of Employ-
ment Survey. The requirements 
for respondents eligibility were 
that they be at least 16 years old 
and work for pay at least twenty 
hours per week. The sample con-
sists of 760 males and 407 fe-
males 
Being female has in general a negative effect on 
training. Though, this effect is attenuated in 
larger companies. Females receive significantly 
more training than males in the 10-49 size cate-
gory. The general differential is the opposite 
sign, or insignificant in the other categories, and 
tends to diminish with increase in size. 
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No significant gender effect  
Draca & Green (2004) Incidence and intensity 
of employer funded 
training 
Personal and job characteristics Survey of Employment and Train-
ing Experience (SETE) conducted 
by the Australian Bureau of Sta-
tistics (ABS) from 1997 
Non-unionised women are 6% less likely to 
gain training than women who are in a union. 
Flexible work appears to have similar effects on 
hours in training and number of courses attend-
ed. Men in flexible working arrangements re-
ceive 1.5 to 4 hours less training than women in 
similar arrangements 
Green & Zanchi (1997) Training participation Age, age-squared, occupation 
dummies, region dummies, job 
tenure dummies, highest quali-
fication dummies; 0/1dummies 
for part-time, married, whether 
more than 25 employees at 
establishment, and whether in 
manufacturing industry. 
Labour force survey (Britain), 
spring quarter 1992, 63,000 
households in the UK 
Women have been catching up with men in 
terms of four-week training participation and in 
terms of off-the-job training experienced on 
average every week. Mode of interview (direct 
or indirect) has a notable effect on the gender 
differences in training participation. Part-time 
work of women effects access to training. 
Veum (1996) Training received  NLSY Data (National Longitudi-
nal Survey of Youth), 1986-1991 
No gender or race differentials in the likelihood 
of received training, in participation of multiple 
training events or in hours of training received. 
White women were more likely to receive more 
training per hour worked than white men. 
Thangavelu et al. 
(2011) 
  
Probability of participat-
ing in training pro-
grammes 
Years in education (+  squared), 
age (+ squared), gender, citizen-
ship, race, marital status, family 
background (number of children 
in the household, family income 
etc.), job-related characteristics 
(own labour income, industry 
and occupation etc.) 
Labour Force Survey for Singa-
pore 
The results indicate that gender does not have 
any significant effect on training participation. 
However, the coefficient on female dummy is 
positive, suggesting women might be slightly 
more likely to participate in training pro-
grammes. 
Warr & Birdi (1998) Participation in voluntary 
development activities 
 Questionnaire of 1798 manufac-
turing workers (vehicle manufac-
turing organisation in the UK), 
95% of the respondents were men 
Gender is unrelated to development activity. 
Brunello (2004) Probability of participat-
ing in education or train-
Tertiary education, upper sec-
ondary education, age, experi-
European Community Household 
Panel, waves 1994 and 1996 (lim-
The results indicate that gender does not have 
any significant effect on training participation. 
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No significant gender effect  
ing  ence, marital status, days of 
absence from work, health con-
ditions, average hours worked 
per week, sector of employment 
(private vs. public), and previ-
ous unemployment  
ited to individuals between 16 and 
60)  
However, the coefficient on male dummy is 
negative, suggesting women might be slightly 
more likely to participate in training pro-
grammes. 
Arulampalam et al. 
(2004) 
“Have you at any time 
since January (in the 
previous year) been in 
vocational education or 
training, including any 
part-time or short cours-
es?” 
Industry, occupation, firm-size The first six waves of the Europe-
an Community Household Panel 
(ECHP), a survey collected annu-
ally since 1994, men and women 
who are: between the ages of 25 
and 54 years and working at least 
15 hours per week; observed in at 
least two consecutive waves; not 
employed in agriculture; and with 
valid observations on all the vari-
ables used in the training equa-
tions 
In most countries training participation rates for 
women and men are quite similar and the differ-
ences are only statistically significant in four 
countries—Denmark, Finland, Italy and 
Spain—where women are more likely than men 
to begin a training course. 
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Table 19: Variables used 
Variable Explanation  Source 
Individual   
Work-related 
training 
guided on-the-job training, training that is defined to be work-related by 
the individual or training that was taken due to improve skills for the cur-
rent or future occupations, to increase job security or because the individu-
al was obliged to participate 
AES 
Female dummy for females AES 
No degree dummy for education according to ISCED97 levels 0-4 AES 
Female x no 
degree 
interaction term referring to females with education according to ISCED 
levels 0-4 
AES 
Age (year of birth – year of survey) - 25 AES 
Age² ((year of birth – year of survey) – 25)² AES 
Tenure year individual started working with the employer – year of survey AES 
Part-time "The distinction between full-time and part-time work should be made on 
the basis of a spontaneous answer given by the respondent. It is impossible 
to establish a more exact distinction between part-time and full-time work, 
due to variations in working hours between Member States and also be-
tween branches of industry." (Eurostat, 2007: 54) 
AES 
Occupation dummy variables for occupations considered as ISCO-88, coded at 2 digit 
level: 0) Armed Forces, 1) Legislators, senior officials managers, 2) Pro-
fessionals, 3) Technicians and associate professionals 4) Clerks, 5) Service 
workers & shop & market sales workers", 6) Skilled agricultural and fish-
ery workers, 7) Craft and related trades workers, 8) Plant and machine 
operators and assemblers, 9) Elementary occupations. 
AES 
Industry dummy variables for NACE classes of the local unit coded at 2 digit: A) 
Agriculture, hunting and forestry, B) Fishing, C) Mining and quarrying, D) 
Manufacturing, E) Electricity, gas water supply, F) Construction, G) 
Wholesale & retail trade; repair of motor vehicles & household goods, H) 
Hotels and restaurants, I) Transport, storage & communication, J) Finan-
cial intermediation, K) Real estate, renting & business activities, L) Public 
administration and defence, M) Education, N) Health and social work, O) 
Other community, social and personal service activities, P) Activities of 
households, Q) Extra territorial organizations and bodies. 
AES 
Size of local 
unit 
dummy variables for local units of 10 employees or less, 11-49 employees, 
and 50 employees or more 
AES 
Year dummy variables for years 2005 – 2008  AES 
Degree of 
urbanization  
dummy variables for densely-populated area, intermediate area and thinly-
populated area 
AES 
Interview 
method 
dummy variables for postal (paper and pencil), face-to-face (paper and 
pencil), face-to-face (electronic version), telephone (paper and pencil), 
telephone (electronic version), through the Internet, mixed mode of data 
collection (e.g. interview and postal) 
AES 
Institutional   
Mean tenure  average years employees have been working for the same employer in that 
country 
own calculation 
based on the AES 
Union densi-
ty 
net union membership as a proportion wage and salary earners in employ-
ment 
Visser (2011) 
Bargaining 
coverage 
number of employees covered by collective bargaining agreements as a 
percentage of all wage and salary earners; no data available for Romania 
Visser (2011) 
Female union 
membership 
percentage of females among union members; for Greece and Cyprus, no 
data is available; for Denmark, France, Hungary, Lithuania, Portugal and 
Romania data for one union is always missing 
European Trade 
Union Institute 
(2012) 
University defined as the ratio of graduates from tertiary education (tertiary graduates 
(ISCED97 5-6) per 1000 inhabitants aged 20-29 
Eurostat (2011d) 
Vocational  ratio of students in the vocational programmes (technical/vocational en-
rolment in ISCED97 2 and 3 as % of total enrolment in ISCED97 2 and 3) 
UNESCO (n.d.) 
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Variable Explanation  Source 
Childcare < 3 share of children below the age of three in childcare for 30 or more hours a 
week 
Eurosstat (2011c) 
Childcare ≥ 3 share of children from the age of three to compulsory school age in child-
care for 30 or more hours a week 
Eurostat (2011b) 
Maternity 
leave 
paid maternity leave for a single child in weeks European Com-
mission (2012) 
Child bene-
fits 
maximum amount paid per child in 100€ European Com-
mission (2012) 
Gender em-
ployment 
equality 
employment gap in percentage of the working men, multiplied by -1 
 
Eurostat (2011a) 
Gender de-
gree equality 
tertiary degree, age group 30-34, gap expressed in percentage of men with 
a tertiary degree in the same age group, multiplied by -1 
Eurostat (2013) 
Gender pay 
equality 
hourly pay of men minus hourly pay of women, net of intervening factors, 
in percentage of men’s pay, multiplied by -1 
Eurostat (2012) 
 
 
Table 20: Sample size by country and gender 
Country 
Probability of training participation & sample size 
Males Females Degree No degree All 
AT 1,410 1,203 573 2,040 2,613 
BE 1,215 1,264 1,218 1,261 2,479 
BG 1,535 1,495 818 2,212 3,030 
CY 1,234 1,415 1,001 1,648 2,649 
CZ 2,710 2,598 856 4,452 5,308 
DE 1,584 1,811 936 2,459 3,395 
DK 874 979 730 1,123 1,853 
EE 832 1,716 970 1,578 2,548 
ES 4,826 3,995 3,361 5,460 8,821 
FI 1,221 1,225 1,063 1,383 2,446 
FR 4,539 4,838 2,796 6,581 9,377 
GR 1,574 1,135 768 1,941 2,709 
HU 2,094 2,012 830 3,276 4,106 
LT 926 1,299 815 1,410 2,225 
LV 714 672 358 1,028 1,386 
NO 1,155 1,054 915 1,294 2,209 
PL 6,049 5,426 2,939 8,536 11,475 
PT 2,557 2,506 766 4,297 5,063 
RO 3,480 2,923 1,346 5,057 6,403 
SE 1,228 1,249 895 1,582 2,477 
SK 1,501 1,605 783 2,323 3,106 
UK 978 1,187 888 1,277 2,165 
Total 44,236 43,607 25,625 62,218 87,843 
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Table 21: Descriptive statistics of individual-level variables (87,843 observations) 
 
Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
Individual & job     
Work-related training 0.366 0.482 0 1 
Female 0.496 0.500 0 1 
No degree 0.708 0.455 0 1 
Age 42.051 10.009 25 64 
Tenure 10.978 10.057 0 50 
Part-time  0.098 0.297 0 1 
Occupation     
Armed Forces 0.007 0.083 0 1 
Legislators, senior officials managers 0.058 0.233 0 1 
Professionals 0.157 0.364 0 1 
Technicians and assoc. professionals 0.163 0.369 0 1 
Clerks 0.112 0.315 0 1 
Service, shop & market sales workers 0.125 0.331 0 1 
Skilled agricultural and fishery worker 0.011 0.104 0 1 
Craft and related trades workers 0.157 0.364 0 1 
Plant and machine operators  0.104 0.305 0 1 
Elementary occupations 0.107 0.309 0 1 
Industry     
Agriculture, hunting and forestry 0.025 0.156 0 1 
Manufacturing 0.222 0.416 0 1 
Electricity, gas water supply 0.017 0.128 0 1 
Construction 0.078 0.268 0 1 
Wholesale & retail trade; repair  0.121 0.326 0 1 
Hotels and restaurants 0.033 0.180 0 1 
Transport, storage & communication 0.066 0.249 0 1 
Financial intermediation 0.028 0.166 0 1 
Real estate, renting & business activity 0.061 0.239 0 1 
Public administration and defence 0.094 0.292 0 1 
Education 0.099 0.299 0 1 
Health and social work 0.102 0.303 0 1 
Other community, social and personal  0.041 0.199 0 1 
Activities of households 0.011 0.103 0 1 
Extra territorial organizations 0.001 0.029 0 1 
Size of local unit     
≤10 employees 0.220 0.414 0 1 
11-49 employees 0.346 0.476 0 1 
≥50 employees 0.434 0.496 0 1 
Year     
2005 0.071 0.258 0 1 
2006 0.380 0.485 0 1 
2007 0.367 0.482 0 1 
2008 0.182 0.386 0 1 
Degree of urbanization     
Densely-populated area 0.451 0.498 0 1 
Intermediate area 0.206 0.405 0 1 
Thinly-populated area 0.343 0.475 0 1 
Interview method     
Postal 0.021 0.145 0 1 
Face-to-face (paper & pencil) 0.583 0.493 0 1 
Face-to-face (electronic version) 0.338 0.473 0 1 
Telephone (electronic version) 0.043 0.202 0 1 
Through the internet 0.015 0.122 0 1 
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Table 22: Descriptive statistics of institutional-level variables 
Institution Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
Mean tenure  22 10.808 2.504 7.500 19.029 
Union density  22 31.614 21.652 7.300 74.100 
Bargaining coverage  21 59.643 29.377 12.000 99.000 
Female union membership  20 46.155 8.718 30.800 62.000 
University  22 56.460 17.599 30.600 89.500 
Vocational  22 23.926 9.983 6.651 40.757 
Childcare <3  22 15.091 14.622 1.000 66.000 
Childcare ≥3  22 46.068 19.265 16.000 80.000 
Maternity leave  22 23.214 13.232 14.000 68.570 
Child benefit  22 1.310 1.481 0.140 7.175 
Employment equality  22 16.930 7.520 6.290 36.240 
Degree equality  22 -28.433 26.663 -84.270 10.290 
Pay equality  22 17.768 6.265 7.500 29.800 
 
 
Table 23: Industry by gender 
Industry Males Females Total 
Agriculture, hunting and forestry 1,495 687 2,182 
Manufacturing 12,116 7,394 19,510 
Electricity, gas water supply 1,151 304 1,455 
Construction 6,224 641 6,865 
Wholesale & retail trade; repair  4,519 6,084 10,603 
Hotels and restaurants 1,000 1,941 2,941 
Transport, storage & communication 4,114 1,697 5,811 
Financial intermediation 1,046 1,457 2,503 
Real estate, renting & business activity 2,717 2,648 5,365 
Public administration and defence 4,350 3,932 8,282 
Education 2,233 6,463 8,696 
Health and social work 1,540 7,426 8,966 
Other community, social and personal  1,621 2,021 3,642 
Activities of households 65 884 949 
Extra territorial organizations 45 28 73 
Total 44,236 43,607 87,843 
 
 
Table 24: Occupation by gender 
Occupation Males Females Total 
Armed Forces 551 62 613 
Legislators, senior officials managers 3,020 2,046 5,066 
Professionals 5,658 8,113 13,771 
Technicians and assoc. professionals 5,916 8,385 14,301 
Clerks 2,695 7,141 9,836 
Service, shop & market sales workers 3,303 7,701 11,004 
Skilled agricultural and fishery worker 666 297 963 
Craft and related trades workers 11,466 2,322 13,788 
Plant and machine operators  7,190 1,950 9,140 
Elementary occupations 3,771 5,590 9,361 
Total 44,236 43,607 87,843 
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Table 25: Size of local unit by gender 
Size of local unit Males Females Total 
Size ≤10 employees 8,678 10,651 19,329 
Size 11-49 employees 15,456 14,972 30,428 
Size ≥50 employees 20,102 17,984 38,086 
Total 44,236 43,607 87,843 
 
  
 
Table 26: Training participation at country-level and institutional variables  
Country 
Variables 
Training 
Mean 
tenure 
Union 
density 
Bar. cov. 
F. union 
mem. 
Uni-
versity 
Voc-
ational 
Child-
care <3 
Child-
care ≥3 
Mat. 
leave 
Child 
benefits 
Employ. 
equ 
Degree 
equality 
Pay 
equality 
AT 0.44 11.61 31.00 99.00 33.30 33.40 38.66 1.00 16.00 16.00 1.53 -17.00 -5.05 -25.50 
BE 0.42 12.70 54.10 96.00 42.20 62.50 40.76 23.00 62.00 15.00 2.13 -20.54 26.23 -9.50 
BG 0.54 8.76 21.20 25.00 47.20 40.80 29.91 16.00 53.00 45.00 0.51 -13.59 84.27 -12.40 
CY 0.39 11.29 58.90 75.00 n.d.a. 30.60 6.65 18.00 38.00 16.00 1.90 -23.55 3.08 -21.80 
CZ 0.45 10.76 18.70 44.00 45.00 44.40 39.42 1.00 39.00 28.00 0.87 -23.13 -9.49 -23.40 
DE 0.52 10.62 20.70 63.00 30.80 37.00 21.88 7.00 26.00 14.00 1.79 -15.80 -10.29 -22.70 
DK 0.46 8.29 69.40 82.00 48.90 76.10 26.80 66.00 80.00 18.00 1.52 -10.74 22.48 -17.60 
EE 0.46 7.50 7.30 22.00 55.10 58.00 15.73 12.00 78.00 20.00 0.19 -8.81 44.91 -29.80 
ES 0.32 10.50 15.00 80.00 34.30 43.40 15.60 19.00 44.00 16.00 0.24 -30.11 28.36 -17.90 
FI 0.53 11.12 71.70 90.00 53.70 60.20 28.80 21.00 56.00 15.00 1.72 -6.29 49.06 -21.30 
FR 0.40 12.53 7.70 95.00 39.50 80.30 19.43 17.00 42.00 16.00 7.17 -14.82 25.28 -15.40 
GR 0.17 13.06 24.70 85.00 n.d.a. 40.80 17.74 8.00 20.00 17.00 0.67 -36.24 12.75 -20.70 
HU 0.13 9.61 17.00 35.00 42.80 46.70 13.64 6.00 51.00 24.00 0.91 -20.31 50.00 -14.40 
LT 0.42 8.14 10.50 12.00 61.30 89.50 9.26 4.00 47.00 18.00 0.40 -9.18 23.58 -17.10 
LV 0.36 8.24 17.60 20.00 62.00 78.20 14.86 14.00 56.00 16.00 0.16 -11.64 71.13 -15.10 
NO 0.59 9.45 54.90 72.00 56.10 59.60 32.60 25.00 57.50 43.00 1.62 -9.01 31.77 -16.00 
PL 0.27 11.24 16.80 35.00 40.80 78.50 23.50 3.00 21.00 16.00 0.17 -21.10 42.16 -7.50 
PT 0.28 13.57 20.80 62.00 48.00 47.50 16.72 32.00 66.00 17.14 1.27 -16.29 77.44 -8.40 
RO 0.08 19.03 34.40 n.d.a. 45.80 51.50 33.91 3.00 16.00 18.00 0.59 -17.84 11.97 -7.80 
SE 0.69 11.24 74.10 92.00 52.10 56.70 27.98 27.00 58.00 68.57 2.24 -7.22 30.90 -16.50 
SK 0.54 9.40 20.60 35.00 40.60 43.70 34.30 4.00 63.00 28.00 0.14 -22.92 12.50 -25.80 
UK 0.43 9.12 28.40 33.50 43.60 82.70 18.22 5.00 24.00 26.00 1.07 -16.34 2.49 -24.30 
n.d.a. = no data available; for variable definitions see Table 19. 
  
 
 Table 27: Pairwise correlation between institutions and training 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 Training 1.000             
2 Mean tenure  -0.516* 1.000            
3 Union density  0.402* 0.114 1.000           
4 Bargaining cov.  0.139 0.682* 0.586* 1.000          
5 F. union mem.  0.164 -0.316 0.209 -0.382 1.000         
6 University  0.042 -0.265 -0.047 -0.268 0.512* 1.000        
7 Vocational  0.309 0.279 0.315 0.332 -0.263 -0.190 1.000       
8 Childcare <3  0.266 -0.149 0.592* 0.407* 0.234 0.182 -0.004 1.000      
9 Childcare ≥3  0.410* -0.488* 0.241 -0.103 0.515* 0.185 -0.030 0.656* 1.000     
10 Maternity leave  0.563* -0.174 0.333 -0.020 0.255 -0.075 0.261 0.124 0.228 1.000    
11 Child benefit  0.187 0.222 0.139 0.574* -0.216 0.179 0.031 0.223 -0.008 -0.002 1.000   
12 Employment equ.  0.551* -0.325 0.310 -0.138 0.703* 0.461* 0.064 0.322 0.466* 0.328 0.175 1.000  
13 Degree equality  -0.055 -0.197 -0.095 -0.309 0.490* 0.197 -0.223 0.284 0.518* 0.164 -0.146 0.334 1.000 
14 Pay equality  -0.403* 0.466* 0.054 0.044 0.087 0.244 0.056 0.206 -0.026 0.031 0.076 0.006 0.496* 
* p<0.1
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Table 28: Model development for all employees – labour market 
 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
FIXED PART         
Female 0.954 0.954 0.955 0.954 0.957 0.957 0.959 0.962 
No degree 0.706*** 0.706*** 0.706*** 0.706*** 0.705*** 0.705*** 0.700*** 0.700*** 
Level-1 controls          
Mean tenure 0.840*** 0.847***       
Mean ten. x. F  0.996       
Union density   1.007 1.011     
Union dens. x f.     0.998     
Bargaining cov.     0.998 1.001   
Bar. cov. x f.       0.999   
F. union mem.       1.027* 1.005 
F. u. mem. x f.         1.009* 
Constant 0.829 0.829 0.925 0.926 0.916 0.916 0.935 0.952 
RANDOM PART        
SD slope  0.198*** 0.198*** 0.197*** 0.194*** 0.203*** 0.200*** 0.203*** 0.190*** 
SD intercept 0.623*** 0.623*** 0.722*** 0.718*** 0.645*** 0.642*** 0.770*** 0.746*** 
Corr. slope-int. -0.706*** -0.706*** -0.594*** -0.588*** -0.613*** -0.608*** -0.733*** -0.709*** 
MODEL STATISTICS        
Log likelihood -48890.7 -48890.7 -48896.6 -48896.2 -47249.9 -47249.6 -46191.9 -46190.5 
Parameters 45 46 45 46 45 46 45 46 
LR test  *** n.s. *** n.s. - n.s. - * 
Individuals  87,843 87,843 87,843 87,843 81,440 81,440 82,485 82,485 
Countries 22 22 22 22 21 21 20 20 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; reference model for the LR test for models with a simple institution: Model 4, 
reference model for models with an institution and its cross-level interaction: previous model with simple institution. 
 
 
Table 29: Model development for all employees – educational system 
 13 14 15 16 
FIXED PART     
Female 0.954 0.954 0.955 0.954 
No degree 0.706*** 0.706*** 0.706*** 0.706*** 
Level-1 controls     
University 1.007 0.998   
University x f.  1.004*   
Vocational   1.025 1.042*** 
Vocational x f.    0.989*** 
Constant 0.870 0.866 0.859 0.859 
RANDOM PART 
SD slope  0.197*** 0.183*** 0.197*** 0.166*** 
SD intercept 0.765*** 0.745*** 0.656*** 0.635*** 
Corr. slope-int. -0.655*** -0.620*** -0.519*** -0.466*** 
MODEL STATISTICS 
Log likelihood -48896.7 -48895.3 -48896 -48892.9 
Parameters 45 46 45 46 
LR test  *** ** *** *** 
Individuals 87,843 87,843 87,843 87,843 
Countries 22 22 22 22 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; reference model for models with 
a simple institution: Model 4, reference model for models with an 
institution and its cross-level interaction: previous model with 
simple institution. 
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Table 30: Model development for all employees – support for women, part 1 
 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
FIXED PART         
Female 0.954 0.954 0.954 0.954 0.955 0.954 0.954 0.954 
No degree 0.706*** 0.706*** 0.706*** 0.706*** 0.706*** 0.706*** 0.706*** 0.706*** 
Level-1 controls         
Childcare <3 1.007 1.012       
Childc. <3 x f.  0.998       
Childcare ≥3   1.012* 1.016*     
Childc. ≥3 x f.    0.998     
Maternity leave     1.023** 1.031***   
Mat. leave x f.      0.995   
Child benefits       0.921 0.977 
Child ben. x f.        0.975 
Constant 0.907 0.907 0.936 0.937 0.855 0.855 0.802 0.803 
RANDOM PART        
SD slope  0.197*** 0.195*** 0.198*** 0.194*** 0.198*** 0.188*** 0.196*** 0.193*** 
SD intercept 0.734*** 0.732*** 0.698*** 0.694*** 0.641*** 0.634*** 0.752*** 0.747*** 
Corr. slope-int. -0.597*** -0.596*** -0.590*** -0.589*** -0.528*** -0.514*** -0.631*** -0.627*** 
MODEL STATISTICS        
Log likelihood -48896.9 -48896.7 -48895.8 -48895.5 -48894.6 -48893.7 -48896.8 -48896.5 
Parameters 45 46 45 46 45 46 45 46 
LR test  ** n.s. *** n.s. *** * ** n.s. 
Individuals  87,843 87,843 87,843 87,843 87,843 87,843 87,843 87,843 
Countries 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; reference model for the LR test for models with a simple institution: Model 4, 
reference model for models with institution and its cross-level interaction: previous model with simple institution. 
 
 
Table 31: Model development for all employees – support for women, part 2 
 25 26 27 28 29 30 
FIXED PART       
Female 0.953 0.954 0.954 0.954 0.955 0.954 
No degree 0.705*** 0.705*** 0.706*** 0.706*** 0.706*** 0.706*** 
Level-1 controls       
Employ. equ. 1.057*** 1.041*     
Employ. e. x f.  1.006     
Degree equality   1.002 0.998   
Degree e. x f.    1.002   
Pay equality     0.971 0.963 
Pay e. x f.      1.005 
Constant 1.034 1.033 0.845 0.844 0.854 0.854 
RANDOM PART 
SD slope  0.196*** 0.191*** 0.197*** 0.191*** 0.198*** 0.195*** 
SD intercept 0.728*** 0.718*** 0.750*** 0.743*** 0.709*** 0.707*** 
Corr. slope-int. -0.772*** -0.762*** -0.609*** -0.594*** -0.581*** -0.577*** 
MODEL STATISTICS 
Log likelihood -48892.8 -48892.2 -48897.1 -48896.4 -48896.2 -48896 
Parameters 45 46 45 46 45 46 
LR test  *** n.s. ** n.s. *** n.s. 
Individuals  87,843 87,843 87,843 87,843 87,843 87,843 
Countries 22 22 22 22 22 22 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; reference model for the LR test for models with a sim-
ple institution: Model 4, reference model for models with an institution and its cross-
level interaction: previous model with simple institution. 
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Table 32: Model development for employees with degree – labour market 
 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
FIXED PART         
Female 1.082* 1.084** 1.086* 1.079* 1.098** 1.097*** 1.096* 1.101** 
Level-1 controls         
Mean tenure 0.863*** 0.874***       
Mean ten. x f.  0.963**       
Union density   1.008 1.009     
Union dens. x f.     0.996**     
Bargaining cov.     1.001 1.  003   
Bar. cov. x f.       0.996***   
F. union mem.       1.011 1.009 
F. u. mem. x f.         1.006 
Constant 0.543*** 0.543*** 0.611** 0.615** 0.626** 0.627** 0.603** 0.600** 
RANDOM PART        
SD slope  0.126*** 0.091** 0.140*** 0.127*** 0.139*** 0.050* 0.145*** 0.140*** 
SD intercept 0.533*** 0.532*** 0.608*** 0.610*** 0.523*** 0.523*** 0.612*** 0.611*** 
MODEL STATISTICS        
Log likelihood -16111.7 -16109 -16114.8 -16112.5 -15521.9 -15507.1 -15004.6 -15004.1 
Parameters 43 44 43 44 43 44 43 44 
LR test  *** ** n.s. ** - *** - n.s. 
Individuals  25,625 25,625 25,625 25,625 24,279 24,279 23,856 23,856 
Countries 22 22 22 22 21 21 20 20 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; reference model for the LR test for models with a simple institution: Model 
3, reference model for models with an institution and its cross-level interaction: previous model with simple 
institution. 
 
Table 33: Model development for employees with degree – educational system 
 13 14 15 16 
FIXED PART     
Female 1.085* 1.084* 1.087* 1.086* 
Level-1 controls     
University 1.003 1.003   
University x f.  1.002   
Vocational   1.029** 1.030** 
Vocational x f.    0.996 
Constant 0.555*** 0.555*** 0.583** 0.582** 
RANDOM PART 
SD slope  0.136*** 0.136*** 0.141*** 0.140*** 
SD intercept 0.625*** 0.624*** 0.563*** 0.563*** 
MODEL STATISTICS 
Log likelihood -16115.2 -16114.9 -16113.6 -16113.2 
Parameters 43 44 43 44 
LR test  n.s. n.s. ** n.s. 
Individuals 25,625 25,625 25,625 25,625 
Countries 22 22 22 22 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; reference model for the LR 
test for models with a simple institution: Model 3, reference 
model for models with an institution and its cross-level interac-
tion: previous model with simple institution. 
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Table 34: Model development for employees with degree – support for women, part 1 
 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
FIXED PART         
Female 1.086* 1.077* 1.084* 1.082* 1.085* 1.084* 1.086* 1.086* 
Level-1 controls         
Childcare <3 1.010 1.012       
Childc. <3 x f.  0.933***       
Childcare ≥3   1.012 1.013     
Childc. ≥3 x f.    0.999     
Maternity leave     1.020** 1.021**   
Mat. leave x f.      0.998   
Child benefits       1.015 1.023 
Child ben. x f.        0.953*** 
Constant 0.611* 0.617* 0.622** 0.624** 0.564*** 0.564*** 0.557** 0.558** 
RANDOM PART        
SD slope  0.139*** 0.098*** 0.135*** 0.133*** 0.139*** 0.140*** 0.137*** 0.076* 
SD intercept 0.614*** 0.617*** 0.591*** 0.591*** 0.577*** 0.577*** 0.626*** 0.629*** 
MODEL STATISTICS        
log likelihood -16115 -16111.6 -16114.1 -16113.9 -16113.4 -16113.3 -16115.3 -16112.4 
Parameters 43 44 43 44 43 44 43 44 
LR test  n.s. *** * n.s. ** n.s. n.s. *** 
Individuals  25,625 25,625 25,625 25,625 25,625 25,625 25,625 25,625 
Countries 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; reference model for the LR test for models with a simple institution: Model 
3, reference model for models with an institution and its cross-level interaction: previous model with simple 
institution. 
 
Table 35: Model development for employees with degree – support for women, part 2 
 25 26 27 28 29 30 
FIXED PART       
Female 1.083* 1.083* 1.085* 1.085* 1.085* 1.088* 
Level-1 controls       
Employ. equ. 1.042** 1.041**     
Employ. e. x f.  1.000     
Degree equality   1.000 1.000   
Degree e. x f.    1.000   
Pay equality     0.977 0.979 
Pay e. x f.      0.994 
Constant 0.628** 0.628** 0.552*** 0.552*** 0.557*** 0.557*** 
RANDOM PART 
SD slope  0.132*** 0.132*** 0.137*** 0.136*** 0.135*** 0.131*** 
SD intercept 0.571*** 0.571*** 0.626*** 0.626*** 0.613*** 0.614*** 
MODEL STATISTICS 
Log likelihood -16113.2 -16113.2 -16115.3 -16115.3 -16114.8 -16114.4 
Parameters 43 44 43 44 43 44 
LR test  ** n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Individuals  25,625 25,625 25,625 25,625 25,625 25,625 
Countries 22 22 22 22 22 22 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; reference model for the LR test for models with a sim-
ple institution: Model 3, reference model for models with an institution and its cross-
level interaction: previous model with simple institution. 
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Table 36: Model development for employees with no degree – labour market 
 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
FIXED PART         
Female 0.886** 0.886** 0.887** 0.887** 0.884** 0.884** 0.890** 0.894** 
Level-1 controls         
Mean tenure 0.852*** 0.839***       
Mean ten. x f.  1.009       
Union density   1.013* 1.013     
Union dens. x f.     1.000     
Bargaining cov.     1.000 1.000   
Bar. cov. x f.      1.000   
F. union mem.       1.027* 1.002 
F. u. mem. x f.        1.010 
Constant 0.693* 0.693* 0.851 0.851 0.780 0.780 0.797 0.797 
RANDOM PART        
SD slope  0.206*** 0.205*** 0.203*** 0.203*** 0.209*** 0.208*** 0.209*** 0.196*** 
SD intercept 0.657*** 0.656*** 0.770*** 0.770*** 0.695*** 0.694*** 0.830*** 0.805*** 
Corr. slope-int. -0.681*** -0.679*** -0.738*** -0.738*** -0.620*** -0.620*** -0.784*** -0.765*** 
MODEL STATISTICS        
Log likelihood -32594.4 -32594.3 -32597.3 -32597.3 -31554.4 -31554.4 -30999.3 -30998 
Parameters 44 45 44 45 44 45 44 45 
LR test  *** n.s. *** n.s. - n.s. - * 
Individuals  62,218 62,218 62,218 62,218 57,161 57,161 58,629 58,629 
Countries 22 22 22 22 21 21 20 20 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; reference model for the LR test for models with a simple institution: model 
4, reference model for models with an institution and its cross-level interaction: previous model with simple 
institution. 
 
Table 37: Model development for employees with no degree – educational system 
 13 14 15 16 
FIXED PART     
Female 0.885** 0.886** 0.885** 0.884** 
Level-1 controls     
University 1.002 0.996   
University x f.  1.003   
Vocational   1.034** 1.052*** 
Vocational x f.    0.990** 
Constant 0.726 0.725 0.750 0.751 
RANDOM PART 
SD slope  0.205*** 0.200*** 0.205*** 0.179*** 
SD intercept 0.801*** 0.792*** 0.680*** 0.655*** 
Corr. slope-int. -0.688*** -0.670*** -0.646*** -0.601*** 
MODEL STATISTICS 
Log likelihood -32598.9 -32598.4 -32596.7 -32594.4 
Parameters 44 45 44 45 
LR test  *** n.s. *** ** 
Individuals 62,218 62,218 62,218 62,218 
Countries 22 22 22 22 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; reference model for the LR 
test for models with a simple institution: model 4, reference 
model for models with an institution and its cross-level interac-
tion: previous model with simple institution. 
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Table 38: Model development for employees with no degree – support for women, part 1 
 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
FIXED PART         
Female 0.885** 0.885** 0.886** 0.885** 0.886** 0.885** 0.885** 0.886** 
Level-1 controls         
Childcare <3 1.014 1.014       
Childc. <3 x f.  1.000       
Childcare ≥3   1.012 1.016*     
Childc. ≥3 x f.    0.998     
Maternity leave     1.027*** 1.033***   
Mat. leave x f.      0.997   
Child benefits       0.927 0.950 
Child ben. x f.        0.991 
Constant 0.829 0.829 0.796 0.797 0.733 0.733 0.684 0.685 
RANDOM PART        
SD slope  0.204*** 0.204*** 0.205*** 0.202*** 0.205*** 0.201*** 0.204*** 0.204*** 
SD intercept 0.786*** 0.786*** 0.747*** 0.744*** 0.676*** 0.671*** 0.798*** 0.798*** 
Corr. slope-int. -0.708*** -0.708*** -0.663*** -0.664*** -0.672*** -0.665*** -0.699*** -0.699*** 
MODEL STATISTICS        
log likelihood -32598.2 -32598.2 -32597.8 -32597.5 -32595.4 -32595 -32598.7 -32598.6 
Parameters 44 45 44 45 44 45 44 45 
LR test  *** n.s. *** n.s. *** n.s. *** n.s. 
Individuals  62,218 62,218 62,218 62,218 62,218 62,218 62,218 62,218 
Countries 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; reference model for the LR test for models with a simple institution: model 
4, reference model for models with an institution and its cross-level interaction: previous model with simple 
institution. 
 
Table 39: Model development for employees with no degree – support for women, part 2 
 25 26 27 28 29 30 
FIXED PART       
Female 0.882** 0.883*** 0.885** 0.884*** 0.886** 0.885** 
Level-1 controls       
Employ. equ. 1.065*** 1.037     
Employ. e. x f.  1.010     
Degree equality   1.003 0.997   
Degree e. x f.    1.003   
Pay equality     0.971 0.959 
Pay e. x f.      1.006 
Constant 0.889 0.891 0.717 0.717 0.726 0.725 
RANDOM PART 
SD slope  0.205*** 0.191*** 0.204*** 0.191*** 0.206*** 0.202*** 
SD intercept 0.801*** 0.777*** 0.807*** 0.788*** 0.751*** 0.746*** 
Corr. slope-int. -0.859*** -0.848*** -0.701*** -0.675*** -0.657*** -0.650*** 
RANDOM PART 
Log likelihood -32593.8 -32595.7 -32598.8 -32597.6 -32598.1 -32597.8 
Parameters 44 45 44 45 44 45 
LR test  *** * *** * *** n.s. 
Individuals  62,218 62,218 62,218 62,218 62,218 62,218 
Countries 22 22 22 22 22 22 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; reference model for the LR test for models with a sim-
ple institution: model 4, reference model for models with an institution and its cross-
level interaction: previous model with simple institution. 
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Table 40: Summary of the multilevel analyses without Romania (differences to estimations including 
Romania marked in red) 
 all degree no degree 
FIXED PART    
Female 0 + - 
Mean tenure - 0   - 
Mean ten. x f. 0 - 0 
Union density (+) + + 
Union dens. x f. 0 - 0 
Bargaining cov. 0 0 0 
Bar. cov. x f. 0 - 0 
F. union mem. 0 0 0 
F. u. mem. x f. + 0 + 
University 0 0 0 
University x f. + 0 0 
Vocational + + + 
Vocational x f. - 0 - 
Childcare <3 0 0 0 
Childc. <3 x f. 0 - 0 
Childcare ≥3 0 0 0 
Childc. ≥3 x f. 0 0 0 
Maternity leave + + + 
Mat. leave x f. 0 0 0 
Child benefits 0 0 0 
Child ben. x f. 0 - 0 
Employ. equ. + + + 
Employ. e. x f. 0 0 0 
Degree equality 0 0 0 
Degree e. x f. 0 0 + 
Pay equality 0 0 0 
Pay e. x f. 0 0 0 
RANDOM PART 
SD slope + + + 
SD intercept + + + 
Corr. slope-int. - 0 - 
0 = no significant relationship, + = positive relationship, - = neg-
ative relationship. 
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Table 41: Importance of vocational education in countries with opposing gender gaps among employ-
ees with no degree 
 
Vocational 
Countries with significant training disadvantage of 
lower educated women 
AT + 
BE + 
CY - 
CZ + 
FR - 
PL - 
SK + 
Countries with training advantage of lower educated 
women 
BG + 
DK + 
FI + 
HU - 
LV - 
+ = value of the institutional variable above the mean 
across all countries in the data set; - = value of the in-
stitutional variable below the mean across all countries 
in the data set; country codes: AT = Austria, BE = 
Belgium, BG = Bulgaria, CY = Cyprus, CZ = Czech 
Republic, DK = Denmark, FI = Finland, FR = France, 
HU = Hungary, PL = Poland, SK = Slovak Republic, 
LV = Latvia. Significance of women’s training disad-
vantage is estimated by running individual-level re-
gressions by country with integration-term for highly 
educated women (not displayed). 
 
 
